

The crisis of a social system

Michael Rustin

Is the current political settlement sustainable?

The persuasive view that Stuart Hall has set out in his article in this issue is that the Coalition is the most radical government since Thatcher. He describes its ferocious programme to further subjugate Britain to the hegemony of neoliberalism as an ideology and world-view. Doreen Massey's complementary argument is that resistance to these conservative forces has to be mounted from outside the compromised perspectives of social democracy with its half-hearted qualifications to market-led regimes whose domination it largely accepts as necessary and inevitable. She argues for a politics based on alternative values and on forms of agency whose potential comes in part from outside the conventional political system.

Both of these arguments, most of which I agree with, are organised around a dynamic conception of ideology, which after all is what 'neoliberalism' essentially is. In Hall's article the concept of ideology, however, becomes expanded, such that the term 'neoliberalism' is not merely employed to describe a doctrine or system of ideas, but becomes a description of an entire social formation, seen as the enactment of its animating ideological principles. One can say, without disparagement, that this is a kind of 'culturalist' approach to political analysis. Since neoliberal ideology is indeed the organising principle of the great transformation of our times, this perspective captures much of what needs to be understood about the 'present conjuncture'.

A systemic crisis

Nevertheless, I want to frame my contribution to this debate in slightly different

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terms. Suppose we think in terms of the development not of an ideological system, but of a social system, whose dominant ideas and mentalities are only one of its components. Suppose one reverts to the antiquated term capitalism, as the name not merely of an ideology but of an ensemble of interrelated elements (modes of production, distribution, social control, socialisation, communication, military power, etc). Suppose one further reintroduces into this model the idea of social classes, in all their complex aspects, and identifies these rather than the ideologies that both construct them and are constructed by them as the prime agencies of change. Any conceptual framing of these issues has its own problems, as arguments within Marxist social theory over recent decades have taught us. Nevertheless, some light might be thrown on our situation through the use of a 'social system discourse' which an ideology-focused account may not provide.

The question which this other framing of the issues may enable us to ask concerns the stability and viability of the systems animated by neoliberal ideology. 'Systems theories', in both their sociological and structuralist Marxist variants, were always concerned with the preconditions of social equilibrium (the issue for functionalism) or potential disequilibrium (the issue for Marxists such as Althusser). The question I want to raise concerns the 'equilibrium' or otherwise of one particular system, namely that of the United Kingdom's national version of capitalism, shaped as it has been by its own specific history. How stable, now, is this particular configuration? My purpose is not to critique in normative terms the neoliberal project for Britain, but rather to ask what its outcomes are likely to be, here in Britain. As a governmental project, can it work, even in its own terms? And should it fail, in what forms might failure manifest itself, and what opportunities might this failure offer to the development of alternative kinds of politics?¹

It is certainly the case that global capitalism has been enjoying a spectacular advance over the past thirty years. This advance began first with the economic and political crisis of the 1970s in the West, and the victory of neoliberals in the struggles of that period. Its second major precondition was the collapse of European Communism, and the emergence of China as a new kind of hybrid formation, capitalist in its economy but still with a notionally Communist one-party form of government. The regime described by Hall and Massey stands as the local British instantiation of this world-wide advance of capitalism. Its strategies have been at some points in the vanguard of this development (for example in the social

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technology of privatisation which was exported to the world from Thatcherite Britain, and in the 'big bang' of the deregulation of the financial sector in 1985); while in other respects they have taken the form of more reactive and defensive responses to the competitive pressures of this encroaching system, for example in the deflation of the 1980s, and perhaps in the current excesses of deficit reduction.

We can perhaps now understand the post-second world war moment in which the aspirations of the generation of those now over fifty or so were formed as the aberration, and the sway of capital, markets, and the ideology of individualism which now prevails as closer to the historical norm. It was once inviting to interpret the emergence of social democracy as the culmination of an evolutionary process, in which aspirations grew in harmony with material and political possibilities. T.H. Marshall's influential account described a historical development in which first civil rights, then political rights, and then economic and social rights had been successfully claimed by means of sustained democratic pressure exercised by the people upon first aristocratic then bourgeois elites.² Raymond Williams' *The Long Revolution* added the dimension of cultural struggle and emancipation to this description, while already warning against the visible capture of democratic agencies by the authoritarian structures which they were supposedly seeking to transform.³ This narrative in effect reformulated an existing Whig view of British history as the evolution of liberalism in more popular social democratic terms. It corresponded, as the earlier Whig view had done, to a particular historical moment in which the particular configuration of class forces whose view it embodied had arrived, if not at the summit of power, at least somewhere within view of the summit. As Marx wrote: 'Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation'.⁴ The post-war years were certainly the period in which a self-conscious and substantially organised working class in Britain had come to form a numerically larger part of the population than ever before. In this period, governments across western Europe and north America were active in managing systems which saw a significant rise in social protection, welfare provision, employee power, and managed political compromises between contending social classes.

It is now evident that the equilibria established both in the welfare states of

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Europe, and to a lesser degree in the USA, and in the balance of power between western capitalism and state socialism in the east, were only temporary, the latter even more spectacularly so than the former. The significance of state socialism in this configuration was primarily as a countervailing threat, rather than as an appealing alternative to democratic capitalism, but as such it constrained the western democracies of both centre-right and centre-left varieties to concede social rights and protections to their peoples, in order to win and retain support from them for parliamentary systems of government, and for the market economies over which they presided. Both these equilibria of forces were the products of a particular crisis - the rise of Nazism and Fascism - and the eventual collective and democratic response to it. It was the defeat of Fascism which led to the advance of social democracy across western Europe, as well as the imposition of the state socialist system upon eastern Europe. Another important element in this post-war reconfiguration of power was the impetus to collective solidarity and organisation that came from the material and social technology of industrial production.

The welfare settlement in Britain and the USA exploded in social conflict in the 1970s, which ended in the victories of neo-conservatism under Reagan, Thatcher and their successors. This brought about a major rebalancing of power. Deregulation and globalisation have proved to be potent means of advancing the power of capital over the political and social forces which had set limits to it. The global organisation of markets has become a more effective form of power than colonial domination by military force, which towards the end of the era of empires was demanding large expenditures of resources and blood, though with lessening economic or other benefit to the imperial metropolises. The bond markets, multinational corporations and the IMF, and indeed the 'soft power' represented by the global diffusion of mass consumption, have mostly proved capable of deploying power more effectively and efficiently than gunboats and armies (though across the Middle East, where the key resource of oil is at stake, military imperialism persists, with its unavailing quest to build capitalist states through the use of armed force).

As Meghnad Desai has reminded us, Marx has proved to be correct in his prediction that capitalism would continue its advance until it had subsumed the entire world under its dominion.⁵ It is important that we should see the condition of capitalism in Britain in this larger global context. In the remainder of this article

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I shall be considering how limited is the scope for manoeuvre that now seems to be available to British governments.

The British case

Hall and Massey each emphasise the radical ambition of the neoliberal project in its British incarnation. They see this as it is embodied in the programmes of the current Coalition, in those of its Thatcherite predecessor, and in New Labour's abject surrender to the values and pressures of neoliberalism in during its thirteen years of office. I, by contrast, will draw attention to the fragility of this neoliberal project in Britain, and to the unlikelihood that it can succeed in achieving the stable hegemony it aims for. It is certainly the case that the Coalition project is exceptionally bold, and that in their broad ambitions if not in their grasp of details the Cameron Conservatives were well prepared to make the most of their arrival in government. But the Coalition's aims also carry with them, almost as the necessary concomitant of their radicalism, a high risk of failure. One can see the Tory-led Coalition government, as no doubt do some of its members, as determined to render irreversible the imposition of the power of capital and markets over all the democratic and collective forces which have over many decades resisted their domination. But one can also view its programme as an ideologically driven attempt to resolve the deep crisis faced by the United Kingdom in the context of the global market system, which in reality has little hope of success.

This brings us back to analysis of the present conjuncture, a theme which *Soundings* has been pursuing over the last two years or so.⁶ In these discussions we drew attention to similarities between the present situation and the period of crisis of the 1970s, which was so presciently described in *Policing the Crisis* by Hall and his co-authors in 1979. The chief parallel lies in the inescapable weight of problems to which no solution can be found within the existing framework of ideas and capabilities. During the 1970s, as Hall reminds us, insurgencies of various kinds threatened the governmental and economic system in Britain with virtual collapse. The administrations of Wilson, Heath and Callaghan succeeded one another in rapid succession because of their recurrent failures to resolve the situation. Inflation, strike action, nationalist pressures from Scotland and Northern Ireland, and new axes of social and cultural conflict, were indicators of the depth of the impasse. As had been

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the case in the great crisis of pre-first world war Britain, working-class militancy was the most dynamic force in a many-faceted insurgency against established structures. But what ensued from these conflicts was a political deadlock within a state of apparent chaos, rather than the transformative process of democratisation which rising aspirations of many kinds had inchoately put on to the agenda. Thatcherism did indeed provide a 'counter-revolutionary' alternative of a kind to a failing social and political settlement. The Thatcherites certainly had a clear understanding that their priority was to achieve a decisive defeat of what they saw as a collectivist threat to both markets and social hierarchy. This was, for the right at least, an explicit form of class warfare.

Hall's suggestion is that this solution has, as it were, come around again. Only perhaps this time with the capacity to achieve a decisive resolution of the British crisis in favour of a fully-dominant neoliberalism. But one can interpret this situation differently, in systemic terms. The implosion of the credit crunch has revealed that the apparently continuous prosperity which the UK seemed to have enjoyed, from the post-Black Wednesday years of the previous Tory government to the end of the 'no more boom and bust' years of Brown, was partially an illusion. Britain has been living out the false prosperity of two speculative bubbles, those of house price inflation, and of an unfounded asset boom. Real incomes for the majority have remained largely stagnant over this entire period, as they have even more in the United States. The falling costs of many commodities, due to their production in emerging low-wage economies, and advances in technology (e.g. IT) have, however, led to some rise in consumption in real-value terms.

The Coalition's dominant idea (much more important to it than its 'Big Society') is that the core problem of the British economy has been excessive public spending. Its particular critique is of the alleged excesses of the past ten years, but the implication of its analysis is that the problem is much longer-lasting. Ostensibly and immediately, the problem is to reduce the public deficit, as a defensive operation to protect Britain from the (extremely unlikely) threat of sovereign debt default. But its longer-term purpose is more fundamental: the explicit aim of Coalition economic strategy is radically to alter the balance between private and state expenditures in the British economy.

What grounds are there for believing that a viable model for economic success, and thus of system stability, in the UK can be based on emulating the example

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of the USA? What leading economic sectors and what dormant entrepreneurial capacities does the UK harbour that could enable Britain to manifest an American-style dynamism, once the alleged shackles of high taxation, excessive regulation, and the 'crowding out' by public of private investment, are removed? This is an especially pertinent question given that the American economic model is itself in severe difficulties, and in Britain the best-rewarded and most attractive occupations for ambitious entrants to the labour market for two decades have been not industry but financial services and their associated professions. It is becoming clear that the excesses of the Coalition's deficit reduction programme will slow if not abort the economy's recovery from the credit crunch. But more important even than this is the probability that its implicit economic strategy, a repetition of the Thatcherite 'scorched earth' programme of the 1980s but without its cushion of newly-discovered North Sea oil, will fail. It will prove to be a wager on growth through entrepreneurship that will fail to appear in anything like the scale required. Joseph Stiglitz has argued that the dominant neoliberal approach to the post-crisis situation (of which the Coalition's is but one extreme variant) is flawed, in so far as its downward pressure on employee incomes and social protection merely leads to a state of 'underconsumption' in which few enterprises can grow. Neoliberal ideology has an additional role in this situation over and above that described above by Hall and Massey. In their articles they rightly argue that it rationalises the remaking of an entire social system in the light of its world-view. But it is also specifically 'ideological' in its misrepresentation of what is feasible and attainable through following its prescriptions. For Britain, it is the route to another economic train-crash.

The politics of the coalition

What are the politics of this critical situation? How probable is it that the Coalition will deliver a sufficient economic recovery in four years time to win the further victory for its allied Parties, or for the Conservatives alone, to underpin a neoliberal hegemony for the long-term?

It is becoming evident that the Lib Dems made a major tactical error in joining the Cameron government on the terms they did. By accepting a version of the 'deficit problem' that Vince Cable had opposed during the election campaign, the

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Lib Dems undermined their own credibility, and rendered themselves powerless to contest Tory economic strategy. They seemed to forget that the Tories had failed to win the general election, and that the actual balance of public opinion revealed by the election result was, if one took into account the support for Labour, closer to their own centrist position than to that of the Tories. Only the achievement of electoral reform, even in the weak form of the alternative vote, would have made this arrangement to their advantage, and they were outmanoeuvred on this too.

Until now, the Lib Dems have been trapped by their partners in government. They have been (and still are) at risk of electoral annihilation if the Tories were to declare the Coalition unworkable and demand an election. Having started down the road of compliance, it is difficult for the Lib Dems to depart from it. It has been a remarkable political achievement by Cameron to have achieved this position of domination from the starting point of a partial electoral failure.

But it must be remembered that popular support for the radical Tory project is far from solid. Indeed the Tories are having to make such heavy use of the partially synthetic deficit crisis (while having little to offer on the real economy) for just this reason. The Coalition has acknowledged that the first few years of the government will be difficult. But when the electoral costs of public expenditure cuts and economic contraction begin to affect Tory as well as Lib Dem support, the balance of power in the Coalition may change, and the Lib Dems could regain some autonomy. Indeed they need to do so, to give themselves a chance in the next election.

Lib Dem dissent over the NHS reforms (initiated by Shirley Williams) may be the beginning of a reconnection with that crucial element of the Lib Dems' electoral base which values public services. If opinion moves against the Coalition's neoliberalism (as it eventually did against the Tory governments of the 1990s), the Lib Dems may rediscover this submerged part of their identity. Historical changes in class alignments in Britain are a later theme of this article, and transformations in the Liberal (and now Lib Dem) parties have often been a significant indicator of these.

It is unlikely that the Tories will be able to deliver a credible form of economic recovery, sufficient to give legitimacy to their dismantling of public services and their erosion of public goods. It is because the majority of British citizens, at existing levels of income, cannot afford self-provision in the spheres of social care, education and health, that universal public services remain in demand, and this is why Labour won support for improving them. There is also an attachment to good public

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provision in other spheres (the popularity of the BBC, the enjoyment of public space, widespread interest in conservation), which makes the ultra-individualist agenda of the neoliberals hard to impose on Britain.

It is quite possible therefore that the Coalition's neoliberal plan to resolve the British crisis will fail, and that we will find ourselves within four years with a Labour government or a Labour-Lib Dem coalition - however, one struggling with the same intractable economic problems as those faced by the present Coalition. The major problem may not be how to bring this political outcome about: from Labour's present position, which is by no means as bad as might have been feared two years ago, it may take only reasonable political competence to bring off. The larger problem may be how to convert a positive electoral outcome into an engagement with the problems of British society that transcends the softened and moderated form of neoliberalism which was all New Labour could achieve. A Labour or Labour Lib-Dem programme which merely rows back from the more radical elements of the Coalition will not suffice, as Hall and Massey also argue. Furthermore, looking ahead, another governmental failure to resolve these problems would be dangerous, perhaps opening the way to an irruption from the populist right such as we have seen elsewhere in Europe when decline threatens.

Changing class structures in Britain

In the early 1960s, a debate took place about the failure of what (even then!) was called 'modernisation' in Britain. It was argued that Britain was still unduly oriented towards what remained of its empire, and that its economic development was held back by this priority. A number of economists criticised the overvaluation of sterling, which they held was a consequence of privileging the financial over the industrial sectors of the economy. Excessive expenditures on defence were understood in related terms. The continued power of aristocracy and its networks of patronage, which were deeply entangled in finance and rent-based wealth, were also viewed as obstacles to progress. The most intellectually substantial version of this critique was developed by Perry Anderson, who argued that Britain had failed to achieve an authentic bourgeois revolution of the kind that had occurred in revolutionary France.⁷ As leaders of thoroughly middle-class origin began to take control of both Tory and Labour parties (Wilson, Heath, Thatcher, Callaghan), and

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as 'modernisation' in its various meanings became the dominant motif of successive governments, it might have seemed that this debate had been resolved, in a final triumph of bourgeois norms and mentalities. But such an assumption would be mistaken. Transformations in the order of class and status in Britain have indeed taken place over this half-century, but much in the old order of property, privilege and hierarchy has remained intact.

The critique of the excessive role of banking and finance in the British economy has even more relevance after the credit crunch. Wilson's 'technological revolution' scarcely happened, and what was left of the manufacturing industry which it was intended to modernise was decimated by the deliberately deflationary policies of the 1980s. The ultra-bourgeois Thatcher presided over an economic strategy whose outcome was an even greater domination of the economy by the financial and banking sector than had existed before. The 'windfall' of North Sea oil had the distorting effects on the economy that 'free' mineral resources of this kind often do, making possible the neglect by elites of forms of wealth creation that depend on social co-operation, rather than on a kind of rent. The social relations of oil-rich states are rarely models to be emulated, and Britain has proved no exception.

Will Hutton developed a powerful argument in the 1990s which connected the under-performance of Britain's economy to its systems of governance.⁸ Essentially this was a critique of irresponsible power - of shareholders prioritising short-term financial returns over long-term development, and of a system of corporate ownership which excluded most 'stakeholders' from a significant role in corporate governance. Indeed this pattern of ownership and control ensures that the relations between labour and capital remain largely antagonistic. Hutton's argument was linked to Charter 88's critique of the UK's constitution, which pointed to the privileges of birth and property that denied democratic voice and entitlement to the people. Arbitrary power was thus held to be the dysfunctional essence of governance in both the economic and political spheres.

The UK's continued involvement over this entire period in quasi-imperial military missions is a further indication of how little has changed in terms of its overseas orientation. The 'special relationship' with the United States has always been Britain's means of continuing its imperial role as a protected junior partner, once its own pre-eminence had ended.

What has, however, declined even further is the UK's capacity to steer its own

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economic development. National assertion becomes a mirage when the main arbiters of economic policy have become the global bond market. The state the British economy needs is not a weak state, nor merely a welfare state, but an enabling state, which has the capacity to sustain investment in the long term, and of promoting sustainable models of well-being. The social democratic division of labour which assigns to the state the role of (collective) consumer, and to private capital that of producer, is dysfunctional. Private capital in Britain cannot produce (and has therefore been gifted parts of the public sector in compensation), and the banks will not lend. There is still an urgent need for a new model for British capitalism.

How is it that, despite the many social changes which have taken place in Britain since the 1950s - for example the lessening in superficial distinctions of status - so much of its essential social structure and value-system remains the same? We can understand this more easily if we revisit the 'double shuffle' argument which Hall memorably deployed to characterise New Labour's politics of ambiguity - its justifying of the ways of capital to its property-less voters.⁹ The double shuffle argument can be reformulated to refer to a wider strategy of class rule. Thus the ultra-bourgeois figure of Thatcher not only advanced the values of entrepreneurialism and markets, but also restored the authority of the state and the values of nationalism and empire. Dominant elites have learned to simulate more democratic and classless forms, while giving up little of their real power. The 'genius' of Blair (and of his style-follower Cameron) is precisely to seem 'ordinary' and 'modern', even while their commitment is to the preservation of the established order of property and privilege. Over the last thirty years, bourgeois and aristocratic modes of domination have further intertwined with one another, while the countervailing values of equality, democracy and citizenship have been weakened, as their base in working-class solidarity and collective sentiment has eroded. Not only this, but the 'working class' has become redefined as mere losers - to be morally improved and fitted to compete in the Great Market Society, culturally disrespected and humiliated (the 'chav' discourse), and socially cleansed from 'respectable' neighbourhoods. This is a move back from a society of class to a society of rank.¹⁰ Social evolution in reverse.

Another way of putting it is to say that, historically, the rising bourgeoisie invariably faced a choice of how far to ally itself with the ordinary people, the large mass of the propertyless or working class, and how far with the previously

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established propertied elites, embedded as these are in the great institutions of the state. Whether states became democratic or authoritarian during the last two centuries was largely determined by how these alliances were made. (In Prussia, Austria and Russia in the late nineteenth century, the ancien regime effectively co-opted the bourgeoisie, but where bourgeois-working-class alliances secured power, parliamentary democracies were the outcome.¹¹) In Britain a bourgeois-working-class alliance was instrumental in bringing about parliamentary democracy, with subsequent concessions of economic and social rights to the working class. But the bourgeoisie has always faced both ways. Although aristocracy per se might seem to have disappeared as a force from the British scene, and Thatcherism to have been a wholly bourgeois formation with neoliberalism as its ideology, the reality was always more complex. Norms of hierarchy and inheritance, and imperial and authoritarian attributes of the state, have continued throughout to exercise a shaping influence on British society, and are the legacies of aristocratic domination.

The past thirty years in Britain have seen a regressive development, in which assumptions of privilege and social closure that once seemed to be on the way out have subtly reasserted themselves. The cult of the super-rich, the co-option even of public sector managers into their ranks, the dispersal of the urban poor through housing and benefit policy, the culture of supposed 'excellence' and exclusivity in the university system, the immunity of the banks from retribution for their irresponsibility - all are indicators of this reassertion of the principle of hierarchy. Aristocratic and bourgeois forms of life and of domination appear to have dissolved into one another. Since education in modern technological societies has become a critical resource for the maintenance of wealth and privilege, money and political power are deployed to control access to it, through the public schools and their privileged access to leading universities - and at subaltern levels of the class structure through the covert reintroduction of educational selection. Because the media have become a crucial modern technology of power, its resources and skills must therefore be mastered by dominant elites. David Cameron is emblematic of this social development, an Etonian background having again become, half a century after Alec Douglas Home, an acceptable qualification for national leadership; while Cameron's previous career in public relations helped hone the skills which have become another essential resource in the establishment's repertoire. There is even, it must be said, a kind of dynamism in this development, for example in the monarchy 'modernising' itself through the marriage of Prince William to the graduate daughter

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of a modern entrepreneurial family (and perhaps leaping over the antediluvian figure of Prince Charles in the process). Governmental insistence on its commitment to social mobility and equal opportunity merely distracts attention (and is even a mechanism of unconscious denial) from the larger systemic processes which are making hierarchies steeper and opportunities more restricted. In this context we should note that the heirs of the Liberal Party in Britain - in the nineteenth century the party of the rising middle class, and frequently having played a progressive role in British politics - at the moment have moved closer to the Tory Party, traditionally the representative of old privilege. While the 1940s 'social liberalism' of Beveridge and Keynes articulated the logic of an inclusive class alliance under the aegis of progressive government, the individualist, anti-statist approaches of the Orange Book Liberals reject collectivism, returning to an alliance with the rentier class whose euthanasia Keynes once called for. But these alliances may not be set in stone.

Over several decades a complex process of social regression has been taking place, even as the ideology of liberalism has appeared to be dominant. In some spheres this was restrained by New Labour, in others it was accelerated. However, the British model of capitalism - democratic or otherwise - remains a failing one. The Coalition now offers an improbable remedy - an even fuller embrace of the market ideology that has brought the country to its present crisis. My argument is that a settlement of this kind is unlikely to be sustainable. The challenge for the left is to develop an analysis which can imagine an alternative pathway for development, in its many necessary dimensions. Nothing less than a renaissance of progressive political thinking, in its broadest dimensions, is now required.

Michael Rustin is a founding editor of *Soundings*.

Notes

1. David Lockwood, linking Marxist and functionalist ideas, differentiated 'social integration' (determined by the existence of consensus or conflict) and 'system integration' (determined by whether a social structure experiences 'objective' contradictions). In Britain, while social integration remains strong, with limited institutional or ideological challenges to it, 'system integration' is

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much more uncertain, given pressures on employment and living standards. D. Lockwood, 'Social Integration and System Integration', in G.K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds), *Explorations in Social Change*, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1964. See also my article, 'Reflections on the Present', in *Soundings* 43, 2009.

2. T.H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', in *Sociology at the Crossroads and other Essays*, Heinemann 1963.

3. R. Williams, *The Long Revolution*, Chatto and Windus 1961.

4. K. Marx, *Preface to The Critique of Political Economy*, 1859.

5. M. Desai, *Marx's Revenge: the Resurgence of Capitalism and the Death of Statist Socialism*, Verso 2002.

6. See 'Reflections on the Present' (see note 1); and S. Hall and D. Massey, 'Interpreting the Crisis', *Soundings* 44, 2010.

7. P. Anderson, 'Origins of the Present Crisis', *New Left Review*, 1/23 January-February 1964.

8. W. Hutton, *The State We're In*, Jonathan Cape 1995.

9. S. Hall, 'New Labour's Double-Shuffle', *Soundings* 24, 2003.

10. R. Williams, *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, Fontana 1976.

11. W. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Penguin 1966.