
Educating Democracy: conjunctures in the long revolution^[1]

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ABSTRACT Democratic comprehensive education has been the target of neo-liberal governments - Conservative and New Labour - for thirty years. The project of the present right wing regime Coalition is to complete the demolition. The question before the social democratic tradition is thus to ask whether Raymond Williams' historic 'long revolution' unfolding over a century and more, to create an educated democracy, is now halted or even lies in ruins. Only an analysis of this *longue durée* can enable understanding of how we are to remake the future. Drawing upon Brian Simon's extraordinary history I construct different formations of education governance since the mid nineteenth century. An emergent theory of transformation is then proposed such that reforms to education and democracy need to be understood together as responses to periods of structural change, conjunctures, that generate crises and lead to political settlements: these expand but regulate participation and opportunity in order to preserve as far as possible prevailing traditions of power. The reform of education lies at the centre of the regulation of democracy. .

Introduction

The project of the coalition is nothing less than the demolition of the post-war social democratic education prospectus of valuing the capabilities of each and providing comprehensive opportunities for all. This is being replaced by returning to a distant tradition of rationing limited opportunities through tacit as well as explicit social selection. The underlying assumptions of fixed human nature and of a society that is believed to work only when constituted as an arena of predatory competition serve to provide a rationale for the few to accumulate their advantage above the needs and well-being of the many who become socialised once more to know their place and limit their horizons. The complementary agenda of weakening the public spaces of democratic deliberation silences the many to object to the appropriation of power, wealth

and opportunity. The coalition's project thus lacks legitimacy as well as pedagogic integrity.

The basic question before the social democratic tradition is thus to ask whether Raymond Williams' [2] long revolution that was driven in pursuit of opportunity, voice and justice for all, is now halted or in ruins. He develops a distinctive cultural analysis of the fundamental transformation he means by 'long revolution'. [3] For him there is not a series of separate, successive struggles towards democratic citizenship; there is the same struggle which unifies the whole period from the Industrial Revolution to the present: to overcome the order of cultural domination that is experienced in the daily lives of ordinary people, subordinating them as inferior members of the polity. Society is in the grip of an elite culture which is assured that only some have the qualities to rule society, while for Williams the educating of democracy lies in 'the people as a whole participating in the articulation of meanings and values' to shape their communities. [4] Yet, this struggle to achieve an educated democracy has been permanently resisted at every stage by those who believe in the natural right of a cultural elite to rule denying recognition to 'the mass' they denigrate. The long revolution has been opposed at every turn.

If the present challenge for social democratic education is to remake the long revolution then the initial task must be to learn again what that path to educating democracy for citizenship entailed and which practices were involved in the struggle to expand rights, aspiration and social justice. Our society in the twenty-first century has to learn again what mid-Victorian public intellectuals from different traditions came to understand. Liberals, J.S. Mill and Harriet Taylor, a puritan idealist, T.H. Green, and a revolutionary socialist, William Morris, each inveighed against the greed and self-interest that pervaded their society and argued for the essential place of the common good if a just society is to be secured. They enable us to learn that unfettered capitalism, whether in its nineteenth century *laissez-faire* form or its twenty-first century neo-liberal form, generates a divided, unstable society whose members are unable to participate as equal citizens in the polity.

In order to make sense of the present beleaguered state of public service comprehensive education and local democracy, I have turned to deepen my understanding of two interdependent histories: the long revolution aspiring to create an educated democracy, and the role of the changing governance of education over time in enabling or frustrating those aspirations. Only an analysis of past historical forms can explain the present and provide understanding of the conditions for remaking the future. The task of the historian is to become reflexive about the changing societal formations through time that present the object of historical analysis: this is always a process of conceptual and theoretical construction. [5] Reading for the book I am preparing has led me to revise the way I have typically constructed the central objects of my enquiry. In this article I wish to focus on re-analysing the changing periods of domination in education and their historical significance for the long revolution. What this reframing of the object of enquiry has helped me to learn

is: to reinterpret the movement of transformation from the mid-nineteenth century; and to develop an emergent theory of transformation such that reforms to education and democracy need to be understood together as responses to periods of structural change, conjunctures, that generate crises and lead to political settlements which expand but regulate participation and opportunity in order to preserve as far as possible prevailing traditions of power. The reform of education lies at the centre of the regulation of democracy.

The next section develops understanding of the significant periods of education governance since the mid-nineteenth century, and the following section then seeks to analyse their meaning in the context of distinctive historical conjunctures, confluences of forces of material, social and political change. The final section discusses what is at stake in the present conjuncture, while the conclusion endeavours to rescue some hope from the tragic dismantling of the social democratic polity.

Reframing the Object of Historical Analysis

Without a theory of periodisation, Koselleck [6] argues, history as a discipline is empty, lacks focus. The challenge is not to erase a notion of time, but to conceptualise it. Historical periods reflect social and political constructions and analysis should examine the conflicts within society, the competing interpretive schema that can generate moments of historic transformation. The theory of periodising education governance which I have developed in my research has been shaped by three interdependent analytical dimensions. The first, that institutional systems form orders of domination, reflects the influence of Weber from my early studies on organisational analysis.[7] Organisations, or institutional settings, or political communities are typically composed of groupings which develop rival conceptions about the purposes and practices of their organisations that reflect fundamentally different value preferences and sectional interests. Those groups which acquire power will come to dominate the interpretive schema, discourses and material decision-making of the organisation. In my research typically I identified three overlapping periods: a 1950s elite order of tripartite education; a social democratic period of comprehensive education from the early 1960s to 1976; and a neo-liberal period of semi-autonomous schools from 1988. The second dimension is thus that orders of domination extend through specific temporal periods. Because the systems of education are always intended to institutionalise larger moral and political purposes of social classification or, alternatively, expansion of opportunity and social mobility, power-holders in education typically plan with a generation, with decades in mind. The third dimension is that the structures of domination are subject to fundamental political and material transformation.

What I have learned from my reading is that the object of historical analysis, as I have usually constructed it – the post-war periods of domination – has been too restricted. If we are to understand the principles and practices which inform the different types of post-war governance of education, and the

contribution they make to the long revolution of educating democracy, then we need to grasp their source in particular historical periods since the mid-nineteenth century. It also became clear to me that concentrating on the post-war era led to fundamental mistakes about how the direction of change in the orders of domination in governing education (elite, social democratic, market choice) is to be interpreted and explained. I have sought to improve my analysis of historical periods in two ways. First, by learning from leading historians: to Fernand Braudel and his sophisticated theory of the layering of historical periods; to the extraordinary education history of Brian Simon to deepen my understanding of the longer genealogy of educational governance; and to Eric Hobsbawm's [8] great history of capitalism and revolution. I have secondly sought to develop a more complex theory of transformations.

For Fernand Braudel [9] 'history operates in tenses on scales, and in units which frequently vary: day by day, year by year, decade by decade, or in whole centuries. Every time, the unit of measurement modifies the view. It is the contrasts between the realities observed on different time-scales that make possible history's dialectic'. [10] Within this framework, he chooses to work at three time planes of historical analysis:

(i) *the history of events*: the narrative of traditional history which hurries 'from one event to the next like a chronicler of old or a reporter today'. [11] This history provides a chronology of individual actions, of acts of parliaments, of wars declared or concluded, of books published, etc. The timescale here is of days and weeks, time as it is lived. As Harold Wilson said, 'a week is a long time in politics'. Braudel says we must learn to distrust this history because it leaves us dissatisfied, unable to judge or understand why the events have happened, or actions taken a particular course.

(ii) *the history of episodes*: here the span of time is a distinctive period, phase, cycle, or generation: the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, World War II. The time scale here may be 10, 20 or 50 years. These are periods of social and political change which Braudel also calls 'conjunctures'.

(iii) *long-term history*: which he refers to as *la longue duree*, apparently unchanging time spans of centuries. These form the semi-permanent features of geography, or culture, the deep frames of thought and habit. Here we may think of the categories of 'classical civilisation', the medieval epoch, or the historical movement to modernity.

What the work of Brian Simon [12], the late Professor of Education at Leicester University, has taught me is that while it is appropriate to identify distinct periods in the governance of education since the World War II, a longer historical perspective discloses the source of these periods in distinct moments in time since the mid-nineteenth century. It is only this lengthened perspective that reveals the true principles and causes of those historical formations of post-war governance and the contemporary muddle they have generated in the present. What now, for example, appear as debates about which type of school

is more or less effective (public, grammar, comprehensive, academy) can then be located in their historical roots as one fragment of a whole system for educating the nation's children. Drawing upon Simon's histories, I have abstracted a genealogy of four orders of governance, each identifying a historical period during which their specific principles and practices were articulated and objectified in ideal typical form in public policy, institutions and practices. The four are: governing education as an aristocratic order of birth and class (1850-1890); a bourgeois and conservative order of nature and intelligence (1920-1950); social democratic order of individual need (1955-1976); and a neo-liberal order of property and possessive individualism (1988-the present). Each formation expresses fundamentally different conceptions of the purpose of education, especially its principles of social selection, whose interests the system serves, how it is organised and governed, and who exercises power. Each order contributes to the expansion of education and thus can be seen as contributing to the unfolding of Williams' long revolution, yet at the same time they are orders of domination that have placed significant limits on opportunity and aspiration.

It is appropriate to begin the genealogy of series of governance with the first constituting of a national system of education as an aristocratic order of birth and class: 1850-90. The year 1870 can be picked out as establishing the foundation of universal elementary or primary education, and as such is a major contribution to the long revolution. In fact, however, the ruling government determined from 1850 to review the whole structure of education in England including the ancient universities, the historic public schools and the grammar schools, as well as the elementary schools.[13] The manifest aim of the reforms was to secure a class hierarchy of schools based on birth and social class rank. The principle informing the order of education, sanctified by religion and tradition, was that class membership would determine social selection through the type of school attended (public, grammar, or elementary) and ensuing position in society. Birth was to determine destiny. In feudal society this social hierarchy of rights and duties was inscribed in law; now a structure of class education would determine one's social station and fate. The aristocracy designed a constitution of national education that secured their interests and power in social reproduction. While the period of enquiry, reporting, deliberation, and legislation took 20 years from 1850, the demands for reform of education had long preceded the middle of the century, and reforms took until later in the century to implement. The gestation of structuring and restructuring national education is not a short term endeavour. At the pinnacle of this class hierarchy for a national system of education stood the independent 'public' school for the few.

The second period of domination strives to establish education as a conservative order of nature and class: 1920-50. It was a period that needed to expand education in response to growing demand for secondary schooling. In the planning, however, expansion was balanced by considerable restriction on opportunity. When it became difficult in the public arena to justify a hierarchy

of schools based on birth, the ruling class developed what they believed to be a proxy that would substitute science for divine right in order to secure the same class hierarchy. Children were judged to be fundamentally different in human type, and thus should be allocated to different types of school and prepared for different occupations. Educational opportunities would be provided according to the purported distribution of innate and unchanging aptitude and ability between types as judged by psychological tests of intelligence set at 11 years old and earlier. These tests were to secure an assessment of nature: biology was fate. Social selection determined by a nature forged in the cultural capital of the privileged would reproduce the social hierarchy. The average varied between local authorities, but a norm of 20% of each cohort would be selected for a place at grammar school and a future in the professions with the remainder consigned to poor secondary moderns and a future in the factory. Though this policy was developed in key public committees (Hadow, 1926, Spens, 1938, and Norwood, 1943) [14], with its iconic statement of tripartite education in the Norwood Report of 1943, the ideology of innate intelligence was unfortunately grounded in forgery and fabrication masquerading as science.[15] Tripartism was not described explicitly in the 1944 Education Act which established universal secondary education, but it became the dominant ideology of organising education from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, and remains official policy in a few local authorities, such as Kent and Trafford.

This conservative order of domination was undermined by World War II and the plans from 1942 to reconstruct a new world to replace 1930s elitism and the depression. A polity which served and reinforced the privileged classes was to be replaced by a just social democracy that distributed opportunity equally according to need and merit. In the post-war period extending to the mid-1970s, education substantially expanded opportunity to ameliorate class disadvantage and division. While the purpose of universal secondary education was constituted by the 1944 Education Act, expanded opportunities only took on the semblance of reality with the Robbins Report's (1963) proposal for a massive growth of higher education, and with leading local authorities plans from the mid-1950s to introduce schemes of comprehensive reorganisation that ended the practice of segregating most working class children to receive an elementary education in poorly provided secondary modern schools that were merely a preparation for factory employment.[16] The comprehensive school hoped to erase social distinctions enabling all children to share in an extended common curriculum through practices of teaching that encouraged enquiry and learning through activity as well as accumulation of knowledge.[17] It was the 'age of professionalism'. Public trust was afforded to the specialist knowledge of professionals and the necessary requirements of answerability could be fulfilled by delegating to head teachers and local advisors – only the trained eye could judge the quality of teaching and pupil progress.[18] Public goods were conceived as requiring collective choice and redistribution. Thus the democratic Local Authority Education Committee formed the arena for dialogue on public policy accountability to respond to the needs of particular communities. While

much was achieved [19], there was not the political will to secure the comprehensive revolution [20], and too many schools continued as if they were secondary moderns, reinforcing unequal intakes, perpetuating class and group selection, and continuing traditional methods of teaching and learning. It was a transformation begun, but far from completed.[21]

Government policy from 1988 to the present has been driven by an agenda not of 'improving' this or that aspect of social democratic education, but of demolishing its very organising principles as the central programme in a wider restructuring of the polity. The Conservatives were committed to establishing a new political order based upon different principles of rights, choice and competition designed to empower the agency of the public. The 1988 Education Reform Act, establishing self-managing schools in a quasi-market place of parental choice regulated by Whitehall, sought to undermine 'the producers' of education – teachers and local authorities – in favour of consumer competition. Public goods, to achieve equity rather than equality, were conceived as aggregated private choices. The governance of education was no longer in the hands of local education authorities who formerly had responsibility for administering the system; under the reformed system each school was granted statutory responsibility for the governance of the institution. The establishment of grant-maintained schools and city technology colleges was designed to foster competition by increasing the diversity of institutional types within an internal education market.

The accession to power of New Labour in 1997 did not lead to a change in the dominant neo-liberal paradigm constituted by the 1988 Education Reform Act, rather an accentuation of the principles of choice, diversity and competition. The creation of a new specialist system (1997, 2003), followed by the academies programme (2001, 2004), self-governing trusts (2004) and the Education Act (2006), all sought to strengthen schools as independent institutions with the support of corporate sponsorship, typically with business and private enterprise. New Labour thus intensified dependency on specifically neo-liberal practice – strengthening consumer choice, contract law, audits of performance, corporate power and regulative accountability – all designed to create public services as a sphere of market exchange relationships. This reconstituting of education governance mediates a direction of change for the public sphere of education, indicating that control of education is seeping from the public to the corporate sector and that traditional forms of local governance are being steadily eroded.[22]

The project of the coalition from 2010 has been to complete the demolition of the social democratic comprehensive education prospectus of valuing the capabilities of each and providing comprehensive opportunities for all. Education is returned to its traditional function of social selection and class subordination. Most children once more must learn their place and limit their horizons. There have been two interdependent strategies to secure the restoration of social hierarchy in education. The first has been to accelerate the corporate ownership and market formation of the school system. Markets create

stratified hierarchies. When schools are driven by competition to achieve relative advantage over their 'rivals' they resort to covert practices of selecting pupils they judge will achieve in external examination results, and excluding children who they find difficult to teach. In time these practices generate a tacit, if not explicit, hierarchy of schools that perpetuates segregation of classes and minority ethnic communities.[23] Markets provide a fierce mechanism of social engineering, enabling social exclusion to masquerade as choice (and equity) with access to opportunity tied to those with wealth and cultural capital.

The second strategy has been to strengthen social selection through the restoration of traditional pedagogies and forms of examination designed to classify most children as academic failures, encouraging them to identify expectations appropriate to their purported restricted natures and vocational aptitudes. Replacing the IQ test at 11 as the principal national means of social selection is the restoration of the traditional pedagogy of teaching, learning and assessment: a fact-based knowledge curriculum, a single end of course examination, and the restoration of the old academic matriculation [24], thus, a high barrier at 16, the intention to return to the old standard of passing only 20% of the old 'O' level entries. Beneath the mask of 'raising standards' is actually a programme to fail most children. It does so through two principal means. Firstly, (a) the model of learning as knowledge and recall of facts privileges those children who come to school already having acquired a particular form of cultural capital at home: knowing the required cultural language of references and texts. The pedagogy which teachers and advisers have been developing over the past generation has favoured a different pedagogy leading to a deeper knowledge: focusing on progress in achievement at school, encouraging motivation to engage in learning as a process of enquiry, learning to question what they experience, and providing stepping stones to a deeper knowledge of critical understanding. Assessing standards achieved in this pedagogy requires a different process than testing knowledge of facts, rather capability in the more sophisticated knowledge of making knowledge rather than knowledge recall: it is a pedagogy that assesses agency rather than passivity. Mugging up and regurgitating facts may have been appropriate in the nineteenth century, though even then subjected to Dickens' withering scorn in *Hard Times*, but in the digital era knowledge is acquired in a thrice enabling time for the hard tasks of analysing and researching the objects of enquiry.[25] Secondly, (b) a further strategy of 'raising' standards has also revealed arbitrary political intervention replacing professional judgement: the manipulation of grade boundaries so that a smaller proportion of students receive a pass grade (as in English marking in 2012). The restoration of professional teaching, judgement and standards is now the most urgent priority in the nation's education.[26]

Brian Simon's longer historical perspective thus discloses four orders of domination constituting distinctive purposes of education, principles of social selection, and formations of organisation and power. Each order sought to establish a universal principle of ordering education that could secure public

legitimacy. The Victorian aristocracy looked to religion and tradition to legitimate a class hierarchy based on birth as destiny, while the post-World War I bourgeois conservatives sought to legitimate the same class hierarchy by turning to the pseudo-science of eugenics and 'intelligence'. Just as the legitimacy of educational selection by birth lost its public credibility, so the 1920s solution of intelligence tests at 11 years of age also faced public scepticism in the late twentieth century. When the good citizens of Solihull were given the opportunity in the 1980s to vote for the restoration of the grammar system they rejected it: which rational parent would vote for a system that will probably consign their child to a second class education? Grammar schools for some mean secondary modern cages for most. The social democratic era turned to the principle of merit and aptitude, yet that only provides a ladder for individuals to rise up one by one rather than meeting the needs of the community as a whole. The era of neo-liberal domination has sought to base its polity on individual rights of choice yet that has only served to afford relative advantage and power in the market place to those with material and cultural capital. The search for a universal principle of public education with general consent continues.

What begins to emerge from this genealogy of four orders of domination is, I have learned, a fundamentally altered perspective. My post-war myopia generated naivety: when that era is taken alone as the object of analysis it can encourage a narrative of expansion and inclusion, which is then interrupted by a neo-liberal juncture of consumerism: although the aspect of public services becoming responsive and accountable to their users has a role in a just order of education. Potentially, there was the prospect of developing beyond an individualistic model of participation into a model of expanded public, community governance of education. When, however, the historical narrative reaches back to the nineteenth century, the longer genealogy and periods of domination alter how the lineage has to be interpreted. It becomes clear that the embryonic era of comprehensive expansion can be witnessed only as a period of exception in the long and continuing trajectory of class-based caging of aspiration and opportunity.

Yet, if the *longue duree* of the struggle to educate democracy is to be grasped, if the four periods of domination in the governance of education are themselves to be interpreted and explained, I will need to deepen the limited theory of change I have worked with. Each of the orders of education deliberated and constituted reforms to education, but the politics of educational change can only be understood in the context of the material and political conjunctures to which they were a response. What do these teach us about the long revolution to an educated democracy?

Conjunctures, Crises and Political Settlements

The long struggle of ordinary people to reform the franchise, establish a just distribution of material conditions, and expand educational opportunities has

taken over 150 years, and the achievements now appear in retreat. Why did it take so long? The reforms were responses to periods of crisis, with structural transformations, conjunctures, in economy and society creating divisions in the polity that were resolved only with fundamental political settlements that reconfigured the order of domination. At the centre of these crises has been the nature of democracy: who is to be included and who is to rule. The crisis would be resolved when the elites constituted a settlement to extend democracy and opportunity, appeasing the rising classes, but constructed to preserve as much as possible of the existing power of the ruling elite. Why, though, did it take a crisis to secure some expansion of democracy and opportunity? What was being resisted? An overview can reveal the role of conjuncture and crisis in breaking resistance to expansion, yet enabling new boundaries to inclusion.

Reforms to the franchise in 1867 and of education in 1870 were a response to a period of transformation gathering pace and uncertainty from mid-century. The Great Exhibition of 1851 suggested a new confidence that was reflected in the triumphant bourgeois driving a massive expansion in global industrial capitalism.[27] Capitalist advance, however, drew more of the population into factories in towns and cities, causing overcrowding, poverty, ill-health, disease, and discontent. Although in England the Chartists had been crushed, and on the continent the revolutions of 1848 had failed, Hobsbawm [28] argues that these disturbances cast a lasting influence, creating a politics of fear. The middle classes of Europe were frightened of the people, and this generated insecurity. To secure order in a new world, the bourgeois demanded change in politics and the wider culture of hierarchy, tradition and deference. They wanted representation in parliament and a constitution to protect their rights and property. Cobden, having with Bright led the repeal of the Corn Law (1845), now campaigned to undermine aristocratic power, demanding power be transferred from the landed oligarchy to the intelligent middle and industrious classes. Yet, the traditional aristocratic order had to adapt to a new world, not just the bourgeois makers of the changing industrial and commercial world, but the people, not accommodated by the Great Reform Bill of 1832, who would have in time to be included in the polity. The defeat of the Reform Bill of 1866 led to huge demonstrations across the country with marchers in Hyde Park tearing down the railings. Nevertheless, although the bourgeoisie were in the ascendancy, it was the landed aristocracy who maintained control of the polity, and the Conservatives in 1867 produced an 'aristocratic settlement' that preserved much of their power by manipulating reforms to representation and the vote. The role of reforming education in schools (1858-70) in this wider political settlement was to perpetuate social control by establishing a fixed class hierarchy of schools, ordered by birth and rank. Saville has argued that these changes and reforms in the period from mid-century reflected the 'consolidation of the capitalist state' in Britain.[29] In a period of crisis, Harris [30] argues, the ruling classes had worked to strengthen control, maintaining 'the ancient tradition of a limited polity of independent freemen' and excluding those deemed incapable of independence, women, agricultural labourers, and the

causal poor. The rulers used a crisis to secure a settlement that bolstered their power. This practice recurs to the present day.

The conjuncture and crises following World War I provide the context to understand the politics of the period. That conflagration, as Selina Todd [31] says, transformed class relations in Britain, expanding the industrial labour force, including a million women and strengthened their demand for the vote. But in the context of revolution and revolt in Russia and Germany, and with growing unrest in towns and cities as the government reneged on promises for peace time employment and 'homes for heroes', the dominant Conservative elite manipulated a post-war settlement to extend the franchise and reviews of secondary education to secure social and political control. The 1918 Representation of the People Act produced a Conservative order of domination in British government and society that lasted until 1940.[32] Although the legislation transformed the political system, trebling the electorate and substantially redefining constituency boundaries, it failed to re-establish the polity on a democratic foundation. As McKibbin comments, 'the English political elite had imposed on Great Britain a constitutional-political arrangement markedly biased towards the Conservative Party, franchise legislation weighted towards property and property rights, an upper house weighted even more towards property which retained formidable obstructive powers used wholly in the Conservative interest'.[33] In education, the Fisher Act of 1918 raised the school leaving age to 14, precipitating public discussion through the 1920s and beyond about the education of adolescents after elementary school. The ensuing reviews of secondary provision (for example, Hadow 1923-26) were shaped by ideologies, formed from the late nineteenth century, which constructed human nature as forming differentiated types of superior and inferior being, reproduced by Darwinian natural selection in the competition of living.[34] Education provided the perfect crucible for such ideologies and secondary planning sought to reproduce class hierarchies of schools for distinct biological types in order to perpetuate social control. Informing the manipulations of the franchise and secondary planning were the same fears: the despised masses encroaching on the educated and cultured minority, having to be included, but managed at the boundary of the polity.

The legacy of that order of domination – mass unemployment, poverty, depression, hopelessness, and class stereotypes that the dole was the result of fecklessness and idleness – fuelled the movement for reform after 1940. That conjuncture, the catastrophe of World War II, led to radicalisation and the growing demand for reconstruction following the war.[35] Bevin used his power, and that of the trade union movement to shape the political settlement for a better society. The working class must not be failed by the state as they were at the end of World War I: 'why should the working class lend the government labour for the war with no guarantee of employment or improvement after'.[36] The political settlement to establish a social democratic state was constructed in two phases. The first stage, 1943-45, established the material infrastructure of the state: the institutional framework for economic

planning and welfare provision, given substance through the work of Keynes and Beveridge: Keynes designed the fiscal policy to stimulate demand and investment as a stable basis for future employment, while Beveridge shaped the blueprint for universal health and welfare support. The second stage was establishing equality of opportunity for a fairer society. Although Butler's 1944 Act introduced universal secondary education, his legislation remained tarnished by the dominant tripartite paradigm. It was not until the 1960s, with Robbins' expansion of universities and Crosland's Circular 10/65 [37] on comprehensive schools, that the opportunity society was authorised. Together the two stages constitute what Rawls [38] was to call 'the guiding framework' of social justice, the infrastructure, of material goods and opportunities to support the expansion of democratic citizenship. But as McKibbin reveals, although the settlement was an advance, the Labour government believed it could raise the working class while leaving the hierarchy of class privilege and deference in place. The country's principal social institutions remained unreformed and with them the chances of real change. In education the public schools continued, though even Churchill wondered whether they could or should be removed, and the dominant model of tripartism was sanctioned by Ellen Wilkinson who believed in the grammar school. Even by 1965, when a Labour government should have legislated for comprehensive reform, it was persuaded by the notion of winning consensus and change through gentle evolution. As in 1945 Labour's conception of reform reflected its awe of the dominant institutions: a historic moment of opportunity blown. As McKibbin concludes, Britain has been 'a society with powerful democratic impulses, but political structures and habits of mind which could not adequately contain them'. [39]

What is to be learned from this review of contexts of transformation and their significance for the long revolution to creating an educated democracy? That the orders of education domination that existed in mid-Victorian Britain (1850-1890), or in the inter-war years (1920-1950), or in the post-World War II period (1955-76) can only be understood against the background of the political, material and military conjunctures to which they were a response. We learn further that the major expansions of education provision – universal elementary education provision in 1870, and the extensions of secondary education in 1918, 1924 and 1944 – were only conceded by beleaguered ruling elites seeking to preserve as much as possible of their existing power and control of society, so that advances were always compromised by limitations of opportunity. Finally, we learn that the reason it took conjunctures, division and crisis to create the necessity for change lay in fear and denigration of the masses and the purported damage inclusion would do to 'civilization'. As McKibbin concludes, although England became 'a society with powerful democratic impulses' [40], and although it did a great deal to establish the material conditions to make social democracy possible, it nevertheless was reluctant to reform its political structures and social institutions leaving its privileged elites untouched.

What is at Stake in the Present Conjuncture?

What is the relationship between orders of domination, crises and change in our own time? What is at stake in such changes? What role is the coalition's restructuring of education playing in relation to such crises? For a generation education has been central to the polity, its function being not just to provide skills for the expanding labour market, but to raise aspirations encouraging young people and their families to look to horizons beyond their immediate social station. How education is designed reveals everything about the dominant political purposes and an emerging social order. What, therefore, is the purpose of the supposed reforms of education being introduced by the Conservative-led coalition, and does it matter? Are the changes designed to fine tune the performance of a service that may need revitalising or is there something more fundamental at stake in restructuring education to accommodate a new cultural, economic and political order?

Education did not always have such a prominent role in the keying of individuals into the social order. That role was taken by religion. MacIntyre, in his 1964 Riddell Lectures [41], noted that communities in pre-industrial England were characterised by stability of social structure that was seen to reflect a fixed natural order, the continuity of which was revealed in traditional norms and moral values that were shared by all ranks in the social hierarchy. In such pre-industrial societies religion was the medium of moral integration lending that unity universal justification. Religion provided the framework for members of all ranks to ask fundamental, metaphysical questions and to receive answers: Who am I? Whence did I come? Whither shall I go? Is there a meaning to my life other than the meaning I choose to give it? What powers govern my fate? Education played a subordinate function of training the clergy to relay scripture to their congregations. After 1800 each social class developed separate religious histories and educational forms. Indeed, MacIntyre argues that there developed side by side three class societies: an upper and upper middle class ethos cultivated by their public schools and promoting service to state and empire; middle class society oriented to the professions, trades and entrepreneurship (supported, he might have added, by grammar school education); and the working class labour force with its elementary schooling.

In the great transition from pre-modern (agrarian) to modern (industrial society) the place of education was transformed and became the common secular medium that enabled individuals to understand their origins, discover their identity, and determine their destiny. Ernest Gellner [42] made this transformation of society through time the centre of his theory of the modern nation. Once the division of labour became complex and subject to technological innovation, individuals would need to be mobile and develop the capacity to communicate with strangers at work, as well as citizens in the wider political community. This could only be achieved by a national education service that prepared all to acquire the universal literacies and idioms of a high culture to participate in the public spaces of the modern economic and political order. Thus the modernising of the education that took place after World War

II, with the introduction of universal secondary schooling, especially the expansion of equal opportunities with the promotion of comprehensive schooling for all, and the rapid expansion of higher education following the Robbins Report in 1963. In the generation that benefitted from these reforms, admissions to universities grew from 3% of each cohort in the 1950s to over 30% from the 1970s.

This analysis of the centrality of advanced education to modernity came to be reinforced more recently by theorists of the knowledge society and economy.[43] The argument proposes that innovation and growth of the modern economy depend upon the high quality of knowledge and information that can only be produced by an expansive science sector and by advanced institutions of education which generate the necessary knowledge and capabilities. This knowledge society is underpinned by flexible networking that shares ideas, people and skills in a way that draws upon the resources of family, community and civil society, as well as the labour market. Informing these practices is what Engestrom [44] calls a common potential for expansive learning that transforms practice and drives innovation.

Education has been central to the modernising of society, key to the securing of a more democratic polity and expansive citizenship as Williams and Marshall [45] emphasised. Yet since the mid-1970s, modern societies have been experiencing a series of changes that amount to a conjuncture, a climacteric that has been transforming the lives and prospects of citizens at work, home and in school, college or university. What have been those transformations, and what is at stake for the lives of citizens? A consensus is growing amongst reputable academics about the significance of the changes.

Structural changes in the environment and ecology [46] include erosion of natural resources and climate change, worse than originally thought, causing dramatic transformations to global temperatures, sea levels and capacity for production of food. These changes, which threaten the very survival of the planet, are the result of carbon pollution of the atmosphere caused by life-styles and economic infrastructures dependent on carbon production. The source of this crisis of climate change is for many the renaissance of neo-liberal capitalism [47], the central transformation and reality of our time. The neo-liberal economic model is for them the principal cause of the crises facing society and the polity. A deregulated market economy replaced a mixed economy, state enterprises and services have been privatised, and the welfare state contracted, together with the ending of commitment to full employment. Neo-liberalism brought with it a fierce duality: entrepreneurial dynamism and growth, but at the expense of the undermining of economic morality and a chronically divided society. Financial deregulation has been responsible in 2008 for the most severe financial catastrophe in over a century. Its sources lie in a predatory competitiveness and greed that corrupted the moral order of too many corporate businesses (banks, food production, etc.). Wealth has increased, but accumulated by the few at the expense of the many, its mechanism laid bare by Piketty [48], the returns to capital increase faster than economic growth further

enriching the already wealthy at the expense of the rest. A divided and fundamentally unsustainable unequal society is the result.

These economic divisions are accentuated by structural changes in the labour market, again independent, but reinforced by the neo-liberal juggernaut. Brynjolfsson and McAfee [49] demonstrate how for a time the new technologies created employment, such as computer programming, but the acceleration of the digital age has realised the fears of many that new technologies would replace human labour. Digital technology allows firms to produce and distribute goods with very few people. These jobs require some highly educated and skilled employees who make a good living, but the remainder of middle level jobs are being squeezed or eliminated. This is, for me, the key structural shift of our time: Marx's substitution of capital for labour. Deindustrialisation in the 1980s saw the collapse of traditional employment in factories and mines: the working classes suffered. The present restructuring of the labour market is contracting not just the clerical, but the tiers of managers and professionals that have supported corporate bureaucracy and public services: now it is the middle classes turn to suffer. For Reich [50], economies cannot grow if the middle classes are out of work or facing declining wages and rising costs of living. The changes are producing a labour market of a limited number of high end jobs, but a majority of poorly paid, insecure work. Guy Standing [51] calls this emerging mass class 'the precariat'. Frances O'Grady [52], General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), points to the sharp growth of people on the minimum wage – a 30% increase between 2008 and 2013. 'Most will be women, and many will have none of the other parts of a job that most take for granted – sick pay, a pension, and progression and development opportunities. Britain has one of the highest proportions of low-paid workers of the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) at 21%. The spread of low pay, part-time, low hours and zero-hours contracts, agency work and other forms of casual working is reminiscent of the conditions that led to support for the Fair Wages Resolution a century ago. To sustain pay rises depends upon well-paid jobs. We need, O'Grady says, to generate jobs that use people's skills, talents and potential to the full. The Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang [53] says the crisis is as much a lack of jobs crisis as a cost of living crisis. People have always worked and through work gained identity and dignity. What is to become of those who seek dignified work which the economy can no longer provide?

Divisions in wealth, employment and income are generating a fundamentally unequal society.[54] Inequality is rising to levels not seen since the nineteenth century. Indeed, Piketty [55] argues that Britain is more unequal than Victorian society, because it combines the arbitrariness of inheritance with meritocratic assumptions that the 'losers' are responsible for their own fate. There are now 6.7 million working families living in poverty, while cuts in welfare spending have led to increasing dependence on food banks and credit. Homelessness has risen sharply. Considerable research demonstrates the impact of poverty on levels of social mobility, educational achievement, levels of trust

and well-being, and civic responsibility to wider community.[56] The collapsing living standards of the middle and lower classes rebounds negatively on the economy through reduced demand and their resort to excessive borrowing to bolster their way of life, while the inability of the rich to consume all that they earn reinforces contraction of demand. For Sennett, the impact of the oppressive configuration of changes creates a 'burden of hopelessness' for the hitherto comfortable, as well as the poor.[57]

Particularly disconcerting is the impact of the transformations on our democratic heritage.[58] A democracy presupposes a common people coming together to deliberate agreed purposes and distribution of functions and resources. A polity that is so utterly divided that the condition of recognition is destroyed by mutual denigration, with the rich no longer willing to pay tax to support the lives of 'losers', and the poor utterly alienated from participation in the public space. What is collapsing is allegiance to shared civic responsibilities, while Galbraith's 'the politics of contentment' leaves the disadvantaged without collective support and the polity bereft of legitimation. What is at stake is whether we are common citizens of one polity [59] or whether we are returned, not to MacIntyre's pre-modern era of a social hierarchy all speaking the same language, but the early industrial world of divided and caged social classes living separate lives and speaking different languages (the privileged despising the poor as less than human) and receiving an education to fit separate strata in the social hierarchy?

These layers of transformation raise fundamental questions for the future of education in an age for many without work to shape identity and stability: who is to be educated? What will the purpose of education be in the future? What will be the meaning of living in the workless age? What are people to become? How is the coalition restructuring education in the light of these unfolding conditions and the questions they raise? Part of the explanation lies in the long political opposition, argued vehemently by Margaret Thatcher, to the post-war settlement and the creation of the welfare state. Yet the coalition's policies, even within that agenda, need to be interpreted in terms of the present structural crisis: the finitude of nature and resources, and the contraction of employment with the substitution of capital for labour. In this context the essence of the neo-liberal project is to justify educating only sufficient young people for a contracting 'salaried bourgeoisie' [60] labour market, while socialising the rest to accept an austere future bereft of aspiration. Policies remove the obligation of the state to develop the capabilities of all young people in order to prepare most for subordinate places in a social hierarchy, protecting the advantage of the privileged few and reconciling the many to their limited lot. In the previous period of economic ('blue collar') restructuring in the 1980s, some elite members of the education polity believed that unless educational opportunities were limited to match the contracting labour market, aspirations would be created that society could not match and social unrest would ensue.[61] Though reaching less lurid conclusions, the recent report of the respected Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) [62] concludes that

because of the decline of professional, high skill jobs, the country is producing too many graduates. Vocational training and apprenticeships would provide a more secure route to meet the expected expansion of medium and low-skill jobs. Such an analysis does not appear to agree with Gellner [63] that all citizens of a modern nation state need access to a shared high culture. Blacker [64] fears that the implication of neo-liberalism is felt not in the economic restructuring of universities, but in its drive to eliminate education as a universal and public good. In transferring the cost to the citizen, elites are raising the drawbridge on funding for mass public higher education. The prospect lies in retreat to the stratified class society divided by language, education and occupational aspiration. What is at stake, therefore, is Gellner's question about the shared medium of social integration: what will enable us to develop the language of a common citizenship?

Conclusion: becoming makers of worlds^[65]

The purpose of this article has been to relearn the nature and stages of the long revolution as the conditions for remaking the present as an educated democracy. This enquiry has taken me on a journey to deepen my understanding of the history of the role of education governance in expanding and limiting the long revolution. Reading Brian Simon has led me to revise the object which hitherto has been central to my research enquiry: the periodising of education governance since World War II. Simon has helped me understand that these periods can only be understood in terms of their connection to specific orders of governance since the mid-nineteenth century with the embryonic constituting of a national system of education. Four distinctive periods of governance were identified, each shaped by a distinctive principle of social selection, and each seeking to expand but also limit educational opportunity. Grasping this genealogy of orders of governance alters how the post-war period is to be interpreted. Instead of a process of gradual expansion interrupted by a period of neo-liberal possessive individualism, the period of social democratic comprehensive education (1955-76) stands out as the exception in the *longue duree* of class based caging of educational opportunity.

Reading Simon with Hobsbawm has further helped me understand that these periods of governance need to be analysed together with periods of democratic reform, and that both reforms to participation and opportunity interpreted as responses to material and political conjunctures, in which elites constitute political settlements to reconstitute the polity by regulating the inclusion of the people who they regard as the masses. The Victorians, for example, expanded the franchise, but defined it in terms of a limited polity of independent free-men. They reinforced this through education reforms which constituted schooling as a hierarchy of class stratification: birth was destiny. The Conservative domination of the post-World War I conflagration merely substituted biology for birth to achieve the same class caging of opportunity, while from the late 1980s, neo-liberals substitute cultural capital to manipulate

realising the same ends. Does this genealogy generate a pathway of despair? The order of power and domination exercised by neo-liberalism over 30 years is clearly daunting. Yet while the histories encouraged by Simon and Hobsbawm disclose the causes of change, they also, therefore can provide understanding of the conditions of remaking.

The essence of the historical analysis is that the different conjunctures, periods of structural transformation, accentuated political divisions, and struggles in the polity. Expansion of participation and opportunity were achieved together as a result of assertion and struggle of the people wrenching concessions from the state, though elites constituted settlements which limited the scope of expansion. Reform was not, as Hobsbawm suggests, a historical inevitability: 'After 1870 it became increasingly clear that the democratisation of the politics of states was quite inevitable. The masses would march on the stage of politics, whether rulers liked it or not' [66], ensuring the inexorable demise of the bourgeoisie and its liberal ideology. It was the bourgeoisie, the makers of the capitalist revolution, who made inroads into Victorian aristocratic power; it was the trades unions, suffragists, and local political leaders who opened the space for reform in 1918; and it was Ernest Bevin leading the movement of trade unions and working classes who pressed for a historic political settlement for a social democratic state of employment, welfare and opportunity. As E.P. Thompson insisted, the working class has been 'present at its own making'. [67]

The conclusion for remaking the present is twofold: first, to lead a new generation of assertion and struggle for the long revolution towards an educated democracy; and, second, to remember McKibbin's stricture that privileged elites can only be undermined by carrying through democratic impulses into reform of political structures and social institutions. [68] The caution and compromise which infected 1944 and 10/65 need to be replaced by resolution to sustain the remaking of our democracy. To begin with this implies rebuilding the central institutions which have supported the common people: trades unions, local government and schools in and for the community. The next major advance in the making of democracy has, therefore, to be in the spaces of democratic community governance, that all citizens, in Raymond Williams' words, become makers of meaning, value and material distribution. [69] Citizens are makers as well as voters. A number of leading local authorities have been developing schemes of community governance that enable layered participation of parents, schools and neighbourhoods which provide models to build on for the future. [70]

Notes

- [1] I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Professor Brian Simon. The article builds on my previous article 'Governing Education: remaking the long revolution', published in *FORUM*, 54(2), and develops ideas from the first chapter of an emerging book, *Educating Democracy*. I had decided that before I

- could complete a book on remaking the governance of education I needed to understand more deeply the sources of the present crisis in education. Being an under-labourer in the field of history I am grateful to a number of colleagues for their encouragement: Clyde Chitty, Michael Fielding, Jon Nixon, and John Stewart. I have been very grateful over the years to Clyde and *FORUM* for the opportunity to develop a more engaged style of writing about education.
- [2] R. Williams (1961) *The Long Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books; T.H. Marshall (1964) *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [3] See also T.H. Marshall (1964) *Class, Citizenship and Social Development*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [4] R. Williams (1968) Culture and Revolution: a comment, in T. Eagleton & B. Wicker (Eds) *From Culture to Revolution*, p. 33. London: Sheed & Ward). See also R. Williams (1961) *Culture and Society*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- [5] cf. R. Koselleck (2002) *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- [6] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- [7] cf. S. Ranson, R. Greenwood & C.R. Hinings (1980) The Structuring of Organisational Structures, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 25(1), 1-17; S. Ranson & J. Stewart (Eds) (1994) *Management for the Public Domain: enabling the learning society*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- [8] Especially the last three volumes: *The Age of Capital 1848-1875*; *The Age of Empire 1875-1914*; and *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991* (London: Abacus).
- [9] F. Braudel (1980) *On History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [10] F. Braudel (1993) *A History of Civilizations*, p. 34. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- [11] *Ibid.*
- [12] Brian Simon is author of the four volume *Studies in the History of Education*: B. Simon (1960) *The Two Nations and the Educational Structure, 1780-1870*. London: Lawrence & Wishart; B. Simon (1965) *Education and the Labour Movement: 1870-1920*. London: Lawrence & Wishart; B. Simon (1974) *The Politics of Educational Reform: 1920-1940*. London: Lawrence & Wishart; B. Simon (1991) *Education and the Social Order: 1940-1990*. See also B. Simon (1994) *The State and Educational Change: essays in the history of education and pedagogy*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- [13] Reviews of the ancient universities began in 1850, of elementary schools in 1858 (the Newcastle Commission), of the public schools in 1861 (the Clarendon Commission), and of grammar schools in 1864 (the Taunton Commission).
- [14] The Hadow Report (1926) Report of the Consultative Committee on the Education of the Adolescent; The Spens Report (1938) Report of the Consultative Committee on Secondary Education with Special Reference to Grammar Schools and Technical High Schools; The Norwood Report (1943) Report of the Department Committee on Curriculum and Examinations in Secondary Schools.

- [15] cf. B. Simon (1978) *Intelligence, Psychology, Education: a Marxist critique*. London: Lawrence & Wishart; R. Lowe (1997) *Schooling and Social Change, 1964-1990*. London: Routledge; C. Chitty (2004) Eugenic Theories and Concepts of Ability, in M. Benn & C. Chitty (Eds?) *A Tribute to Caroline Benn: education and democracy*. London: Continuum; C. Chitty (2009) *Eugenics, Race and Intelligence in Education*. London: Continuum.
- [16] Progressive local authorities, such as Middlesex, Coventry and Leicestershire, began introducing comprehensive schools in the 1950s. National endorsement of comprehensive schools appeared with Circular 10/1965, although then only to encourage rather than require institutional change.
- [17] The leading research on the progress of comprehensivisation was: C. Benn & B. Simon (1972) *Half Way There: report on the British comprehensive school reform*. Harmondsworth: Penguin; C. Benn & C. Chitty (1996) *Thirty Years On: is comprehensive education alive and well or struggling to survive?* London: David Fulton.
- [18] M. Kogan (1978) *The Politics of Educational Change*. London: Fontana.
- [19] Surveys have demonstrated major improvements in performance of comprehensive schools (cf. J. Hills, T. Sefton & K. Stewart [2009] *Towards a More Equal Society?* Bristol: Policy Press). When comparing comprehensive schools with grammar schools and secondary moderns, research concludes that there is little difference in examination results between the two systems (cf. J. Gray, D. Jesson & B. Jones [1984] Predicting Differences in Examination Results between Local Education Authorities: does organization matter?, *Oxford Review of Education*, 10(1), 479-491; J. Glaesser & B. Cooper (2012) Educational Achievement in Selective and Comprehensive Local Education Authorities: a configurational analysis, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 33(2), 223-244. Boliver & Swift (2011), examining the effect of 'comprehensivisation on social mobility, conclude that when the two systems are compared as a whole, comprehensive schools were as good for social mobility as the selective schools they replaced', *British Journal of Sociology*, 62(1), 102.
- [20] Professor A.H. Halsey identifies two crucial failures of political will: the failure of the 1944 Education Act to abolish private education and the failure of Anthony Crosland on comprehensivisation in the mid-1960s: 'he was really cautious ... politically he was nervous' (*Guardian Education*, January 18, 1994, p. 3).
- [21] cf. R. Lowe (1997) *Schooling and Social Change 1964-1990*. London: Routledge; K. Jones (2003) *Education in Britain: 1944 to the present*. Cambridge: Polity Press; M. Benn (2011) *School Wars: the battle for Britain's education*. (London: Verso).
- [22] cf. C. Crouch (2003) *Post Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity; D. Marquand (2004) *Decline of the Public*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- [23] Governments from the 1980s seemed impervious to the evidence of renowned statisticians about the achievements of comprehensive schools, and deaf to the evidence accumulating in a mountain of outstanding research on the effects of market competition on school practice and performance (including Ball, Edwards, Gewirtz, Gillborn, Glatter, Maguire, Power, Reay, Riddell, Vincent, Whitty, and Woods). The curriculum becomes narrow and distorted to simplify

- teaching and the passing of tests or exams. The constituting of (an unelected) Conservative-led coalition in 2010 not only set aside the developing body of scientific knowledge about learning, teaching and achievement in comprehensive schools, but seemed determined to despise the very practice of education research. What could possibly warrant a programme of demolition rather than improvement, of scorching the earth rather than cultivation?
- [24] A Department of Education and Science (DES) statistician informed me in 1980 that 'the statistic of passing (English, maths, a science, a humanity subject, and a foreign language) at 'O' level produced the proportion of children who used to pass the 11+: that is circa 20%'. If this were the case it would be, I believe, because 'O' levels in that period examined a middle-class curriculum that depended upon prior cultural capital.
- [25] The central example of curriculum as factual knowledge was revealed in Secretary Gove's attempt to substitute his own partial version of history. Professor Sir Richard Evans wrote recently describing the Education Secretary as 'someone who tried to dumb down the teaching of history by eliminating the teaching of skills and converting it to mindless rote learning of a slanted patriotic version of events' (*The Guardian*, July 22, 2014). See also his article 'The rote set in', *New Statesman*, 15-21 March, 2013.
- [26] cf. Professor Sir Richard Evans (2014) So how will you remember Michael Gove?, *The Guardian*, July 22.
- [27] E. Hobsbawm. *The Age of Capital 1848-75*. London: Abacus.
- [28] Ibid.
- [29] J. Saville (1994) *The Consolidation of the Capitalist State*. London: Pluto Press; H. Mahamdallie (2013) *Crossing the River of Fire: the socialism of William Morris*. London: Redwords.
- [30] J. Harris (1994) *Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain 1870-1914*. London: Penguin.
- [31] S. Todd (2014) *The People: the rise and fall of the working class 1910-2010*. London: John Murray.
- [32] M. Pugh (1978) *Electoral Reform in War and Peace: 1906-18*. London: Routledge.
- [33] R. McKibbin (2010) *Parties and People: England 1914-1951*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 28.
- [34] E. Hobsbawm (1987) *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*. London: Abacus; C. Chitty (2009) *Eugenics, Race and Intelligence in Education*. London: Continuum; M. McMillan (2013) *The War that Ended the Peace*. London: Profile Books.
- [35] R. McKibbin (2010) *Parties and People: England 1914-1951*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [36] A. Bullock (1960) *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin*, vol. 2, p. 137. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- [37] Higher Education (the Robbins Report), Cmnd 2154 (1963). London: HMSO; Department of Education and Science (1965) *The Organisation of Secondary Education*, Circular 10/65. London: HMSO.

- [38] J. Rawls (1972) *A Theory of Justice*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, p. 53 and chapter 2.
- [39] R. McKibbin (2010) *Parties and People: England 1914-1951*, p. 202. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [40] R. McKibbin, op.cit., p. 202.
- [41] Published as A. MacIntyre (1967) *Secularization and Moral Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [42] E. Gellner (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell; cf. C. Taylor (1998) Nationalism and Modernity, in J.A. Hall (Ed.) *The State of the Nation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [43] M. Castells (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell; A. Hargreaves (2003) *Teaching in a Knowledge Society*. Maidenhead: Open University Press; UNESCO (2005) *Towards Knowledge Societies*. Paris: UNESCO.
- [44] Y. Engestrom (2005) *Developmental Work Research: expanding activity theory in practice*. Berlin: International Cultural-historical Human Sciences.
- [45] Refer to Note 2.
- [46] A. Giddens (2009) *The Politics of Climate Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press; J. Bellamy, B. Clark, & R. York (2010) *The Ecological Rift: capitalism's war on the earth*. New York: Monthly Review Press; N. Stern (2010) *Blueprint for a Safer Planet*. London: Vintage.
- [47] J. Stiglitz (2010) *Freefall: free markets and the sinking of the global economy*. London: Penguin; P. Krugman (2012) *End this Depression Now!* New York: Norton; R. Reich (2013) *Aftershock*. London: Vintage; Ha-Joon Chang (2014) *Economics: the user's guide*. London: Pelican; T. Piketty (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- [48] T. Piketty (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- [49] E. Brynjolfsson & A. McAfee (2014) *The Second Machine Age: work, progress and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies*. New York: Norton.
- [50] R. Reich (2013) *Aftershock*. London: Vintage.
- [51] G. Standing (2014) *The Precariat Charter: from denizens to citizens*. London: Bloomsbury.
- [52] F. O'Grady (2014) A Minimum Decency, *The Guardian*, April 1.
- [53] Ha-Joon Chang (2014) The Big Problem, *The Guardian*, January 22; cf. J. Madrick (2012) Our Crisis of Bad Jobs, *New York Review of Books*, December 9.
- [54] R. Wilkinson & K. Pickett (2010) *The Spirit Level: why equality is better for everyone*. London: Penguin; F. Mount (2012) *The New Few: power and inequality in Britain now*. London: Simon and Schuster; J. Stiglitz (2012) *The Price of Inequality: how today's divided society endangers our future*. London: Allen Lane; T. Clark & A. Heath (2014) *Hard Times: the divisive toll of the economic slump*. New Haven: Yale University Press; D. Piketty, refer to note [48].

- [55] T. Piketty (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- [56] cf. R. Putnam (1994) *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; R. Wilkinson & K. Pickett (2010) *The Spirit Level: why equality is better for everyone*. London.
- [57] R. Sennett (1995) The Spectre of Uselessness and the Search for a Place in the World, *Times Literary Supplement*, September 22; R. Sennett (2009) *The Culture of the New Capitalism*. New Haven: Yale.
- [58] R. Patel (2009) *The Value of Nothing: how to reshape market society and redefine democracy*. London: Portobello; A. Gamble (2014) *Crisis Without End: the unravelling of western prosperity*. London: Palgrave; D. Graeber (2014) *The Democracy Project: a history, a crisis, a movement*. London: Penguin.
- [59] E. Gellner (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- [60] S. Zizek (2012) The Revolt of the Salaried Bourgeoisie, *London Review of Books*, January 26.
- [61] S. Ranson (1984) Towards Tertiary Tripartism: new codes of social control and the 17+, in P. Broadfoot (Ed.) *Selection, Certification and Control: social issues in educational assessment*. London: Falmer.
- [62] IPPR (2014) *Winning the Global Race*. London: Institute of Public Policy Research.
- [63] E. Gellner (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- [64] D. Blacker (2013) *The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neo-liberal Endgame*. Winchester: Zero Books.
- [65] I am grateful to Clyde Chitty for encouraging me in this conclusion to lift my sights to brighter horizons.
- [66] E. Hobsbawm (1994) *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*. London, Abacus, p. 85.
- [67] E.P. Thompson (1968) *The Making of the Working Class*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- [68] R. Mckibbin (2010) *Parties and People: England 1914-1951*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 85.
- [69] R. Williams, refer to note [2].
- [70] cf. S. Ranson & C. Crouch (2009) *Towards a New Governance of Schools in the Remaking of Civil Society*. A Research Paper for CfBT Education Trust. Reading: CfBT; M. Fielding & P. Moss (2011) *Radical Education and the Common School: a democratic alternative*. London: Routledge; R. Hatcher (2012) Democracy and Participation in the Governance of Local School Systems, *Journal of Educational Administration and History*, 44(1), 21-42; S. Ranson (2012) Remaking Public Spaces for Civil Society, *Critical Studies in Education*, October, 1-17; R. Hatcher (2014) Local Authorities and the New School System: the new authority wide partnerships, *Educational Management Administration and Leadership*, 42(3), 355-371; see the framework in S. Ranson (2012) Schools and Civil Society: corporate or community governance', *Critical Studies in Education*, 53(1), 29-45.

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