

‘Little Moscows’ revisited. What we can learn from French and German cases

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In 1980 Stuart Macintyre published his *Little Moscows: Communism and Working-Class Militancy in Inter-war Britain*.¹ The book showed that in the interwar years, in some small, isolated places in Britain, communists were able to attract a substantial following at a local level. In the ensuing debate British historians have questioned the specificity of these ‘Little Moscows’ as isolated places of exceptional communist support. John Foster argued that they were only extreme examples of working-class militancy in many parts of Europe after World War I, but this begs the question why some places became, and remained, more prone to communism than others.² Some have argued that the ‘Little Moscows’ were not so special, because most of them were situated in larger areas of communist implantation, like in the well-known case of ‘Little Moscow’ Mardy in the Welsh Rhondda Valleys mining district, where, according to Chris Williams, this kind of local communism was only a radicalised manifestation of a wider regional militancy.³ Nevertheless, also in these areas there were extreme local variations. In Rhondda East for instance, the communist presence in Mardy (population c. 9,000) contrasted sharply with the relative weakness of the party just a mile or two away. The electoral history of Scottish ‘Little Moscow’ Lumphinnans (population c. 2,500) in Fife presents a stark contrast to nearby Cowdenbeath and Lochgelly, only a half-hour’s walk away, where the communists never outpolled the Labour Party.⁴ So, within the wider regional context of these cases, we can still find a localised kind of small-place communism.

To explain this phenomenon, Macintyre referred to ‘a sense of community, rooted in work and residence’, which local communist militants were able to mobilise in such a way that their policies were identified with the general interest of the community.⁵ This part of Macintyre’s explanation is closely linked to the idea of isolated communities producing a radical attitude, based on a strong occupational identity. This would explain why most of them were mining communities. The argument has a long tradition in sociological research, both in studies on strike propensity (the notorious ‘isolated mass’⁶), and on ‘occupational communities’, more specifically those of miners.⁷ However, Macintyre acknowledged that, the ‘Little Moscovs’ ‘were subjected to the same social and economic processes that bore on other working-class localities [...] and [that] the local cultures that informed their responses were not markedly different from those in adjoining areas’. In the end, according to Macintyre, ‘the intensity of their [the ‘Little Moscovs’] efforts to protect themselves and improve their lot owed much to the calibre of their leaders. These were able individuals of immense courage whose communism provided them with an unshakable confidence in the justice and ultimate success of their struggle’.⁸ So, the ultimate explanation of small-place communist success is to be found in the convictions and extraordinary abilities of local communist leaders, like Abe Moffat in Lumphinnans, or Arthur Horner in Mardy.

The argument that communal isolation – especially in occupational communities like mining villages – produced a kind of radicalism that perhaps made these communities more communist-prone than others, has been brought to the test by Roy Church and Quentin Outram in a statistical analysis of miners’ strike propensity in Britain.⁹ Church and Outram themselves invoke the Welsh ‘Little Moscow’ Mardy as an example of such a community, but in their statistical analysis they show that ‘massed isolation’ of miners elsewhere by no means guaranteed high levels of strike activity. So, if we use this as a proxy for political radicalism, the outcome is not encouraging for an explanation of local communism being produced by the geographical isolation of occupational communities. If we accept the proposition that strike propensity and susceptibility to

communism were somehow related, we have to conclude that being an isolated occupational community in itself cannot explain the success of communism in some of these.

Should we therefore fall back on the second part of Macintyre's explanation, that it was quality of leadership which caused local communist success? In a social history of British communism, based on extensive prosopographical research, Morgan, Cohen and Flinn have indeed argued that local communist attachments resulted from a 'multiplier effect whereby the establishment of an effective party presence would itself then attract new recruits from environments hitherto untouched by communism'. This 'snowball effect [...] might help explain the extremely localised pattern of communist implantation'. Later they reiterate their claim that: 'it is [...] quality of leadership, in the sense of personal example, capability and articulacy, that best explains the more localized variables of communist implantation in Britain'.¹⁰

Of course, local politics always requires personal activism, and electoral results also depend on the availability of popular and respected candidates, but for me this kind of reasoning is not really convincing. It has to be valued as an attempt to replace the structuralism of the concept of the isolated occupational community by the agency of communist leadership, but in my view personal agency alone cannot explain why some communities proved more receptive for alignment with communist leadership than others, and why some developed into such persistent local strongholds. For an explanation of the institutionalised communism in these places we have to overcome the simple dichotomy of communal isolation versus personal leadership, and look for both (more) contextual features and for collective agency behind their emergence as local counter communities.

In this article, I want to show that studies of small-place communism in Germany and France can provide insights into this phenomenon that can perhaps help us to understand better the British cases too. Small-place communism, both industrial and agrarian, can be found all over Europe since the interwar period, but to my knowledge only French, and to a lesser extent German, cases have been studied thoroughly enough to compare them with the British ones.¹¹

Germany: isolated industrialisation

In Germany, the work of Klaus Tenfelde is important. In his study of the small mining township of Penzberg (with a population 6,491 in 1933), near the Austrian border in Upper-Bavaria, he introduced the concept of *punktueller Industrialisierung* ('isolated industrialization') to explain the radicalization of the miners there before 1933.¹² Electoral results of the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (German Communist Party, KPD) in Penzberg fluctuated from a low point of 10.8 per cent in 1928 to a high point of 44.1 per cent at the Reichstag election of July 1932, while in the nearby mining town of Peißenberg the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party, SPD) held the upper hand, with fluctuating results there for the KPD between 2.8 per cent in 1928 to 19.1 per cent in November 1932. Neighbouring communities were very hostile towards the 'nest' of communists (*Kommunistennest*) in Penzberg. On the eve of liberation (on 29 April 1945) this hostility even resulted in the murder of several socialists and communists by radicalised Nazis from the surrounding villages.¹³

Later, Tenfelde expanded and generalised his argument: 'wherever industrialization happened [in] one single industrial community, similar signs of militancy and tensions within the environment could occur'.¹⁴ The argument has been applied to other German cases of small-place communist implantation, especially in research connected with the resistance to the Nazi dictatorship in this type of places after 1933.¹⁵ Apart from Penzberg, the porcelain manufacturing town of Selb (population 13,366 in 1925), which is also in Bavaria near the Czech border, is a clear example. Communist electoral results in Selb reached a steady, and in the wider border region and in Bavaria as a whole exceptional, 30 per cent during the 1920s and early 1930s.¹⁶

Both Penzberg and Selb had experienced a fairly recent economic upsurge in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. There were only a few farmsteads in Penzberg in the middle of the nineteenth century; workers' housing was erected here by the mining company from the 1870s, and, together with the mining labour force, Penzberg's population grew from 1,620 in 1880 to 4,000 in 1910, attracting migrants from a range of neighbouring countries.

The first generation of miners in Penzberg had arrived at the end of the nineteenth century from a mixture of nations belonging to the neighbouring Austrian-Hungarian Empire: Slovakia, Croatia, Bohemia, and South Tirol. After the turn of the century, the town grew primarily by natural increase. This affected the age structure significantly: it was a relatively young community. As a consequence, most miners recruited in the 1920s were born in Penzberg itself, and this was reflected in the KPD leadership in the 1930s; most of these party leaders were born there, largely around 1900. In 1932 all party members were below forty years of age. Tenfelde writes about a radicalisation of this generation, building up after the First World War. Judged by the demographic history of the locality, these must have been second generation migrants. At least two-thirds of the KPD members in 1931 were miners, and probably 80 per cent were related to the mine or belonged to miners' families. In nearby Peißenberg, where the KPD remained much weaker, almost all miners originated from miners' families from the town itself.¹⁷

The porcelain industry in Selb had been established there in the 1850s, but only developed at a moderate pace until the 1890s, when a sudden expansion started. Like Penzberg, Selb at first experienced a high rate of immigration, but even before the First World War the birth rate began to determine its population growth. So, again like in Penzberg, its population was relatively young. The KPD leadership in the porcelain town of Selb counted many migrants who had arrived from nearby Saxony, Thuringia and the Czech lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the First World War. Commuting by porcelain workers from the Czech border town of Asch (Aš), just a few kilometres from Selb, was quite common. The number of workers from Bohemia in Selb was estimated at 25 per cent. Asch also had a sizeable communist electorate (39.9 per cent in 1932).¹⁸

There were more isolated centres near the Czech border with a strong communist electoral base, like the glass manufacturing village of Frauenau (with a population of 3,026 in 1933), known as the red glass city or Bavaria's red island.¹⁹ Communist membership in these places did to a large extent reflect local occupational specialisation. In 1920, almost all KPD members in Selb worked in the local porcelain industry (as both skilled and unskilled workers). In 1931 all leading communist

figures in Selb were porcelain workers. In Frauenau, the KPD was the party of the glass workers, at least half of its candidates worked in one of the glass factories.²⁰

According to Georg Goes, who compared the political attitudes of four glass and porcelain towns in southeast Germany, communist preponderance was related to late industrial development: 'Industry being established relatively late, even fairly recent, [...] is a characteristic of industrial communities with a large communist electorate'.²¹ Hartmut Mehringer, in his study on the KPD in Bavaria, also related the implantation of the KPD in specific places to late industrialisation in isolated industrial communities within agrarian surroundings; the labour force in these new industries consisted of casual workers and small peasants, recently recruited from in the surrounding countryside, and of more experienced workers from industrial districts elsewhere.²²

These German (Bavarian) examples of small communist strongholds were all isolated occupational communities – of miners, porcelain or glass workers. In the British cases we have seen that this in itself would not be sufficient to explain communist success. Therefore it is important to note that Tenfelde and others have added an historical dimension to this sociological concept by introducing the argument of *recent* industrialization. The sudden industrial development (*punktueller Industrialisierung*, to cite Tenfelde) of these places had 'lifted' them, so to say, out of the surrounding countryside, and had radicalised the newly established immigrant population.

France: regional variations

In France, research on the regional implantation of the *Parti Communiste Français* (Communist Party of France, PCF) started in the 1970s with studies by communist historians of the *Institut Maurice Thorez*, and has been expanded by historians around the journal *Communisme*.^{23 24} This kind research had to deal with a tradition in French electoral geography, which postulated a continuity of regional variations in electoral strength from democratic republicanism in 1849 to twentieth-century socialism and communism.²⁵ The anthropologists Le Bras and Todd delved even deeper into the past by arguing that the regional implantation of

communism in a broad strip of land stretching from the north-west to the south-east of France was related to the decay of the traditional extended family systems in this area. Elsewhere, they presented an even more essentialist explanation: the particular structure of communist implantation in this area corresponded with a contact zone of Celtic, Germanic, and Roman cultural encounters.²⁶

Against this kind of ahistorical and essentialist reasoning, there are a wealth of studies stressing the temporal and spatial specificities of communist implantation in France. In a brilliant essay on 'the making of the French working class', Gérard Noiriel related communist success during and after the Popular Front era in the 1930s to the late industrialisation of France in the 1920s and the influx of new generations of workers – both immigrants from the countryside and from abroad – in the newly erected fordist enterprises of the time, epitomised by the 'metallo' as an icon of the communist worker in France.²⁷ Research on the regional implantation of the PCF revealed a great variety, both inside and outside the larger zones of communist electoral success.²⁸ A striking example can be found in the Limousin and Dordogne regions, in the heart of the so-called mid-French 'contact zone', as identified by Le Bras and Todd. Laird Boswell, who did extensive research on the peculiar agrarian communism in these regions, could identify several places where right-wing parties had done consistently well throughout the last century, even in the Corrèze department in the Limousin where the PCF generally scored highly. Such was the case, for instance, in the canton also called Corrèze, bordered on three sides by the cantons of Seilhac, Treignac, and Bugeat, which were among the 'reddest' in the department and in France as a whole. The differences at village level could also be substantial: in the 1936 election the PCF obtained no votes in the Corrèze village of Meyrignac, while it received 36 and 54 per cent respectively in nearby Beaumont and Grandsaigne in that same year. The social and family structures in these cantons and villages were similar, however.²⁹

Inside and outside the larger zones of communist implantation many examples can be found of isolated communities of exceptional communist success, sometimes strikingly resembling the German cases of 'isolated industrialisation', as described by Tenfelde. For instance, the

case of Boucau in the South-west of France near Bayonne, a communist stronghold since the 1920s, where the installation of the steel plant *Les Forges de l'Adour* in 1884 led to a sudden growth from 2,500 inhabitants in 1880 to 4,935 in 1901 and 5,568 in 1936. Immigrants came in successive waves: first, at the end of the nineteenth century, from the surrounding countryside of Les Landes, and also the Basque country and the Béarn region; then there followed groups of steel workers fleeing from occupied Alsace-Lorraine, and, during the First World War, many migrants from nearby Spain. Boucau, together with adjoining Tarnos, became a real island of workers in a predominantly rural area.³⁰ This pattern can also be recognised in the small French glove-making town of Saint-Junien in the Limousin near Limoges (population 10,645), where the PCF reached 63.9 per cent of the vote in 1936. *Petit Moscou* Glane, part of Saint-Junien, had undergone a transformation from an agrarian village to an industrial neighbourhood in the 1860s and 1870s, and it saw its population increase rapidly at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, partly by immigration from the surrounding countryside.³¹ Before 1914 Saint-Junien became a centre of anarchism, which in the 1920s turned to communism.

Generations of migrants

Because they have been studied thoroughly, it is possible to select three small communist strongholds in France for further analysis: the textile town of Halluin (population 13,278 in 1936) in the far north at the Belgian border;³² Sallaumines (population 14,541 in 1954) in the coal-mining basin of Pas-de-Calais;³³ and Villerupt (population 11,005 in 1926) as an example of the Lorraine iron-mining communities at the Luxembourg border near Longwy. The last area is particularly interesting as the PCF succeeded in conquering these communities only after the Second World War, in contrast to the others, which date from the interwar years.³⁴ However, communism gained the upper hand only in iron-mining communities, and it remained very weak in older boroughs and the central towns. Also, among Lorraine coal miners the communist following remained very weak.³⁵

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Longwy region was a

small, sparsely populated rural canton, composed of dozens of villages. In 1861, Villerupt counted 561 inhabitants. The region's first industrial development dates from the 1870s, but shortly after 1900 a real industrial euphoria started, when new layers of high quality iron ore were discovered. Mining suddenly expanded, as did steel manufacturing. Labourers were recruited from the surrounding countryside, from across the Belgian border, and from Italy, the latter almost exclusively to work in the iron mines. Growth continued until 1930, with migrants from many countries if mostly from Italy. In 1928, Villerupt counted 21 nationalities in a population of around 10,000. Some fifty years before, in 1881, it had only 1,226 inhabitants, exploding to 8,569 in 1911.³⁶ The region as a whole has been characterised as a series of worker colonies (*cités ouvrières*) around industrial plants, monotonous agglomerations hardly ever exceeding 10,000 inhabitants. Migrants were concentrated in these *cités*, while the French continued to live in the old villages. It is in these suburbs without cities (*banlieues sans villes*, referring to the communist dominated *banlieues rouges* around Paris), as Serge Bonnet called them, that communism found its strength, not in the older villages or urban centres like Longwy itself.³⁷

After the immigration ended in the 1930s a stable workforce emerged, composed of second generation Italians, who entered the mines and the steel works in this period. They were the basis of post-war communist success. Representatives of this second generation took the lead in implanting the PCF during the 1930s and, especially, during wartime *Résistance*. For second generation Italians, adhering to the PCF and participating in the resistance were a means to accomplish their integration into France and to acquire a national identity.³⁸ In the late 1950s and early 1960s the communists won control of the *mairies* of municipalities with a large Italian presence: Villerupt in 1959, somewhat later also Longlaville, Saulnes and Mont Saint-Martin near Longwy.³⁹

In the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais the PCF became well-established in the coal mining districts, more particularly those east of Lens, but its local implantation there was also very irregular. Sallaumines (near Lens) already stood out in the elections of 1924 with the PCF taking 30 per cent of the votes. Yet in other mining communities in this area its results were quite modest, around 2-3 per cent. Sallaumines

proved to be very loyal during the 1920s and 1930s, and in 1935 the PCF gained a majority there, but in adjacent Noyelles-sous-Lens the socialists held on to their lead.⁴⁰

In the coal mining communities in Pas-de-Calais, continuous growth of production and employment in the mines between the 1860s and the First World War had resulted in a steep increase of the population in both Sallaumines and Noyelles-sous-Lens, partly owing to migration from the surrounding countryside in Pas-de-Calais, from more distant regions in Kabylie (Algeria), and above all Belgium. In the 1850s these had been small villages of 628 and 190 inhabitants respectively. There were important differences between these small mining towns, however: between 1851 and 1911 Sallaumines grew by 77.4 per cent, Noyelles by 'only' 32.9 per cent.⁴¹ In spite of their apparent resemblances as mining towns, Sallaumines and Noyelles-sous-Lens differed by the speed of industrial development, population growth, and spatial restructuring.

In Sallaumines new housing for miners' families was built to keep up with demographic growth. Few remnants of the old village remained, the more so after its destruction during the war. Noyelles developed more gradually, without these effects on its spatial structure. The new miners' quarters were separated from the old village, which kept its integrity, organised around the church as a symbol of traditional society.⁴²

Post-war reconstruction in the 1920s attracted new waves of migrants to the French coalfields, this time of Polish origin; both experienced miners arriving from the Ruhr (so called *Westphaliens*) and from Poland itself. Both in Sallaumines and Noyelles two-thirds of population growth in the 1920s was a result of Polish migration; in the 1920s almost half of the population were Poles. Until the 1930s net migration accounted for 62.4 and 67.9 per cent of growth in both villages, but, like in the Lorraine, in the depression of the 1930s migration came to halt; many Poles were even sent home. While in the 1920s the first generation of Polish migrants lived and organised separately in what were actual ghettos in both communities, in the 1930s the remaining Poles began to adapt to the different political milieus of each town. Social and political integration was only achieved by a second generation of Poles after 1945, however, when this generation, born in France, started their working life. In Sallaumines they were rapidly assimilated into the local community

by means of mixed marriages, common trade-union militancy, an estrangement from the Polish priest, and political support for the PCF. In Noyelles, things developed differently: until the 1950s Polish inhabitants remained segregated in their isolated *cités* and organised their own social life.⁴³ Arguably, the structural social differences between both mining villages can be considered part of the explanation of the difference in voting behaviour. In general, different political attitudes in mining communities in interwar Pas-de-Calais have been attributed to a restructuring and renewal of the mining labour force before 1914 in what later became communist localities.⁴⁴

While the PCF gained a majority in Villerupt in 1959, and in Sallaumines in 1935, in its other northern stronghold of Halluin this had already been achieved in 1920. From the end of the nineteenth century, socialism was introduced there among Flemish migrants (and their descendants) and cross-border commuters by propagandists from their Flemish socialist home town of Ghent (just 60 kilometres away), but the town remained politically isolated. The neighbouring communities in the *Vallée de la Lys* were very hostile toward communist Halluin. Politically it was a besieged citadel.⁴⁵ In 1920, the socialist majority on its municipal council, which had been elected in 1919, adhered in its entirety to the Third International, and managed to hold on to this majority as PCF representatives in the following elections.⁴⁶ Interestingly, the whole sequence of fast but isolated industrial development, population growth predominantly owing to immigration, then stabilization, and political radicalisation of the second generation can be found in Halluin too, but in an earlier period.

Its urban growth in the nineteenth century was 'disorderly', according to Michel Hasting, especially between 1850 and 1870, when Halluin was 'destabilised' by the influx of Flemish migrants. As a booming textile town, it became one of the destinies of the waves of emigrants from 'poor Flanders' in the 1850s and 1860s. In the fifteen years between 1851 and 1866 Halluin's population increased by an average of 10 per cent annually, from 5,408 to 13,673. At that time, it was the fastest-growing town in the northern textile region as a whole. After 1866, growth slowed down, with Halluin's population peaking at 16,599 in 1901. Thereafter, population stabilized, and later even diminished by

several thousands. The proportion of 'strangers' born outside of France (almost all of them Belgians) rose to about 75 per cent in the late 1880s and early 1890s (much higher than in other northern textile towns), but after that it quickly fell until it reached about 25 per cent after 1918. A process of indigenization is clearly visible: Halluin's interwar inhabitants were mostly born to second or third generations of Belgian descent.⁴⁷

Unsurprisingly, the labour movement in Halluin had a distinct Flemish 'flavour' from its beginnings at the turn of the century. Many of the early socialist and trade union leaders were to become communists in 1920. On the basis of a sample of twenty-eight socialist militants known in 1912, Hastings concludes that at that time they were relatively young (in their thirties). Three-quarters had been born in Halluin from parents born elsewhere; the others had arrived from small Belgian villages in the neighbourhood. So again, these were predominantly second generation migrants. As in the case of the Italian electorate in the Longwy region voting communist after 1945, there is a clear correspondence between the presence of increasing numbers of settled and naturalised Flemish migrants and the rise of socialism in Halluin before 1914.⁴⁸ A sample of 96 communist militants in 1925 confirmed their 'flemishness': 84.2 per cent had been born in the town itself, but 82 per cent had Belgian parents, and can be considered second or third generation. This corresponded with the composition of elected working-class members in the municipality: 90 per cent were born in Halluin and 88 per cent were of Flemish descent. Like Michel Hastings, we may conclude that: '*Halluin la Rouge* was the adventure of a *communisme générationnel*, like that of Longwy studied by Gérard Noiriel'.⁴⁹

The industrial communities described above, both in Germany and France, had emerged from small, mostly agrarian villages, or were constructed as completely new settlements. Most of them started to grow around 1890 or 1900. These places were isolated, recently developed, and mono-industrial boom towns, populated by a wave of migrants from the surrounding countryside or by specifically recruited foreign workers, who had formed mono-occupational, pioneer societies. Metaphors used to designate these places – *citadelle assiégée* (Halluin), *Kommunistennest* (Penzberg), *das rote Insel* (Frauenau), illustrate their political isolation. Second generation migrants turned to communism and built occupational

communities. In the German cases, this generational aspect could be deduced from their demographic history; in the French cases it was central to the argument. Interestingly, the French examples make clear that the turn towards communism by second-generation migrants could happen in different periods. In Halluin it was relatively early, preceding the First World War, and culminating in a communist majority just after it. These were second generation Flemish migrants. In the mining communities in Pas-de Calais, such as Sallaumines, that turn took full effect in the 1930s. These were second generation migrants from the northern French countryside, and later also Polish miners. In the mining communities in the Longwy region, the communist breakthrough came only at the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s. These were second generation Italian migrants.

Return to Mardy

Of course, on the basis of this selective number of cases it is impossible to decide whether the characteristics of the places concerned can be considered necessary or sufficient conditions for communist success in others. Nevertheless, in my view, it would be interesting to look anew at Britain's 'Little Moscows' with these characteristics in mind. There are at least some striking resemblances between the cases of small-place communism described above and 'Little Moscow' Mardy. Within the British coalfields, communist communities might not have been more isolated than others, but this was certainly the case with Mardy. Before the 1920s, Mardy had been a new and booming part of the Rhondda coal rush, attracting both Welsh and English 'immigrants' since the opening of its collieries in the 1870s. It was distinctive, both because of its geographical isolation and the lateness and swiftness of its growth. Its workforce was mobile and variegated, and had only recently settled there. Between the 1870s and 1909, Mardy had grown from just a farm house to a settlement of 880 dwellings, housing 7,000 inhabitants, reaching nearly 9,000 by the end of the First World War.⁵⁰ The *South Wales Daily News*, reporting on Mardy as 'Little Moscow' in 1926, wrote about 'the young Communists of Mardy',⁵¹ and these must have often been second generation immigrants, born in Mardy itself. Macintyre notes that the

lateness of economic development of Mardy perhaps accentuated the mix of English immigrants and those from the Welsh-speaking hinterland,⁵² and according to Morgan, Cohen and Flinn in the Rhondda generally the emergence of militant socialism was strongly identified with newcomers to the area, pointing at the overrepresentation of leading communists of English descent, like Arthur Horner himself.⁵³

To reach more substantiated conclusions about other 'Little Moscows' in Britain would, of course, require much more research, including comparisons with isolated occupational communities that remained untouched by communism. The common characteristics I found can only serve to construct a taxonomy for further research from a local perspective. It would be even more interesting to extend this kind of research to other European countries, or, indeed, the world.

Notes

1. Stuart Macintyre, *Little Moscows: Communism and Working-class Militancy in Inter-war Britain*, London, 1980.
2. John Foster, 'A proletarian nation? Occupation and class since 1914', in A. Dickson, J.H. Treble, *People and Society in Scotland*, Volume 3: 1914-1990, Edinburgh, 1992, p227, cited in Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen, Andrew Flinn, *Communists and British Society 1920-1991*, London, 2007, p28.
3. Chris Williams, *Democratic Rhondda. Politics and Society, 1885-1951*, Cardiff, 1996, pp181-4.
4. Morgan et al, *Communists and British Society*, p30; MacIntyre, *Little Moscows*, pp49, 181-2.
5. Ibid, p177.
6. Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, 'The interindustry propensity to strike – an international comparison', in A. Kornhauser et al (eds.), *Industrial Conflict*, New York, 1954, pp189-212.
7. Martin Bulmer, 'Sociological models of the mining community', in *Sociological Review* 23, 1975, pp61-92.
8. Macintyre, *Little Moscows*, pp193-4.
9. Roy Church and Quentin Outram, *Strikes and Solidarity. Coalfield conflict in Britain 1889-1966*, Cambridge, 1998, pp132-172.

10. Morgan et al, *Communists and British Society*, pp30, 112.
11. In this article I build on research done for my "Little Moscows" in Western Europe: The Ecology of Small-Place Communism', in *International Review of Social History* 56, 2011, pp475-510.
12. Klaus Tenfelde, *Proletarische Provinz. Radikalisierung und Widerstand in Penzberg/Oberbayern 1900-1945*, Munich, 1982.
13. Ibid, pp161, 191, 369-382. On the label Kommunistennest: p1.
14. Klaus Tenfelde, 'Social Consequences of Isolated Industrialization: The Case of Germany', in Sakari Hänninen et al (eds), *Meeting Local Challenges – Mapping Industrial Identities*, Helsinki, 1999 (pp108-121), p116. The subject of this volume, Karkkila (Högfors), is a Finnish example of a small communist stronghold based on isolated industrialisation.
15. Albrecht Bald, *Porzellanarbeiterschaft und punktuelle Industrialisierung in Nordostoberfranken. Der Aufstieg der Arbeiterbewegung und die Ausbreitung des Nationalsozialismus im Bezirksamt Rehau und in der kreisfreien Stadt Selb 1895-1936*, Bayreuth, 1991, pp245-254; Hartmut Mehringer, 'Die KPD in Bayern 1919-1945. Vorgeschichte, Verfolgung und Widerstand', in Martin Broszat and Hartmut Mehringer (eds), *Bayern in der NS-Zeit V. Die Parteien KPD, SPD, BVP in Verfolgung und Widerstand*, Munich, 1983, pp1-286; Georg Goes, *Arbeitermilieus in der Provinz. Geschichte der Glas- und Porzellanarbeiter im 20. Jahrhundert*, Essen, 2001. Several other examples of small KPD-strongholds are in Klaus-Michael Mallmann, *Kommunisten in der Weimarer Republik. Sozialgeschichte einer revolutionären Bewegung*, Darmstadt, 1996, pp241-261.
16. Mehringer, 'Die KPD in Bayern 1919-1945', p217; Bald, *Porzellanarbeiterschaft und punktuelle Industrialisierung*; Ludwig Eiber, *Arbeiter unter der NS-Herrschaft. Textil- und Porzellanarbeiter im nordöstlichen Oberfranken 1933-1939*, Munich, 1979, p47.
17. Tenfelde, *Proletarische Provinz*, pp21-30, pp34-5, p 64, p143, p207, p213; Mehringer, 'Die KPD in Bayern', p256.
18. Eiber, *Arbeiter unter der NS-Herrschaft*, pp37, 158, 270, note p367; Bald, *Porzellanarbeiterschaft*, pp7-13, 15-25, 92; Bald considers the estimate of 25 per cent of Bohemian workers in Selb as perhaps too high.
19. Goes, *Arbeitermilieus in der Provinz*, pp246-250. At its highest point in 1930 the KPD reached 43 per cent in Frauenau. After WW II the KPD was represented until 1956.

20. Bald, *Porzellanarbeitschaft*, p128; Eiber, *Arbeiter unter der NS-Herrschaft*, p47; Goes, *Arbeitermilieus in der Provinz*, p262.
21. Ibid, p253.
22. Mehringer, 'Die KPD in Bayern', p65.
23. Jacques Girault, *Sur l'implantation du Parti Communiste Français dans l'entre deux guerres*, Paris, 1977; Cahiers d'histoire de l'Institut Maurice Thorez 29/30 (1979) special issue Étudier le PCF.
24. *Communisme. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires* 15/16 (1987) special issue *Société ouvrières et communisme français*; ibid 51/52 (1997) special issue *PCF: implantation, identité, structures*.
25. E. Labrousse, 'Géographie du Socialisme (13 Mai 1849-2 Juin 1946)', in *La Revue Socialiste* 1, 1946, pp137-148; A. Siegfried, *Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République*, Paris 1913; F. Goguel, *Géographie des Élections Françaises de 1870 à 1951*, Paris, 1951.
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