Introduction: local communisms within a global movement

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Reviewing the impact of the then recently available archival sources on research into the German Communist Party (KPD), Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten observed that the quintessential question for researchers – the balance between exogenous and endogenous factors in shaping communism – was here to stay.[1] This is a question which has been framed in a number of ways, but in one form or another it is embedded across the varying national historiographies of a transnational movement.[2] The contributions to this issue of *Twentieth Century Communism* – which draws on a selection of papers presented to a conference at the University of Glamorgan (2011) – explore the relationship between the universalising intentions of Bolshevism and the prism of local conditions, which fragmented the light from the East to produce a spectrum of communisms.[3] Each author places the balance – as Koch-Baumgarten termed it – at a different point on the scales in weighing up these exogenous and endogenous influences; but they all, to one extent or another, point towards many shades of 'red', as a diversity of specific 'local' factors reacted with the Soviet-issue pigment.

Before pointing the way ahead to the individual contributions, this introductory discussion first itself engages with this most enduring debate in communist studies, primarily using the German Communist Party as an example. The main point is as basic as it is fundamental: the 'monolith' was undeniably a Bolshevik aim, and was central to western constructions of communism; but the influence of very diverse 'local' conditions meant that it remained an unfulfilled statement of intent.

The monolith as 'over-simplification'?

The dynamics of Soviet communism were a spectre haunting the minds of policy-makers and their academic advisors for most of the past century. In this context, Koch-Baumgarten's question leaped from the book-shelves to take on existential importance in the systemic battle between capitalism and communism. To take one illustrative example, in 1970 the journal *Problems of Communism* held a symposium on the topic 'Myths, Perceptions, Policy', to which the leading lights of Soviet studies were invited, from Alex Nove to Hugh Seton Watson. Andrew Ezergailis's introduction set the agenda, which was framed in a language sounding remarkably contemporary.[4] In response to the then recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and its impact on cold-war Sovietology, Ezergailis identified two myths – or over-simplifications – in how communism was perceived in the West. Firstly, with the rise of Soviet military power and the ability to project this globally after the Second World War, the 'myth of the monolith' reached its apogee in the 1950s; secondly, after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 it had become increasingly fashionable to view communism as 'crumbling' – which implied that the 'monolith' was being eroded in the Soviet bloc as the 'centre' clashed with the 'periphery' in a dialectic of demise. Ezergailis's aim was to caution the symposium's participants against the sorts of 'over-simplification' which led to misjudgement in policy-making. (The journal, we now know, received CIA funding and winning the Cold War was central to its remit.) The delegates, Ezergailis believed, should be aware that the West's image of Soviet Russia and 'world communism' was a changing construct, which shifted with changes in global politics. The Bolshevik aspiration for total control over the parties and movements that the October Revolution of 1917 had breathed life into was not in question; the possibility of communism living in a vacuum sealed off from a diversity of 'local' conditions was.

What can be said with a high degree of consensus is that the 'monolith' remained most intact at the 'centre', if we define this as the Comintern's Moscow-based apparatus. In the mid-1990s an edited collection entitled *Centre and Periphery* drew on the new documentation to set the research agenda.[5] A number of key articles outlined the origins and development

of a highly centralised hierarchy of decision-making in which Bolshevik authority went sufficiently unquestioned that even the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943 went unchallenged.[6] Kevin McDermott's contribution detailed how there could no longer be any question that Stalin, from 1923/24 at the latest, played an increasingly dominant role in the Comintern's top-down policy-making process – not only in the formation of the 'general line' but also at individual decisive moments.[7]

More recent studies of the KPD confirm this, with the outstanding example being Stalin and Molotov's personal intervention in reappointing Ernst Thälmann as party leader after the German central committee attempted to oust him in 1928 to limit the impending 'left turn' and the anticipated purges of more 'moderate' leaders.[8] Another exemplary study of the high-level relationship between the KPD and Moscow has added important details on the Comintern's responses to Hitler's rise to power. Stalin discussed tactics with his German factional supporters – in particular in private meetings with Thälmann and above all Heinz Neumann – but far from always took their advice. These differences, according to Bert Hoppe, derived from the different 'model of understanding' (*Wahrnehmungsmuster*) constructed by differing Russian and German experiences.[9]

But something was missing from *Centre and Periphery*: the periphery stopped at the level of the national party leaderships, and there was no framework for transnational comparison.[10] It was for this reason that the editors of this journal published the volume offering *Perspectives on Stalinization*, which identified the potential for drawing on Hermann Weber's 'Stalinization' thesis as a model offering a conceptual framework for transnational comparison.[11] Although the extent of engagement with Weber's model varied among the contributors, his primary question was in the foreground: how was it possible for the Comintern's national sections to be subordinated to Moscow?[12] The authors deployed a diversity of approaches – exploring centre-periphery issues; making direct as well as indirect comparisons between national communist experiences; deploying culturalist approaches; looking at case studies using 'history from below'; and at biography. In summary, the volume corroborated Weber's Stalinisation thesis, but also problematised it

by demonstrating considerable variation across the national parties in terms of periodisation and impact, whereby different parties were more or less disposed towards implementing the Comintern's changing 'general lines'. The Soviet 'monolith' was now shown to encompass 'local' difference within the overarching similarities of ideology and structure.

Local and national communisms

The KPD, the largest communist party outside Soviet Russia during the 1920s and early 1930s, was almost certainly one of the most fully Stalinised of the Comintern's 'national sections'. Yet, below the national level, more recent studies have detailed how the communist movement continued to be rooted in a diversity of local conditions. The social-history and, subsequently, culturalist methodologies deployed by these studies widened our historical vision from the centralising and universalising drive emanating from Moscow and Berlin to the centrifugal pull of the immediate local environment.

Klaus-Michael Mallmann's influential 'social-political' study subdivided the mass-based national party into four local milieus, which ranged from strongholds in which communism was the dominant party on the left (e.g. Penzberg or the Mansfeld mining region) to areas in which it remained marginal (e.g. Hannover).[13] Penzberg's depiction of a milieu in which the workers' movement was deeply and irreconcilably divided was the least controversial of his categories; it built on the findings of a number of prominent earlier studies that sought to explain the KPD's militant intransigence towards social democracy and the state.[14] Firstly, there were the scars of left-on-left violence during the 'German Revolution', in which the social democrat-led Reich government used the old military powers to suppress localised workers' radicalism, including experiments in 'council communism'. This extended from Berlin to the Ruhr, Bremen, Hamburg and Munich.[15] Secondly, the KPD became a vehicle for articulating the protests of the rising numbers of unemployed and unskilled workers who were thrown out of the factories and onto the streets from the mid-1920s in the process of economic modernisation – or 'rationalisation' – that had been championed by leading social

democrats.[16] Case studies of communist electoral support and the party's presence in the factories have shown that the party increasingly found support among unskilled workers, to an extent that gives a sociological basis to the political division in the workers' movement.[17] Thirdly, violence and confrontation on the streets created 'a party and movement marked by a highly combative, intransigent … political culture'.[18] Finally, the role of the social democrats in the Prussian Diet and Berlin associated them among communism's supporters with cuts in welfare provision and the anticommunism of the capital city's chief of police, Karl Zörgiebel.[19]

More contentiously, Mallmann's study also identified a 'left proletarian milieu' in which the labour movement was politically divided, but both party's 'ordinary' members continued to inhabit the 'niche society' of the pre-war labour movement, spanning the trade unions, sporting and cultural associations and co-operative societies, and could co-operate in specific campaigns. In this setting, the KPD leadership's leftist policy directives were adapted to suit local needs, even ignored; although the impact of the Great Depression was to push the two parties apart at their base. In addition to the Saarland, Mallmann gives examples of this milieu in parts of western Germany, such as Baden and Württemberg.

In Saxony, the fifth largest of the German *Länder*, differing local environments replicated the spectrum of political orientations that Mallmann had delineated at national level. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland (Chemnitz) during the 1920s the KPD was disposed to tactical co-operation with the SPD, from trade union activity to 'joint lists' in municipal elections in order to defeat 'blocs' of parties representing middle-class interests. In neighbouring West Saxony (Leipzig), however, the majority of the membership consistently supported a policy of outright antagonism toward the SPD. A number of specific local variations conditioned the politics and mentalities of the different party wings, from political traditions to patterns of industrialisation.

However, the primary indicator was the relative strength of the SPD's organised subculture. In Erzgebirge-Vogtland the SPD milieu was relatively weak, allowing the communists influence; West Saxony, by contrast, was a stronghold of social-democracy's counter-world,

preventing communist influence which, in turn, deepened the fratricidal division of the workers' movement.[20]

All of these political, economic, social and sociological factors underpin explanations of the KPD's hostility to everything that was not communist during the early 1930s, even regarding social democracy as part of a 'united front' extending from social democracy to the Nazi Party.[21] But they also show that Germany's highly regionalised development created different responses within the communist movement. We should also note that despite the KPD's authoritarian internal structures and dogmatic ideology, it remained active in progressive campaigns – from the campaign to expropriate the inherited wealth of the former royal families in 1926, to the campaign for legal abortion in 1931 and the 'street politics' of preventing tenants from being evicted during the Great Depression.[22]

The studies discussed above illustrate how the 'monolith' fragmented into a mosaic of local communisms within one nation. This finding is reinforced when communisms are compared across national border. One of the most convincing over-arching frameworks for identifying internationally the conditions both facilitating and limiting the rise of communism was put forward in the work of Ian Kershaw, who is best known for his expertise on fascism. Kershaw's survey of differing degrees of political violence in European societies between 1918 and 1950 observed that the decisive factor was the impact of war on existing political cultures. High levels of political violence were found in countries without established (liberal) democratic structures, attitudes and mentalities; in those that had been defeated in the war – which engendered a sense of national humiliation; and in those had suffered territorial losses. It was here that the major ideological cleavages producing mass-based communist and fascist parties existed. By contrast, societies with relatively low levels of political violence – outside of their colonies, which were marked by very high levels of state-sanctioned violence – were characterised by stable democratic structures; had been on the winning side in the war; and had not suffered territorial losses.[23]

This explanatory framework clearly applies to Britain and Germany, whereby political legitimacy and stability characterised the former

and the rise of mass-based communist and fascist movements amid systemic collapse the latter.[24] In the early 1920s, the KPD had more members in the city of Hamburg (c 22,000) than the CPGB had nationally (c 4000). In the general elections of 1932, held under the shadow of the Great Depression, the KPD vote reached within 3.5 per cent of the SPD vote (16.4 and 20.4 per cent respectively); in Britain the CPGB gained 0.3 per cent in the 25 seats in which candidates were fielded.

Size was one reason why the CPGB found it difficult to escape the gravitational pull of the wider labour movement, within which it tended to work as a sort of leftist ginger group. However, the relative prominence of skilled workers in the CPGB – as in the PCF – further disposed activists toward the policy of the Popular Front, in contrast to the support for the Third Period among the KPD's unskilled supporters.[25] These differences in political character between the KPD and the CPGB have also been confirmed in a biographical approach. The KPD chairman, Ernst Thälmann, was projected in the party's propaganda as a Red Front Fighter, who would smash all of the party's enemies – from the priests in the Catholic Centre Party, through the SPD *Bonzen* to the *völkisch* nationalists from President von Hindenburg to the Nazis. Harry Pollitt, by contrast, traded on his credentials as a skilled boilermaker who was active in his trade union.[26]

Even after the homogenising drives of Bolshevisation and Stalinisation there was still relative diversity between and within the communist parties. Some British communists (notably Rajani Palme Dutt) supported the policies of the Third Period, and others (for example Ewan McColl) looked to the German model of activism.[27] Yet, in contrast to the political polarisation and economic 'modernisation' shaping German communism in an increasingly divided workers' movement, British communists stressed high levels of continuity in their political development from the pre-war period in which the wider labour movement was formed.[28] Importantly, too, the British labourite-dominated workers' movement was able to accommodate a range of pro-Soviet views within its 'broad church', to an extent unthinkable in the strongly anticommunist German SPD.[29]

Already in the mid-1920s, the independent minded KPD leader Ruth

Fischer dismissed the CPGB as closer to 'reformism' than communism.[30] These differences in character continued to inform the two parties' relations until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The East German SED was always dismissive of its British 'sister' party on account of its insignificant size and lack of political influence, as well was what was seen as its ever worsening 'ideological deviation' from the Soviet model. There were even attempts to support the CPGB's hardliners in their feuds with Eurocommunism.[31]

Our opening anecdote looked at the how the events of 1968 led researchers to see East-bloc communism as 'crumbling'.[32] At the same time, the 'monolith' in the Western Europe communist parties had been superseded by what, in communist parlance, was referred to as 'polycentrism' – or specific, national roads to socialism.[33] Even if we agree with the view that the Eurocommunism of the 1970s was a fleeting response to a coincidence of national and international crises with no lasting consequence other than to generate internal party divisions, its differing purchase across a diversity of national settings reinforced researchers' interest in the centrifugal pull of specific 'local' conditions.[34] Researchers into Italian communism since the 1970s have emphasised specific national historical developments and political culture in explaining the party's social implantation, or *presence*.[35] Koch-Baumgarten's quintessential question for communist studies had required researchers working on the interwar period to place endogenous and exogenous factors on the scales of historical judgement; however, by the final decades of communism, the question had become wider: as one author put it: 'if the PCI had travelled furthest from Leninist orthodoxy, under given conditions, are communist parties subject to assimilation?'[36] No researcher – and few if any former Eurocommunists – would deny the continuing importance of the Soviet Union and relations with the East bloc; but neither would they claim that the 'Soviet model' for world communism was universally accepted in the world communist movement.[37]

Few of the articles published in this issue cover the postwar period in the depth of treatment given to the interwar years; but all of them to one degree or another engage with the issues surrounding the possibilities and limitations of local communisms. Andreas

Wirsching addresses the tensions produced by Bolshevism's ideological commitment to universalism. These tensions were apparent in Soviet Russia itself, as a multinational entity, as well as in the clashes between the 'local' and the 'centre' beyond its borders. Reflecting on a wider range of 'local' examples, Wirsching demonstrates the impossibility of Bolshevism's aspirations to universalism; yet, for party functionaries, Moscow would always remain the ultimate arbiter in political and moral life. Sebastian Zehetmair offers new insights into the so-called 'Munich Soviet' of 1919. Firstly, he shows the diversity of views within the early KPD concerning localised uprisings and strike movements, making the crucial observation that they were informed by a diversity of regional political dynamics. He then details how these events were re-written in party histories over time, in a manner reflecting the changing ideological demands of the KPD's Bolshevisation and subsequent Stalinisation. From Germany, our attention then turns to France and Spain. Thomas Beaumont uses a case study of the Paris-based railway workers' union to chart the influences of the 'periphery' on the national 'centre', and how this, in turn, shaped a pragmatic and flexible communist trade unionism. Tim Rees illustrates how strong traditions of regionalism in Spanish political culture, which influenced all of the country's parties and movements, ensured that the Spanish Communist Party was never centralised in the manner the Comintern prescribed for its 'national sections'. Shortly before the Comintern's dissolution, Moscow was actually forced to accept the strength of national feeling by recognising 'Catalonian Bolshevism' as an independent member party.

Eryk Martin's article takes us beyond the shore of Europe to Canada and, while outlining the wider political context of Canadian communism, analyses communist narratives (including poetry and songs) in order to demonstrate how local communists' direct experience in forestry work informed an environmentally-friendly stance during the 1930s and 1940s. Our themed section ends with a discussion of communism and Islam within Soviet Russia and internationally. Ben Fowkes and Bülent Gökay address the range of factors facilitating the 'years of alliance' between communists and Muslims, while ultimately noting how the absence of revolution in

the West by 1920 underpinned the turn to the colonised peoples of the East. The promotion of an anti-imperialist foreign policy was a shared objective. Yet, in domestic policy, even before the formal adoption of the New Economic Policy and its compromise with the peasantry to retain power – Muslims were prominent among the peasant populations of Soviet central Asia – Stalin and Lenin were at the forefront of pursuing the 'alliance'. This broke down towards the end of the 1920s with the onset of the 'cultural revolution', and was not resumed internationally until the exigency of Third World national liberation movements revived it in the 1950s. Yet, in the view of Sevket Akyildiz and Richard Carlson, in the final decade of communist rule an Islamic religious identity could coexist with a civic integration into the Soviet system, despite calls for reform. They argue that, unlike the Baltic republics, there was no nationalist cum religious fuelled separatist movement in Uzbekistan, or in Soviet central Asia more generally.

The 'Forum' section continues the theme of 'local' communisms, beginning with a debate between Ad Knotter and Kevin Morgan which takes place within the more usual social-history definition of the term. Their articles engage in differing ways with Stuart Macintyre's classic study *Little Moscows*, but taken collectively provide examples of how new insights can offer fresh perspectives on perennial questions concerning the 'local' in an international movement. Finally, Willie Thompson turns our attention to Scotland, where he offers an insider's view of how the CPGB retained some influence within the overall context of slow decline from the 1960s.

Notes

1. Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten, 'Eine Wende in der Geschichtsschreibung der KPD?', in *International wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, 46, 1, 1998, pp82-89.
2. For the British example, see John Callaghan, 'Review Article: National and International Dimension of British Communist History', in *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 24, 3, 2008, pp456-72.

3. Thanks are due here the Fiona Reid and Lois Thomas for their role in co-organising the conference.
4. Andrew Ezergailis, '"Monolithic" vs. "Crumbling Communism"', in *Problems of Communism*, XIX, 1 (1970), pp1-27.
5. Mikhail Narinsky and Jürgen Rojahn (eds), *Centre and Periphery. The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents*, Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1996.
6. Lebedeva and Narinsky, 'Dissolution of the Comintern in 1943', in Narinsky and Rojahn, *Centre and Periphery*, pp153-63.
7. Kevin McDermott, 'Recent Literature on the Comintern: Problems of Interpretation', in Narinsky and Rojahn, *Centre and Periphery*, pp25-32.
8. See the introductions by Bernhard Bayerlein and Hermann Weber in *Der Thälmann-Skandal. Geheime Korrespondenz mit Stalin*, Aufbau-Verlag: Berlin, 2003; Florian Wilde, 'Ernst Meyer (1887-1930) – vergessene Führungsfigur der deutschen Kommunismus', PhD, Hamburg: 2012.
9. Bert Hoppe, *In Stalins Gefolgschaft: Moskau und die KPD, 1928-1933*, Munich, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007.
10. On the pitfalls of indirect comparison which does not take account of differing national historiographical traditions, see Jürgen Kocka, 'Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German "Sonderweg"', *History and Theory* 38 (1999), pp40-50.
11. Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley (eds), *Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern: Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917-53*, Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2008.
12. For Weber's most recent statement on his work on the KPD, see idem, 'The Stalinisation of the KPD: Old Views and New', in LaPorte, Morgan and Worley (eds), *Perspectives on Stalinization*, pp22-44.
13. Klaus-Michael Mallmann sets out his views in summary in idem, 'Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Kommunismus', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 21, 1, 1995, pp5-31.
14. Mallmann's thesis produced a number of debates. For a summary of these in English, see the introduction to LaPorte, Morgan and Worley, *Perspectives on Stalinization*.
15. Mallmann, 'Sozialgeschichte', pp23-24. For Munich, see the article by Sebastian Zehetmair below.

16. On the role of SPD prominent leaders and 'rationalisation', see Kevin Morgan and Norman LaPorte, 'Learning from the Future? Begegnungen deutscher und britischer Gewerkschafter mit Amerika in den Zwanzigerjahren', in *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung* (JHK), 2012, pp129-144.
17. For a case study of the communist vote in Halle correlating with unskilled and unemployed workers, see Eric Weitz, *Creating German Communism, 1890-1990. From Popular Protest to Socialist State*, Princeton: PUP, 1997, pp246-49. The pioneering studies on the KPD and rationalisation are, Uta Stolle, *Arbeiterpolitik im Betreib*, Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik: 1980; Eva Schöck, *Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung, Frankfurt:* Campus, 1977, Lore Heer-Kleinert, *Die Gewerkschaftspolitik der KPD in der Weimarer Republik*, Frankfurt: Campus, 1983.
18. See, for example, Eric Weitz, 'Communism and the public spheres', in idem and E. Barclay (eds); *Between Reform and Revolution*, New York: Berghahn, 2003.
19. Andreas Wirsching, *Von Weltkrieg zum Bürgerkrieg? Politischer Extremismus in Deutschland und Frankreich 1918–1933/39*, Munich: Oldenburg, 1999, esp. pp22, 325, 360, 410, 610.
20. Norman LaPorte, *The German Communist Party in Saxony, 1924-1933*, Oxford, Bern: Peter Lang: 2003 esp. chapter two.
21. Eve Rosenhaft, *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929-1933*, Cambridge: CUP, 1983, esp. 7ff, 18ff, 26.
22. Eve Rosenhaft, 'Communisms and Communities: Britain and Germany between the Wars', in *Historical Journal* 26, 1, 1983, pp. 221-36.
23. Ian Kershaw, 'War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe', *Contemporary European History*, 14, 1, 2005, pp107-23.
24. The following section draws on Norman LaPorte and Matthew Worley, 'Towards a Comparative History of Communism: The British and German Communist Parties to 1933', in *Contemporary British History*, 22, 2, 2008, pp227-255.
25. Comparison between the PCF and the KPD is the subject of Wirsching's major work on this topic, see idem, *Vom Weltkrieg*. For a summary in English of issues relevant here, see idem, 'The Impact of "Bolshevisation" and "Stalinisation" on French and German Communism: A Comparative

View', in LaPorte, Morgan and Worley (eds), *Perspectives on Stalinization*, pp89-104.

26. Kevin Morgan and Norman LaPorte, 'Der Rote Frontkämpfer und der militante Gewerkschafter', in *JHK*, 2008, pp68-79.
27. For a critique of the literature discussed below, see Callaghan**, '**British Communist History'; idem, *Rajani Palme Dutt. A Study in British Stalinism*, Lawrence and Wishart: London, 1993, pp76f.
28. Kevin Morgan et al, *Communists and British Society, 1920–1991*, London: Rivers Oram: 2007, esp. pp49-55.
29. See Kevin Morgan, *Bolshevism and the British Left*. Parts 1 & 2, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2006; see also his article below.
30. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik. Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionären Bewegung*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996, p71.
31. Stefan Berger and Norman LaPorte, *Friendly Enemies. Britain and the GDR, 1949-1990*, Oxford: Berghahn, 2010, esp. pp148-53, 167-71, 185-94, 237-40, 304-5.
32. The impact of 1968 in the international communist was discussed in a previous issue of this journal, see Richard Cross, 'Introduction', in *Twentieth Century Communism*, 3, 2011, '1968 and after – between crisis and opportunity', pp5-13.
33. Rick Simon, 'Eurocommunism', in Daryl Glaser and David M. Walker, *Twentieth Century Marxism. A Global Introduction*', Abingdon: Routledge: 2007, pp81-118.
34. Willie Thompson, *The Communist Movement Since 1945*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, p170; François Furet deals with Eurocommunism in a single page, see idem, *The Passing of an Illusion*, Chicago: UCP, 1999, p492.
35. For an example of contemporary approaches to this topic, see Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (eds), *Communism in France and Italy, Princeton*, Princeton University Press, 1975. For Tarrow's more recent research, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, Cambridge: CUP, 1998.
36. Giuseppe de Palma, 'Eurocommunism?', in *Comparative Politics*, 9, 3, 1977, p369.
37. For a discussion of relations between the western European communist

parties and the SED, see Arnd Bauerkämper and Francesco Di Palma (eds), *Bruderparteien jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs: Die Beziehungen der SED zu den kommunistischen Parteien West- und Südeuropas (1968-1989)*, Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2011.