The crisis of social reproduction and ‘Made-in-China’ feminism

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Chinese feminism is heterogenous and reflects local histories and challenges

From the detention of five feminist activists on the eve of International Women’s Day to the increasing numbers of women speaking out under the #MeToo banner, in the last few years a tidal wave of high-profile events has introduced a new generation of Chinese feminists to the global arena. In comparison to their counterparts in previous decades, these young women and their allies are much more outspoken, innovative, and fearless, though they are standing up to one of the most powerful authoritarian regimes in history.

This increased activity and visibility raises many questions. Why are we seeing a proliferation of feminist rhetoric and actions at this moment of Chinese history? What are the political contexts and social conditions that have given rise to such unprecedented social energy? Is the current feminist awakening in China a monolithic force, or does it consist of multiple strands and camps? What should the international left make of contemporary Chinese feminism(s)?

In discussing this current wave, it is important to recognise that feminism in China is not a recent invention. It was born at the turn of the twentieth century.
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during the period when the semi-colonial empire was being transformed into a republic; and it was then profoundly shaped by the mid-century communist revolution, as well as the reopening to the global market after the late 1970s. These legacies from earlier social formations, alongside the complexities of contemporary China's hybrid mix of authoritarianism and capitalism, suggest that an accurate conceptualisation of current Chinese feminism requires analytical devices that go well beyond a discursive boundary of ‘authoritarian state vis-à-vis liberal feminism’. My aim in this essay is to contextualise contemporary Chinese women's feminisms within a new historical conjuncture-in-the-making, in which the country's socialist past, and its ongoing crisis of social reproduction, play crucial roles.

The crisis of social reproduction

In line with a growing number of Marxist feminists, I define ‘social reproduction’ as referring to all those processes and institutions through which the maintenance and renewal of labour power and social bonds takes place - such as cooking, cleaning, caring for the needy, as well as healthcare and education - all of which are indispensable for capital accumulation. A ‘crisis of social reproduction’, then, refers to an intensifying contradiction between capital's need for healthy labour at relatively low cost, and the system's tendency to damage the social conditions that sustain and renew such labour. While this problem is not unique to China, the local socio-political mechanisms that produce such a crisis differ from those in the Global North.

In the North, the neoliberal privatisation of social reproduction that began in the 1980s went hand in hand with the erosion of the postwar family-wage regime and women's unprecedented entry into the labour market. In China, on the other hand, by the 1990s, when the state-controlled privatisation of social reproduction took off, accompanied by both state and societal forces that were pushing career women back to the family, mid-century socialist gender-levelling had already produced a dual-earner-family regime, wherein both women and men held paid jobs. (I will explain later why this historical circumstance is so crucial to understanding the spectacular rise of Chinese feminism in the new century.)

The concept of a crisis of social reproduction as an analytical framework should be distinguished from the official Chinese discussion of a ‘population crisis’. In May 2021, China published its seventh census data, revealing that the country is
experiencing the lowest population growth rate since the 1960s. It is this slowing population growth, and the rapid aging of the population, that have led to a consensus about ‘crisis’ among economists, demographers, media pundits and policy-makers alike. As a result, China’s population policy is undergoing an about-turn. The party-state that implemented the infamous one-child policy for more than three decades, from 1979 to 2015, is now swiftly moving toward pro-natalist imperatives; measures under discussion range from government compensations for each birth in the household, to prolonged maternity leave, and making divorce inconvenient.

It is true that the population is aging faster than that of other countries at the same development level. Yet China is still the world’s most populous country, with 1.41 billion people. From the viewpoint of the state, then, the real problem is not so much having fewer people in absolute numbers as the decline of relatively cheap and young labour, which may jeopardise the country’s continuous growth in both production and consumption.

Framing the current problem as a purely demographic one, and arguing that a fix is needed to boost birth rates, policy-makers have turned away from the underlying problem - namely contradictions in processes of social reproduction, which cannot be resolved by social engineering. The real root cause of the social reproductive crisis, I argue, is China’s two-tier system for the social reproduction of labour. The country’s long-existing urban-rural divide and the unchecked patriarchal-capitalist mode of accumulation of recent decades have combined to create a situation in which migrant workers from rural areas are second-class citizens when it comes to the costs involved in social reproduction. (As I note below, there are parallels here with the experiences of migrant workers in the West.)

The current system of social reproduction has its origins in the pre-Reform era (1949-78), when both industrial and agricultural labour were de-commodified as a result of the communist revolution. The urban state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would use part of their revenues to provide employees with housing, healthcare, schools, and care services - though the comprehensiveness of these programmes varied greatly across sectors and regions, and the gendered division of reproductive labour by and large remained intact. In the countryside, state welfare provisions were generally much less elaborate, though the expansion of basic medical care and primary education did significantly increase rural literacy and life expectancy. This
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system of social reproduction played a vital role in keeping labour costs relatively low in the post-Reform era, especially in the early decades.

Radical changes came in the 1990s. In the urban sector, industrial restructuring led to the laying off of more than 30 million urban workers, the privatisation of the majority of SOEs, and the dismantling of the earlier welfare system. Thanks to militant and continuous resistance from SOE workers across the country, however, some of the welfare provisions for urban workers, including pension schemes and healthcare insurances, were not fully privatised; instead they were transferred to local governments. The privatisation of childcare and eldercare services, due to their high level of reliance on women, hit much less resistance, and these have been increasingly commodified. Today, China is among the very few countries in the world where there is zero government expenditure on care services for children under three. As of 2016, there are 25.42 million paid domestic workers in China - making it the world’s largest domestic service market. But in spite of this considerable transfer of the costs of social reproduction from state enterprises to the individual, urban citizens remained in a better position than their rural counterparts.

Although the state allows agricultural labourers from rural areas to find temporary jobs in urban manufacturing and service sectors, it by and large denies their rights to social welfare in the cities; and, through this restriction of migrant workers’ social reproduction to their home villages, the state has created an attractive environment to foreign capital: there is a ready supply of migrant workers whose full social reproduction costs do not have to be paid for. The most telling case is the well-documented despotic dormitory labour regime in the coastal areas, where private employers only need to pay for labour’s daily reproduction, while leaving other costs to their home villages, where the burden is disproportionately borne by older women.

But this low-cost, dual-system of labour reproduction is about to reach its limit, as a result of deepening marketisation and the state’s re-orientation of its development strategy. Urban industrial restructuring, despite keeping basic pension and healthcare schemes in the public domain, has given rise to sky-rocketing costs in housing, medicine and education, on top of the soaring prices in care services. Moreover, since the early 2010s, the state has set a goal to accelerate urbanisation, with the urban population increasing from less than 50 per cent of the total population to about two-thirds in just one decade. This means that 20 million
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peasants have forgone their land, which used to be both a means of production and a source of social safety net, and their labour is now fully commodified. A rapidly growing urban population, in combination with an insufficient supply of public services, has further driven up the cost of social reproduction, which in turn contributes to declining fertility rates. Even in the rural areas, where labour is not fully commodified, private business has not only made inroads in agribusiness but has also affected the social fabric. The commercial service sector, including the provision of for-profit childcare and eldercare facilities, is swiftly filling up the care void, and thereby fuelling the flight of prime-age labourers from rural China.

Perceiving the crisis primarily as a shortage of cheap labour, and seeking solutions in closely managing the family, especially women, the state has turned from a stringent policy on childbirth to one that encourages birth. While explicit measures rewarding childbirth in the form of child allowances or tax credits still remain in the policy-proposal stages, official discourses emphasising family values and women’s role in caretaking have already been well propagated. President Xi has on multiple occasions expressed his appreciation of ‘traditional Chinese family values’ and women’s particular role within it. There are also changes in the legal realm: the new Civil Code, effective since 2021 and replacing the Marriage Law, stipulates that before a divorce application is approved, the couple have to wait for thirty days to ‘calm down’ and reconsider their decision - a controversial change that is believed to discourage divorce.

The intersectional impact of the crisis

It remains uncertain whether propaganda campaigns and legal changes can effectively boost fertility rates in the long run as the state wishes. But it is pretty clear that its unequal and inadequate system of social reproduction is a major factor in China’s population decline; and, within this, the system has produced uneven consequences among different social groups, intersectionally defined by class, gender and urban/rural citizenship, and has thus exacerbated existing inequalities.

Those being hit hardest are rural families with migrant workers. With parents working in the city and rural care facilities underdeveloped, left-behind children and their aging grandparents suffer from a wide range of issues, from malnutrition, negligence and abuse to crime. And, despite strong grassroots protest, the children who are brought along by their parents to the city are denied access to the public
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school system and other urban welfare services, which are reserved for those with urban residency. As a result, migrant children are often restricted to a wholly privatised, and barely regulated, form of schooling. Ironically, since the domestic care market has become one of the largest sectors employing migrant women, many rural women become substitute mothers/caregivers in their urban clients’ homes, while leaving their own children and parents behind. Under current labour law, individual domestic workers are not considered formal employees, and thus have no employment protection, despite working in a lucrative business (in which profit goes to the agency). Having no formal contracts, protections or benefits, employment can be terminated at any time; and if any injuries or harassment occur in the workplace - that is, in the client’s home - a worker’s only option is to file a civil case, if they have the resources to take action at all. This highly exploitative internal migration system resembles what has been described as ‘the global care chain’, where women from the less wealthy regions of the world work as substitute caregivers in the rich countries. Whereas care workers in the global chain have their wages suppressed and are deprived of rights because of their immigrant status, their counterparts in China are restricted by their rural residency.

In urban families it is also women who disproportionately bear the brunt of the structural problems, but for a different set of reasons. While most urban families have their healthcare, pension, and K-12 education covered by government-assisted schemes, this coverage is so basic that there are many specialist markets that capitalise on loopholes within the system, and for-profit childcare and eldercare is the fastest expanding sector. Meanwhile, the ever-deepening class gap and increasing labour-market competition have convinced middle-class families that intensive parenting and financial investment in their children’s education from the earliest stage is a must. Since a conventional gendered division of labour is still the norm, women - be they wives, mothers or grandmothers - are performing a disproportionate level of emotional and cognitive labour in the family, often also hiring paid helpers for physical and more routine chores. This family need, alongside the state’s re-emphasis on women’s domestic value, has significantly contributed to the decline of the female labour force participation rate - from 73 per cent in 1990 to 60 per cent in 2019, according to the World Bank. During the same period, the average income of Chinese urban women relative to men decreased from 78 to 67 per cent, according to Chinese official reports.
Finally, in this cut-throat environment, children of migrants and the urban poor, who cannot afford elite education and care services, see their upward mobility becoming more elusive day by day. Stories about young people becoming cynical or dropping out have made for interesting headlines, even abroad; there are accounts of migrant drifters who decide to ‘work for a day, party for three’, and of ‘lying-flat’ urbanites who give up on career competition and even refuse to marry and reproduce.

Women’s differing responses to the crisis, and the rise of ‘made-in-China feminism’

Chinese women face systemic appropriation and exploitation of their reproductive labour, but experience this from different social positions, which means that responses to the current system of social reproduction and its simmering crisis have also varied. This section maps out these different positions, before going on to delineate what Angela Xiao Wu and I call ‘made-in-China feminism’ (or C-fem) - that is, women’s agitations at the grassroots level that are transforming the cultural realm.

As mentioned earlier, the unfolding of the social-reproductive crisis in China does not resemble that in the Global North. What makes it distinct are, firstly, the country’s state-sponsored ‘women’s liberation’ under the banner of ‘socialism’ in the mid-twentieth century, and, secondly, the continuation of state intervention in social reproduction. Understanding what the socialist gender-levelling did and did not achieve, I argue, is a key, yet usually neglected, element for making sense of the current dynamic.

Despite their many limitations, the earlier efforts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in promoting women’s liberation, inspired by communist ideologies, did have the effect of significantly narrowing gender gaps in the economic, political and social domains. It is noteworthy, however, that these achievements were not so much given by the male party leaders as fought for by a group of revolutionary feminists working within the party system. The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), established in 1949, represented state feminism, and in the first decades of the People’s Republic implemented a set of progressive policies including equal pay, free marriage, paid maternity leave and public childcare. As a result, a new gender ideal started to take root and ultimately became hegemonic: women, regardless of their marital status, should have a paid job as a way to gain independence and
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contribute to building socialism. The expectation for both husbands and wives (in theory) was that they would each become wage earners and would equally share household chores, childrearing and other care work. The government also built public care facilities to help lift individual families’ care burden. Yet, in practice, campaigns encouraging women to take men’s jobs in the production realm far outnumbered state and community interventions in the domestic realm to transform the traditional gendered division of reproductive and caring labour (except for a short-lived, unsuccessful campaign during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-61).

In the post-Mao reform era (1978 onwards), these socialist feminist legacies, with both their achievements and their limitations, continued to shape the contours of gender politics, even after the CCP started retracting many of its commitments to progressive class, gender and ethnic policies. One example elucidating the reversal on gender norms is the fate of the ‘iron girls’. Once a glorious image, an ‘iron girl’ is typically a young, manly, rural woman, devoting all her energy to collective production; this has now become a derogatory term, as she signifies lower economic status and fails to embody the newly restored traditional femininities, which have been re-connected to class status and access to visible consumption. As well as these other changes, since the 1980s the ACWF has become increasingly marginalised within the state apparatuses, and its power and social influence has started to wither.

Yet many women who came of age during the Mao era continue to believe in the socialist feminist causes that were instilled in them in the earlier period. This is why the civil society-based organisations which started burgeoning in the 1990s were met with enthusiasm by a generation of women lawyers, journalists and scholars, many holding state-sponsored positions, who went on to establish a network of NGOs advocating for women’s and girls’ rights and combating gender-based violence. These NGOs had to negotiate between the ACWF, which had been increasingly subsumed to the central party authority, the non-state sectors that allowed gender discrimination and misogyny to amplify, and the international funding agencies that tried to promote their liberal feminist agenda; and they at first worked effectively as key platforms where urban Chinese women could turn their various resources into leverage for bargaining with patriarchy and empowering their worse-off sisters. Yet, this NGO-based mode of feminism came to an end around 2010, when the state drastically changed its overall approach, both to managing the newly flourishing civil society and to its relationship with international funding agencies. In short,
increasing political pressure and the drying-up of resources have paralysed almost all feminist NGOs, alongside other types of NGOs.

Against the background of a changing structure in social reproduction, which reinstates women’s primary role as caregivers, the last decade has seen the rise of ‘made-in-China feminism’, as well as a backlash that tries to contain it. Intentionally avoiding the generic term ‘Chinese feminism’ in adopting this neologism, we invite readers to appreciate Chinese women’s agitations on their own terms.

Departing from the practices of much extant literature, which glosses over or presumes the actual content of feminism, we acknowledge different kinds of feminisms, and understand them as ‘interpretive constructs’ that are attached to certain configurations of thought and practice under specific historical circumstances. This is a particularly effective approach for studying women’s struggles in the global South, where the concept of feminism, often seen as an import, has caused much confusion and hostility. The perceived ascendance of feminism in any society signals women’s growing awareness of their oppression and exploitation in the existing relations of power, and their intention to do something about it. Such ‘agitation on women issues’ always generates a backlash. Viewed from this perspective, home-grown Chinese feminism is not a single, fixed, entity. It has always been a crucial, albeit contentious, component in China’s major political and social transformations, but it has taken different forms since the beginning of the twentieth century.

As well as the structural factors I have been outlining, what further explains C-fem’s unprecedented momentum is the particular subjectivity of the new generation of urban Chinese women. Born in the 1980s and the 1990s as the single child in their families, these women aspired for equal opportunities in education and career during their formative period, a time when socialist gender-levelling had not faded away. However, their assumed entitlement to equality began to crumble as they moved through the school system and into the workplace, both of which have increasingly blatantly favoured men. The massive discrepancy between this generation of women’s expectation and the reality they have faced has been an abundant source of discontent and grievance, and has provided legitimacy to their actions.

On the vanguard front, one group that has stood out is Youth Feminist Activism, an informal network of college students and young professionals, from both urban
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and rural backgrounds, who have campaigned, protested, fought legal cases and run social media platforms, as well as performing plays and staging walkathons, calling for attention to be paid by the state and society to gender discrimination and violence in all sectors. After five of its most prominent figures were detained by the state in 2015, this activism-based approach became more de-centralised and spontaneous - which does not mean it has become weaker. Quite the opposite.

The Chinese #Metoo movement, which started with a single complaint online in 2018, has now swept the Internet, and has a thousand-page file documenting cases and discussions. In the same year, a Chinese student at the University of Minnesota, Liu Jingyao, filed a lawsuit against Chinese tech billionaire Liu Qiangdong, on the grounds that he had raped her after a business banquet. Despite the ruling not finding in favour of the plaintiff, because of a lack of ‘sufficient evidence’, and the massive volume of the backlash against her on the Chinese internet, Ms Liu has the unwavering support of the Chinese feminist community, and her courage has inspired many more victims to come forward. In another recent landmark case, 28-year-old Zhou Xiaoxun (popularly known as Xianzi), accused Zhu Jun, one of China’s most prominent TV anchors, of sexually harassing her when she was an intern. While Ms Zhou also lost her case, in September 2021, she has decided to appeal. The huge social impact of her lawsuit, and the tremendous support she has received, suggests that sexual harassment continues to gather citizens’ attention and energy.

The vanguard organisations and activists tend to have explicit agendas, pushing for institutional accountability and engaging in legal pursuit. But the grievances and agitations of women in the broader population are usually intuitive or individualistic reactions to the current system, as it tries to subjugate them to the increasingly pronatalist marriage institution. As Wu and I argue, there are two latent strands within this broader population. An ‘entrepreneur’ strand seeks to take advantage of the system by actively cultivating hyper femininities and sexualities in exchange for an opportunity to marry up on the class ladder; an ‘unco-operative’ strand, however, rejects marriage and the reproductive roles imposed on women, and seeks class mobility through their own individual merit, via education and career development. This latter strand is currently surpassing the former, at least in the arena of public discussion, which means it is very unlikely that the state’s goal of pushing all women back into the family, and letting families have more kids, can be achieved any time soon.
Unfortunately, many media commentators, and some analysts, tend to lump these two strands together, and uncritically label them as ‘country feminism’, a derogatory term implying that Chinese women do not understand the ‘true causes’ of feminism, and that their complaints and demands stem from motives of self-interest.

Concluding thoughts: potential sites of struggle and solidarity building

Among some sections of the international left and intersectional feminism there is a shared tendency to accuse local women's discourses and demands of being ‘elitist’ because they do not address class inequality up front but instead focus on individual rights and empowerment. Chinese feminist movements have not escaped this accusation. C-fem has been accused, among other things, of being class blind, biased towards the urban privileged and complicit with consumerism and the neoliberal ethos. However, before judging the ‘essence’ of an energetic movement, we should first contextualise its logic and strategies within the broader political economy of the local regime. In spite of the suffocating political air looming over China, its feminist movement - no matter how de-centred and heterogenous it may be - has impressively continued to gather momentum, and has brought about real changes in the discursive terrain, as well as, sometimes, in the policy domain. The point is not to quickly label it as ‘not progressive enough’, but to learn from local activists about how to navigate such a hostile environment: it is only through such efforts that future solidarity can be built. Likewise, Chinese feminist movements can benefit from sharing experiences with feminist struggles from within and across other regions, especially those in the global South, where historical circumstances and political realities share a similar level of complexity, which often escapes the scrutiny of Northern theory.

To conclude, I set out some areas where organising and solidarity building across national borders may have some potential.

First, many feminists have a shared emphasis on organising care workers, and envisioning new forms of global labour movements, given the increasingly indispensable role such labour plays in society, and the low levels of formalisation and unionisation in such sectors. This discrepancy between demand for workers and a lack of protections and rights is also a feature of the Chinese care-work
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sector, albeit in more extreme ways, as the domestic service market here is totally excluded from the rule of labour law, and chances for unionisation seem bleak, since independent labour unions are not permitted in China. Because of the growing labour shortage in this sector, the state is now experimenting with importing care workers from other countries such as the Philippines. This may represent an opportunity for Chinese and international activists to work together to push the authorities to implement labour laws that meet basic international labour standards. Yet, this is a worldwide issue, and the pathway toward full citizenship for domestic workers seems difficult everywhere, from Saudi Arabia and Japan to the US; while severe abuse and violence against them is widespread. This is partially because care work is still ignorantly deemed as ‘low-skilled’ by virtue of its high degree of feminisation. One common goal for Chinese and global care work activists seems to be raising awareness about the true value and skills required in care work.

Second, despite the state’s sexist policies, Chinese women’s level of educational attainment has reached a historic high. The female labour force participation rates are still among the highest in the world, albeit declining. In other words, Chinese women still constitute an essential part of the country’s economy. This is especially the case given that the country has shifted away from male-dominated sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing and towards the service sector, an increasingly feminised domain. If they do not properly address women’s needs and rights in both the public space and the private home, state measures may provoke further resistance, rather than help fulfil birth quotas. The state seems to be aware of this. In July 2021, the government issued a new policy that promotes gender-based affirmative action in the field of science and technology. Although an insufficient and limited measure in itself, this gesture is welcome, and the proclaimed willingness to promote minority groups should be extended to all sectors.

Finally, Chinese feminists have come to realise that solidarity with labour movements and other activist groups, both inside and outside China, is not only morally desirable but also strategically necessary. As I show in this essay, class, gender and citizenship issues are not operating along separate lines, but are intersecting and re-constituting each other. A change in the system requires challenges to all the issues. There is also a new situation today with regard to building ties with transnational feminism. In the past Chinese activists channelled considerable energy towards seeking resources from the global North, the place from
which hegemonic discourses about women's rights originated, and where funding agencies are located. This unequal mode of collaboration is currently suspended - ironically, due to state intervention. Feminist NGOs - most of them born out of the 1995 UN World Women's Conference - are forbidden from receiving foreign funding and are running out of resources. At this moment, not only are new visions and strategies welcome; they are also essential if the feminist struggle is to survive and sustain itself. While the Chinese #MeToo campaign has already shed some refreshing light on how to forge a de-centralised, online-based movement that can penetrate social life, it is also time to reach out to other women fighting in the global South. This is not because there exists a ‘universalised Southern subject’, rather, it is because, through reflecting together on some of the issues that feminists in these regions share in common - the power relations between the core and periphery in transnational feminism, and the hegemonic narratives that flatten historical complexity and deny agency - they can inspire and uplift each other.

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Notes


2. While Marxist feminists have been theorising social reproduction in relation to gender and class politics for decades, a recent revival of interests has been widely noted. For some recent discussion, see, among others, Tithi Bhattacharya (ed), *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*, Pluto Press 2017; and Nancy Fraser, ‘Contradictions of capital and care’, *New Left Review* 100, 2016, pp99-117.
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3. As of today, more than half of all Chinese migrant workers are older than forty, while just one decade ago, the figure was only 16 per cent.


