

A century of anti-communisms: a roundtable discussion

In the French collection *Le siècle des communismes*, communism is characterised in terms of diversity held together by a common project. Anti-communism – conceived as the rejection, exposure or suppression of these diverse manifestations – was not even held together by a common project. Conservatives might target communism as epitome of a wider threat, whether ‘marxism’, secularism, modernity or diverse forms of national or social mobilisation. And these in turn could generate the wider solidarities which the French referred to as anti-anti-communism. On the other hand, communism itself was not only a movement with its own history of ruptures, defections and disillusionments. It also represented a claim to the values of the left, more or less exclusive according to the context, but from start to finish fiercely contested from within the left. One of the crudest devices of stalinism was to smear these forms of dissent together, as in the trotskyist-fascists who (like POUM in Spain) were often neither. But they were all, in some sense, ‘anti-communist’.

Can so diffuse and abusable a concept be employed productively in a comparative context? One possible line of approach is the ideological one. One might perhaps adapt Michael Freeden’s conceptualisation of ideologies in terms of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts.¹ Freeden doubts how far even the varieties of official communism were held together by shared core concepts. It is certainly difficult to see what these would be in the case of anti-communism. But perhaps one might more fruitfully ask if there are ideologies or movements for which anti-communism itself was a core concept. Or if there are others for which it was a secondary or peripheral concept, important at particular times or in particular aspects, but nevertheless not ineliminable or of a defining character. Here anti-communism might characterise particular

variations of some movement or ideology, or particular phases in its history. It might help define lines of internal cleavage; and if anti-communism was adjacent or peripheral to other concepts, the issue arises of how these concepts may have been clarified, adjusted or possibly compromised by the relationship with anti-communism, and with what sorts of internal contestation. Quintessentially this might have been the case with western liberal and social-democratic responses to communism during the Cold War.

At a less abstract level, the character and rationale of anti-communism has been discussed in terms of the interests, actors and political strategies it served. A number of possible lines of differentiation emerge from the literature.

- What did the communism in anti-communism stand for? Was it narrowly conceived as bolshevism and/or its degeneration into stalinism? Or was anti-communism used to counter some wider threat?
- What alternative to communism did the anti-communist stand for? Was it a better realisation of values and ideals betrayed by communism itself? Or the claim to a better communism against a worse one? Or was communism condemned ab origine and its roots traced to 1917, to Marx, perhaps to 1789?
- How far was communism conceived more as internal or as external threat – and what was the relation between them? And to the extent that it was constructed externally, how was anti-communism affected by considerations of realpolitik, for example in the 1940s or the period of détente?
- Did the strength of anti-communism correspond to the challenge actually posed by communism? Aristotle said that to secure the interest of the polity one had ‘to invent fears and bring distant dangers near’. Did anti-communism represent a proportionate response to the challenge communism posed either to particular state interests or to other political movements (including other sections of the working-class movement)? Or was the challenge of communism consciously or unconsciously exaggerated to secure the greater integration either of movement or of state?

In each case anti-communism may be considered in terms of actors, instruments and rationale, from forms of political competition and ideological contestation to legal discrimination and outright persecution.

Communism itself represented both the promise of emancipation and its betrayal. At the very crudest level, one might therefore propose a distinction between individuals and movements opposed to its emancipatory objects and those upholding those objects against their betrayal. At the same time, while there can be no simple conflation of the forms of anti-communism, anti-communism can help to clarify alliances, accommodations and transitions that are otherwise difficult to explain. At the level of the individual, the party or the state, anti-communism frequently emerges not only as an indispensable concept but as an ineliminable one.

Each of the six contributors below reflects on the character and significance of anti-communism as a concept on the basis of their own particular research interests.²

Carl Levy (anarchist anti-communism)

Anarchist anti-communism before 1917 was very important because the great split in classical anarchism was between collectivists and communists. Naturally, the communism of the anarchists was voluntary and anti-statist. The difference between collectivists and communists centred on the question of property: how much property should one person own, families own, or collectives own? This issue foreshadowed the concept of the functional use of property associated with the ideology of syndicalism in the early twentieth century. The anarcho-communism of Kropotkin was based on altruism, in other words, a world of interlocking *kibbutzim*. Nevertheless, early Soviet scholars were quite interested in Kropotkin, at least up until a certain point in the 1920s.

In any case, the important thing is to underline the anti-communism of the anarcho-collectivists, who saw all forms of communism as leading to disaster. For Proudhon, communism was authoritarian and dictatorial, and a governmental communist system was based on the principle that the individual was subordinated to the collective; that from it alone he or she drew his/her rights and life; that the citizen belonged to the state

like the child to the family; that the citizen would owe submission and obedience in all things. This is very different from collectivism, Proudhon argued, but for him even voluntary communism would be an oxymoron; economic organisation based on communism led to a dictatorial, authoritarian, indeed totalitarian society.

We can follow this theme further with Proudhon's critique of Marx, as well as Bakunin's critique in the later 1860s/early 1870s. Bakunin argued that a communist revolution would end up with a leadership that would be composed of ex-workers, technicians and intelligentsia, rather than proletarians. For this reason many people trace the origins of the concept of the New Class back to Bakunin's arguments with Marx in the First International. However it is interesting to understand that some early Soviet scholars actually tried to recuperate Bakunin. There was a school that argued that Bakunin's revolutionary strategy anticipated Lenin's, especially his idea of the invisible or vanguard pilots of the revolution. So there was a strange dialectic going on between the early Soviet Union and Bakunin's legacy; and we see this discussion taking place in the 1920s among the anarchists themselves, because Makhno, the defeated Ukrainian anarchist, advanced a Platformist Policy that was Leninist anarchism, a more organised anarchism; and the same 'Leninist' tensions were present between the FAI (the militant anarchist organisation) and the CNT in Spain from the late 1920s through to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

Syndicalism saved anarchism in the early twentieth century. Anarchism survived as a mass movement up to 1914 through the syndicalist movement; and what we see from 1916 to 1923 is how this syndicalism, radicalised by the war, melded into shop stewards' movements, councilism and sovietism. This is where the Bolsheviks and the anarchists debate the historical legacies of the Paris Commune and pre-war syndicalism: the battle over what the Paris Commune meant for marxists and anarchists after 1871 revived at this time. Many anarchists who had been involved in the pre-war syndicalist movement thought that Lenin had returned marxism to direct action politics, or that he had abandoned marxism. Of course, the Bolsheviks, Lenin and his closest comrades, used the unorthodox energy of these various councilist movements, the Russian Soviets, and so on, to construct communist parties

and red trade unions, and this battle for the control of syndicalism and council communism lasted through to the early 1920s. It was at this point that many anarchists and syndicalists started calling themselves anarcho-syndicalists to differentiate themselves from the form of syndicalism that has been taken over by the communists through the red trade unions.

I have two quotes from this period that cast light on these debates. One is a document I found in the Library of Congress in Washington DC in the Paul Avrich Archive. It is a letter to Harry Kelly, an American anarchist, dated 1 July 1918 and sent from Kobe, Japan, by an unnamed Russian anarchist who had been in Russia during the events of 1917 and early 1918 and clearly had also lived in the USA before the First World War. This letter was written during the great debate amongst the anarchists and syndicalists over the meaning of Bolshevism, and it is interesting because it reveals the problems for the anarchist movement at that time, which had been unsettled by the First World War. Some noted anarchists had succumbed to national feelings; and Kropotkin had strongly supported the Entente. This made many anarchists supportive of the Bolsheviks in 1917-18, because they appeared to be more internationalist than some of their better-known comrades, who had sided with one side or the other in a similar fashion as the discredited social democrats of the Second International. The letter, written in wobbly English, referred to Kropotkin, and included interesting sarcastic remarks on the 'revolutionary' journalism of Louise Bryant and John Reed:

I can quite understand that neither of them would satisfy you. I know them both, knew them when in Petrograd. I knew their attitude to Kropotkin and even more than that – the sources from which they got their impressions on 'Kropotkin being behind the times'. I fully agree with your remark regarding Louise, and I would rather not refer to her. I might say a few words about Reed. I do not exactly know what Reed is: a Democrat, Socialist or Bolshevik, or something in between, or rather a mixture of them all. He is of course far from an anarchist, but what he certainly is, that is a journalist of somewhat revolutionary trained type or character. When praising the Bolsheviks or admiring their actions, he does it, not so

much because of his being a conscious follower of their principles, but merely because of their more or less revolutionary methods, drastic tactics and daring activity. What he, as a typical American, cannot help appreciating ... Not at all so in the case of 'ideas' or principles, and this is my opinion, why he lacks in understanding of Kropotkin.³

Kelly goes on to argue that in his view, although Kropotkin had become a constitutionalist and a great anti-German, by this point Kropotkin was coming back to their side.

The point I want to make here is that this letter shows the tensions within anarchism itself, the cross-cutting tensions caused by the First World War, but it also shows that some marxists seemed to be becoming more anarchist-like. But this story is then laid to rest by subsequent events in Russia: the persecution of the anarchists. Here is Errico Malatesta talking about the Russian Bolshevik revolution in 1919. The Russian Civil War is still going on, but Malatesta questions the Bolshevik formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He asks: what is the dictatorship of the soviets?

In reality one is dealing with the dictatorship of the party; and a very real dictatorship, with its decrees, penal sanctions, executions and above all its armed force that today helps to defend the revolution from external enemies, but tomorrow will help impose the dictators' will on the workers, stop the revolution, consolidate and defend new interests of a new privileged class above the masses. Even Bonaparte helped defend the French revolution against the European reaction, but in defending it he strangled it. Lenin, Trotsky and comrades are certainly sincere revolutionaries and they will not betray what they take as revolution but they are preparing the governmental apparatus which will help those who follow them to profit by the revolution and destroy it. They will be the first victims of their methods, and with them, I fear, the revolution will collapse. History repeats itself, *mutatis mutandis*: and the dictatorship of Robespierre brought Robespierre to the guillotine and prepared the way for Napoleon.⁴

The 1920s witnessed the ebb-tide of anarchist and generic libertarian revolutionary movements. In Malatesta's estimations, by the time Lenin died in 1924 he wasn't even a sincere revolutionary. Lenin's death was an occasion for celebration not mourning: a tyrant was dead. Nevertheless, though the anarchists might have felt vindicated, they also felt increasingly alone. In a private letter to the Austrian anarchist and historian Max Nettlau, Harry Kelly argued that the anarchists had been abandoned, because the syndicalists who were with them before the war, who had given them camouflage, had disappeared, possibly to the Communist International; and he concluded that the latter 'were not really Anarchists at all, though they thought they were – they were *economic revolutionists*, and when the test of libertarianism came [that is, the methods of the Bolsheviks] they were found in the seats of the authoritarians'.⁵

Malatesta's 1919 interpretation of the Russian revolution was actually a recycling of well-known interpretations of the French Revolution, and this may have misled the anarchists in the 1920s. After 1921-2 the Soviet Union was understood by the formula 'the NEP plus a Bolshevik dictatorship'; and this led the anarchists to argue that the Bolshevik dictatorship had crushed its leftist competitors and would now restore capitalism, just as Bonaparte had melded the *ancien regime* with changes wrought by the French Revolution. But for the most part, throughout most of the 1920s, the anarchists missed the dynamics leading to the creation of a new social order based on bureaucratic collectivism.

It is only in the 1930s that the anarchist analysis broke new ground. As Kenyon Zimmer notes in a wonderful article, the anarchists became 'premature anti-communists'.⁶ The Spanish Civil War fractured the international anarchist movement over to what extent the Spanish anarchists should support the Republican government. Did one support members of the FAI joining its cabinet and becoming 'government anarchists'? Should the social revolution be delayed in order to win the war against the Nationalists? Should anarchists support regular or guerrilla war? And finally, the short-lived but traumatic civil war within a civil war in May 1937 in Barcelona pitted militant anarchists and the POUM against Republican forces, in a struggle during which Soviet-dominated units executed noted foreign anarchists such as Camillo Berneri. And of course it was the 'Barcelona Days' that brought to life George Orwell's critique

of Soviet communism. The anarchists and Orwell shared an affinity in the type of socialism they promoted but also in their critiques of the Soviet Union under Stalin: Barcelona and the Great Purges and the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 placed them at the centre of an intellectual interchange and debate over the nature and meaning of totalitarianism.

In the light of events in the Soviet Union and Spain in the 1930s, the anarchists promoted a new interpretation of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath, which was then 'mainstreamed' by Cold War social scientists and politicians – albeit without the anarchists' critique of liberal democratic capitalism. Thus the anarchists argued, as Malatesta predicted generically in 1919, that Lenin led to Stalin, Lenin led to totalitarianism. In a famous debate between Emma Goldman and Leon Trotsky in 1938, Goldman responded to Trotsky's opposition to the Great Purge Trials by responding that Trotsky protested too much. Hadn't Trotsky forgotten Kronstadt? Didn't he see that his methods had led to the Great Purges?

From 1939 to 1940 anarchists influenced the great debate about bureaucratic collectivism that involved ex-trotskyists and dissident leftists and indefinable intellectuals and activists such as James Burnham, Bruno Rizzi, Max Schactman and Orwell. Much of the conceptualisation of totalitarianism can be traced back to earlier texts, even to the interaction of anarchists with the elite theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Anarchist and syndicalist concepts were found quite clearly in Michels and Pareto, and even in the slightly different Mosca. The iteration of the 1930s was merely a new chapter in an older story. Max Nomad, an anarchist who wrote a successful text about the history of anarchism, was an activist and a friend of Malatesta, but was also a close friend of Daniel Bell. Nomad was influenced by the Polish anarcho-marxist Jan Wacław Machajski (1866-1926), whose formulations of a New Class, and what came to be known as cultural capital, in turn influenced Daniel Bell's sociological treatments of totalitarianism and post-industrial society. Thus anarchist ideas were not unimportant in the birth of cold war anti-totalitarian American sociology.

My final remarks will examine the post-1945 period. After 1945 'Classical Anarchism' died a death, though maybe not as quickly as we thought. We may quibble about the timing and allow for new formations in the Global South, but generally the anarchism of social movements of

workers and peasants was replaced by an anarchism of students and intellectuals: an anarchism which was against 'nuclear bomb culture', close to several generations of bohemians, and flowed eventually into the New Social Movements of the 1960s. Central to the 1960s and the anarchist tradition was the concept of participatory democracy. Just like the elitist sociologists and sociological partisans of the concept of totalitarianism and post-war corporate liberal democracy, a younger sociologist, the charismatic Texan C. Wright Mills, cleared the way for participatory democracy; and Wright Mills's theories are clearly heavily influenced by the anarchist, and particularly 'Wobbly' (IWW), legacy.⁷ Andrew Cornell has written interestingly about a 'new anarchism', and the connections between the participatory democracy of the 1960s American New Left and small groups of anarchist pacifists and bohemians of the 1940s and 1950s.⁸ I have also looked at this in a special issue about Colin Ward, a British anarchist of the same generation who died in 2010.⁹ Thus we have come full circle with the earlier discussion of the nature of totalitarianism as raised by anarchists and other dissidents in the 1930s and early 1940s. I have also discussed elsewhere something I call the 'Orwell Test': to what extent did the British or American New Left see the world through his lens? Thus E.P. Thompson, who had left communism and called himself a humanist socialist, could never abide Orwell because he felt Orwell's legacy was being employed to buttress Nato-American hegemony in the East-West world struggle. But this leads us to the question posed earlier by the anarchists in the 1920s and 1930s, about the legacy of the Russian Revolution and the role of Lenin and Old Bolsheviks in paving the way for Stalinism.

In the 1960s the rapid rise of the New Left owed a great deal to the dissemination of the concept of participatory democracy, which, as we have noted, could be traced back to the slightly earlier generation of 1940s anarchists and the longer-term legacy of the Wobblies. In the early American New Left – the Port Huron Statement of the American SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) for example – one found a critique of the present 'nuclear' condition which, if not openly anarchist, borrowed from post-1945 formulations that transcended East and West, endorsed a method of participatory democracy, criticised red and capitalist bureaucracies, and engaged with the new youth culture. This fusing

of influences can be seen in the writings and actions of Ken Kesey and his Merry Pranksters, in Guy Debord, the Situationists and the spectacular and unpredicted events in Paris and France in 1968, and in less well known sites in Eastern Europe – not least, of course, Prague.

But just as the unorthodox syndicalists, anti-war shop stewards movement, council communists and non-party Sovietists were sucked into the Leninist formation during the period 1917 to 1924, the New Left in the United States also travelled from its maverick libertarianism to forms of conventional or bizarre Marxism-Leninism. Thus if the heroic October Revolution silenced the history of pre-1914 anarchism and syndicalism, in the late 1960s the heroic guerrilla struggle in Vietnam and the Third World was a bridge to more conventional forms of Marxism-Leninism. However this operation was not always so straightforward, and recent research on the post-1968 case in France demonstrates a rather more complicated path. Some French Maoists created a quasi-libertarian interpretation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution – a Maoism that was very far from the practice of Maoism in China – through a series of political and intellectual mutations that eventually led some of them into a ‘discovery’ of Orwell, Solzhenitsyn and the Gulags, and human rights culture, all which had been mediated by conscious and unconscious encounters with anarchist and libertarian traditions.¹⁰ If, however, we examine the American New Left, the changes were startlingly rapid. In late August 1968 in Chicago, posters proclaim ‘Welcome to Prague’, comparing the suppression of anti-war demonstrations by the Chicago police to the entry of Warsaw Pact tanks into Prague and the crushing of the Dubček experiment. But by October 1969 the Weather Underground, three hundred ‘crazies’, were marching through the streets of the same city, proclaiming a weird blend of Mao, Stalin, LSD and the Grateful Dead. So the rediscovery of Mao and Stalin in all their authoritarian glory, and a malfunctioning of the libertarian anarchist tradition, destroyed the New Left’s largest organisation, SDS. Just as in the early 1920s, the tide receded with the emergence of the Comintern, though perhaps this time the denouement was more farce rather than tragedy.

In the 1970s and 1980s parts of the less sectarian New Left in Europe and the Americas fed back into new social movements who rediscovered or re-launched the project of participatory democracy: second-wave

feminism, the gay movement and the anti-nuclear power and weapons movement built on the libertarian 1960s tradition. The final iteration of our story occurred after 1989 with the fall the Soviet model, the decline of social democracy and rise to global supremacy of Chinese Leninist capitalism (itself momentarily threatened by Tiananmen Square in June, 1989). Throughout the 1990s new forms of political struggle became manifest, certainly after Seattle in 1999, and more so after 2008 and the entry into the current financial crisis. There was a profound deepening of the tradition of participatory democracy. New social movements have always had been in this tradition of course, but the newest social movements in some ways make it central: the idea of horizontal democracy, a consensus-based method of discussing politics, and going beyond the old models, became widespread – from Occupy Wall Street, to London, to the Indignados, to Chile, and most dramatically, and in a different context, the Arab Spring. Of course there were still ‘model-hunters’ who looked for replacements for ‘1917’: Chavistas, Zapatistas and all the rest of it; and there were still attention-seekers such as Žižek or Negri. But I think in the newest social movements an interesting tradition of participatory democracy is present, which to a large extent can be traced back to that new anarchism of the 1940s and 1950s and its precocious children of the 1960s.¹¹

Paulo Drinot (populist anti-communism)

Populist anticommunism is a big topic, and my own expertise is limited to Latin America, and within Latin America to Peru, and within Peru to Peru’s early twentieth century. So I’m going to focus my contribution on this area, but hopefully what I have to say will prove useful for thinking more broadly about populist anticommunism.

In the Peruvian case, it is probably useful to speak of populist anti-communisms in the plural, or of varieties of populist anti-communism. And, I would suggest, it is useful to do so more generally for Latin America and perhaps beyond. But before turning to populist anti-communism as such, it is probably necessary to define populism. This is very difficult because populism is one of those terms that tends to shift meanings over time and across space, and in some forms it can be applied

to a very wide range of people, movements or indeed political processes.¹² It is also a term that has largely negative connotations: there is no Peruvian Populist Party, and there never will be. The sociologist Ernesto Laclau has made a case for seeing populism as something other than a political pathology, and there is, I think, a case for seeing populism as a particularly, if not exclusively, Latin American way of doing politics.¹³ But that is an issue we don't need to address here.

In Latin America populism has historically been associated with political movements and charismatic political leaders who emerged in the inter-war period, particularly following the Great Depression. The three classic populists – the holy trinity – are, of course, Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico, Getulio Vargas of Brazil and Juan Perón of Argentina; but there are many more, including some, like Peru's Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who never really held power.

In the classic interpretation, populism in these countries emerged as a consequence of the severe disruption created by the Great Depression and in tandem with a shift in the economic orientation of Latin America from export-led growth – the process whereby the region inserted itself into the global economy via the export of export commodities such as copper, tin, beef, bananas, coffee, sugar, etc – to Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI), a more inward oriented process that sought to privilege industrialisation as an engine of 'development'. This shift, again in the classical interpretation of populism, was dependent on the successful cooptation and mobilisation of sectors deemed strategic to the successful transition to ISI, namely the urban working class and workers in the export sectors, although in some countries, agricultural workers were also to be mobilised, as was the case in Mexico, as were some sectors of the middle classes, and this was the case in Peru.

The mobilisation of these sectors hinged on discursive strategies that identified local elites and their international allies as the enemies of the 'people'. This was a key category that populists introduced into the political lexicon, though they were of course borrowing it from older traditions. Perhaps crucially, the advent of populism, according to the traditional interpretation, involved the strengthening of the state apparatus, with state participation in the economy, and in 'the social' too – although this is often overlooked – becoming increasingly important. Later, economists such as

Rudiger Dornbusch would home in on this supposed characteristic of Latin American populism in trying to explain the economic mess most Latin American countries found themselves in by the 1980s.

This, in broad strokes, is the classic interpretation of populism as it emerged in Latin America. It has been critiqued by historians and sociologists, who have rightly pointed out that it is a model that fits the historical record rather imperfectly. In particular, the emergence of populist leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Carlos Menem in Argentina or Alberto Fujimori in Peru, led many to question the supposed link that existed between populist politics and ISI, since these politicians pioneered neoliberal economic policies that had little relation to the classic populist economic policy. Moreover, historians have shown that even the classic populists do not conform to the model. As a consequence, they have suggested that it is best to see populism as a political style rather than as a political project closely tied to ISI.

So, how does this relate to anticommunism? In a very obvious sense, communists and populists in Latin America targeted the same sectors: urban workers and workers in the export industries. There are some interesting exceptions, such as in Central America, where communist parties also targeted the peasantry, and in Cuba, where the clerical class received some attention. But for Latin American communists, particularly in the immediate post Great Depression period, workers were the vanguard, the revolutionary core, of a movement that would bring about the end of capitalism – either in time, or, in some cases, almost immediately. Similarly, for Latin American populists, workers were a vanguard of a new populist order, one in which an anti-oligarchic form of rule, often based on corporatist relations between state and labour, would be established. Moreover, and more problematically, workers were ‘the people’ and ‘the people’ were workers.

This led to tensions in some countries, where racialised and gendered social orders produced exclusions from the category ‘worker’. In Peru, populists did not envision the indigenous as part of ‘the people’ that they interpellated.¹⁴ ‘Indian’ and ‘worker’ were incommensurable categories, and Indians qua Indians were not deemed amenable to becoming populist subjects. Indeed, the populist subject was more often than not, in Peru as elsewhere, envisioned as white or mestizo, and male – the role of women

in populist projects was always a subordinate one, even in Eva Perón's Argentina.

Of course, this is largely true also of communism: for the most part, the communist subject, in Latin America but perhaps also elsewhere, was also white or mestizo and male. To be sure, race was an issue that communists in Latin America could not ignore: José Carlos Mariátegui, the Peruvian marxist thinker, in particular, provided elements for a radical understanding of the role of the indigenous in revolutionary politics. But even Mariátegui could not envision Indians qua Indians as subjects of revolution. Instead he viewed them as objects of revolution, as beings whose wretched lives would be transformed by revolution. Che Guevara reached very similar conclusions.¹⁵

Populism and communism in Latin America shared a similar agent of history, the worker, which was defined narrowly in racialised and gendered ways, but they differed in one important respect. Communists were internationalists; populists were nationalist, or, at most, pan-Latin Americanists. In Peru, in particular, the struggle between Mariátegui's socialist, later communist, party, and Haya de la Torre's Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, or APRA) hinged on Haya de la Torre's hatred of the soviets, although of course Mariátegui was no soviet puppet – quite the contrary.

So, returning to my earlier point about varieties of populist anticommunism, I would suggest that there are three broad 'moments' of populist anticommunism in Peru, and possibly in Latin America. We can classify them perhaps as proto-populist anticommunism; 'classic' populist anticommunism; and 'cold war' populist anticommunism. The distinction between classic and cold war populist anticommunism is complicated by the fact that, as several historians have argued, the Cold War in Latin America was 'long': i.e. it began much earlier than, say, Yalta or Korea.¹⁶ But for our purposes the distinction can be useful.

Proto-populist anticommunism is a form of populist anticommunism which is anticommunist in a vague sense, since it predates the formation of the communist party in Peru. I would associate it with the brief populist regime of Guillermo Billinghurst, 1911-13, and the first years of the second government of Augusto Leguía, 1919-30.¹⁷ This proto-populist anticommunism targeted the urban working class, which was minute and

consisted primarily of artisans – bakers, carpenters, etc; and it sought to mobilise them in a way that challenged the exclusionary order of the elite of the oligarchic Partido Civil (Civilian Party) but was not revolutionary. Rather, the urban working classes were to be channelled in a new top-down project of rule – Leguía's *Patria Nueva*, or New Fatherland – which would give a greater role to the state in the management of the social and the economy, while leaving largely unchanged the basic underlying economic structures. Its anticommunism, to the extent that it could be described in these terms, was directed not at self-identified communists, but at anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists who had begun to organise in study groups and trade unions and to mobilise. I include it here because these were precisely the groups that would later feed into the communist party.

The second variety of populist anticommunism, the classic variety, emerged in the 1920s and was cemented in the 1930s. In the 1920s, anti-communism properly speaking begins to appear as a discourse and policy. Originally focused on 'foreign' communists and marked by a strong dose of anti-semitism, it would go on to become a central element of the conflict between APRA, the populist party established by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and José Carlos Mariátegui's Peruvian Socialist, later Communist, Party. As is well known, APRA's anticommunism had its roots in the ideological debates between Haya de la Torre and the Cuban communists, particularly Julio Antonio Mella, in the first instance, and between Haya de la Torre and Mariátegui in the second half of the 1920s.

Haya de la Torre's distrust of communism may have had something to do with the time he spent in the Soviet Union, where he became convinced that any revolution in Latin America led by Moscow was bound to fail. But APRA's anticommunism was also strategic.¹⁸ It adapted and adopted a form of bottom-up labour anticommunism, an anticommunism that emerged within the organised working class in Peru as a reaction to communist attempts in the early 1930s to co-opt labour. This strategic incorporation of labour anticommunism was part of APRA's broader strategy to defeat the Peruvian Communist Party in the struggle between the two major forces of the Peruvian left to channel and lead the working-class movement.

The third variety of populist anticommunism emerges in the context of the Cold War. It is associated with the social-democratic forces that

take shape in, and draw strength from, the atmosphere of progressive but anti-revolutionary change created by Kennedy's Alliance for Progress.¹⁹ In Peru, the main protagonist of this populist anticommunism was Fernando Belaúnde Terry and his party *Acción Popular*. In contrast to the classic populist anticommunism, which targeted a small but threatening local communist party, in the 1950s the main communist threat was either external or not strictly speaking communist. By the 1950s, the Peruvian Communist Party had been tamed. The populist anticommunism of Belaúnde targeted instead local versions of a now diversified communism, including the Trotskyist Hugo Blanco and his peasant movement in Cuzco, the Castroite or Guevarist insurrectionary groups (MIR, ELN) and the Maoist groups (*Bandera Roja*, *Patria Roja*).

The cold war popular anticommunism of Belaúnde was less focused on the 'worker' as the agent of history. It sought to contain not the revolutionary potential of workers but that of the Peruvian indigenous peasantry, which had begun to mobilise in the late 1940s, implementing a *de facto* agrarian reform from the bottom up in large parts of the country. Some sectors of the new left had started to recognise the revolutionary potential of these rural movements, and there were number of failed Cuban-style insurrections in the 1960s. Belaúnde's reforms, which included a modest agrarian reform and a mass road-building project to integrate the country, targeted what he identified as the source of the peasant discontent that the new communists were trying to channel.

Populist anticommunism, and its varieties, was itself only one of several varieties of anticommunism in Cold War Latin America. In some cases, as in Peru from the 1950s onwards, classic populist anticommunism, as articulated by APRA, established an alliance with other varieties, including the fascist – or perhaps more accurately national security – anticommunism of General Manuel Odría, dictator of Peru from 1948 to 1956. This national security anticommunism was the variety that became dominant in Argentina and Brazil from the 1960s, and in Chile in the 1970s.

Although not strictly speaking of the national security variety, anti-communism was equally central to the 'government of the revolutionary armed forces' of General Juan Velasco in Peru, who ruled from 1968 to 1975. But the military regime successfully incorporated several leading

communist cadres into the state apparatus, and they went on to play an important role in the reformist agenda, which included a large-scale if ultimately unsuccessful agrarian reform, introduced by the regime. As a coda to my contribution, there is also the complicated issue of Shining Path and whether or not it is to be considered part of the communist movement, and therefore whether or not the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) could be considered to have developed a form of populist anticommunism in reaction to Shining Path.

Matthew Worley (fascist anti-communism)

We started this morning with different definitions of communism and marxism, and there is also debate among scholars of fascism about how you define this term. It's a contentious debate, and, just as people are now talking about communisms in the plural, people are also talking about fascisms. That's partly because fascism, broadly defined, took on different forms in different countries and was very much informed by national characteristics.²⁰

I'm going to try and get a sense of fascist anti-communism through the lens of Britain. This might not be the most obvious way of doing it, but there are two reasons for proceeding in this way. First, it's what I know best, and, secondly, the way fascism developed in Britain over the 1920s and into the 1930s allows us to appreciate quite neatly the different ways in which fascism articulated an anti-communism. Hopefully the elements of British fascism which are relevant to the bigger fascisms of German national socialism and Italian fascism will be obvious.

Fascism in Britain was first associated with the British Fascisti (later renamed the British Fascists, BF), formed in 1923. What's interesting about them is that they named themselves the Fascisti in honour of Mussolini, and what they liked about Mussolini was that he was fighting communism; he was smashing the reds and breaking up a socialist – or potentially communist – revolution in the factories in Italy. The reasoning behind the BF was that Britain was heading in a similar direction. The Labour Party was growing in strength, and the Fascisti did not really differentiate between the Labour Party and the Communist Party: the Labour Party tended to be seen as a cover for the Bolshevik nut that was inside it.

So from Italy they took the term fascist essentially to mean anti-communism; and there's a debate among historians about how fascist the British Fascists really were. They certainly became more fascist over time, but at the outset there was not a lot of theory: no conception of corporatism or any specific kind of ideological bent. In many ways it shared its anti-communism with what you'd imagine would be the traditional right-wing conservative critics of communism. It looked at the fact that communism was a threat to existing institutions, to existing values – the existing order of things: it was a means by which the mob, the people, would seize control and lead to chaos. There was a distrust of the intellectual content within socialism and communism. More importantly, however, it would lead to class war, civil war, civil strife. It was therefore unpatriotic and a threat to national unity. All of these things could be applied to much of the centre-right and far-right critiques of communism.

Wheedling its way through the BF was a strand of anti-semitism, and this soon contributed to a split in British fascism and the setting up of rival fascist organisations that took a far more explicitly anti-semitic line. The most famous, formed in 1928, was the Imperial Fascist League, associated with Arnold Leese. Arnold Leese's fascism, and thereby his anti-communism, was far more shaped by the German example. He was very much a national socialist informed by Hitler's critique of Bolshevism. As well is known, national socialist critiques of communism were framed by anti-semitism and the Jewish conspiracy, by which, put very simply, capitalism and communism were simply two sides of the same coin. They were twin tweezers, if you like, of the Jewish conspiracy. On either side – sectional financial interest or labour movement disruption – it boiled down to the Jews. In many ways, Leese's fascism became more dominant after the Second World War, feeding into the revival of the British fascist movement via the National Front, British Movement and later the BNP.

The third anti-communism that came out of fascism in Britain was associated with the most well-known British fascist, Oswald Mosley. Mosley's route to anti-communism is slightly more interesting and nuanced, if that's the right way to put it. He understood both communism and fascism as modern movements: what he called new movements. He saw them both as potential futures, competing modernisms, competing realms that would exist once capitalism and parliamentary democracy had

come to their inevitable end. This became clarified for Mosley towards the end of the 1920s, particularly after the Wall Street Crash, and in 1930 whilst he served as a member of the Labour government of 1929-31, trying to formulate ideas about solving unemployment. He and John Strachey had, from the mid-1920s, been trying to understand the problems of capitalism, and together they formulated a theory of capitalist crisis. What's interesting is that in 1931 they both leave the Labour Party, but go in completely different directions based on the same analysis. Strachey, of course, became close to the communist party, very close to Palme Dutt; in a sense he follows a sort of communist critique of capitalism that leads into his acceptance of the CP line through the 1930s. Mosley, on the other hand, becomes a fascist and adopts the corporate state as his means of solving the capitalist crisis. What distinguishes their decisions is Mosley's rejection of the class struggle. That was his principle critique of communism; that it would create civil disorder, civil war, and it would turn people against people within the nation. He looked to the Soviet Union as the classic example of what would happen. It led to civil war, mass disruption, famine, millions of people dying. So he thought that if Britain turned to communism a similar train of events would happen there.

There were other factors. Mosley was very critical of what he saw as the materialism of Marx, and was influenced by the ideas of Georges Sorel and others about vitalism or the spirit – things that were lacking in a marxist or communist reading. He was also very influenced by George Bernard Shaw. Fascism, as opposed to communism, as he saw it, was a unifying force. He saw in corporatism a way of bringing the nation together. As the crisis hit and the Labour government fell in 1931, Mosley began to talk of the collapse of parliamentary democracy, the collapse of the social order, fighting in the streets, civil war; and his solution to that was fascism, and that's one of his reasons for anti-communism.

In considering some of the points that were circulated before this discussion, I teased out a few general comments about fascist anti-communism. First of all, anti-communism was certainly core to Mosley's fascism, as it was indeed to Mussolini's and to Hitler's. What's interesting about Mosley is that he saw communism as the main competitor to his future vision. He saw both as post-democratic, both as post-capitalist – twin tracks – dual potential outcomes of what would happen in a specific historical trajectory.

That meant that anti-communism became a means of unifying this modern movement – as Mosley called it – with the traditional right. Again, this is something we see in Germany and in Italy, where Hitler and Mussolini came to power in agreement with traditional right-wing, establishment, institutions. Mosley also had this in mind; he saw such a process as potentially allowing him to power – he would be invited into power in the same way as Mussolini had been, and as Hitler was in 1933.

Within fascism more generally, at different times and in different contexts, communism was either simply associated with Bolshevism, or seen as a generic term for the left: anything from trade unions and ordinary workers' organisations all the way through to the communist party. Mosley tended to see communism as meaning Bolshevism. What he thought was going to happen was that social democracy and the Labour Party would collapse as a result of being blamed for the capitalist crisis of the 1930s. The communist party would become the main bulwark of the left in Britain, and therefore fascism would have to compete with communism in order to win the battle for the future.

Communism was thus seen as both an internal and an external threat. On the one hand you had the communist party within Britain itself, built on the Bolshevik model and ready to transplant Bolshevism onto Britain; on the other there was the Soviet Union itself, which provided a broader potential threat from outside. This becomes far more acute after 1945, when the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower, but it's there already in the 1920s and 1930s. Communism is this incipient thing that is finding its way into various national contexts, overseen by the Communist International and the Soviet Union.

At the grassroots level this competition was initially envisaged as a battle for control of the streets. This is why Mosley, when he set up his fascists, looked to Germany and had his blackshirts to the ready. If parliamentary democracy collapsed and society fell into civil conflict, the battle would be won on the street corners; it's about securing territory and securing localities. Again, this is telling in the post-1945 period with the emergence of the National Front and the British Movement; and their take on things is very much about winning the battle on the streets.

From a British point of view, anti-communism on the fascist side distorts and exaggerates the potential threat that communism poses to

the nation state. In some ways this is a reflection of the position of fascism in Britain; it's on the margins and trying to win a marginal base within the British polity. Obviously, if we take this into a German or an Italian context things are very very different.

Then, from the mid-1930s, Mosley begins to adopt a far more obviously anti-semitic strand to his fascism. He's very keen to woo Berlin to get some money; he's very keen to develop support in the East End of London. But his basic opposition to communism remains fairly consistent. Communism is a gateway to civil conflict, civil war, national disunity, whereas fascism is this unifying thing.

After 1945 British fascism goes into a lull, and it then re-emerges from the late 1960s through to the 1980s with the National Front and the British Movement. Their take on communism is slightly different. In some ways it works on two layers. At the top layer there is this Leese-ian critique of communism as a Jewish conspiracy: John Tyndall, for example, was completely obsessed by the Jewish conspiracy and falls very much into that mindset. However, the National Front and the British Movement began recruiting at a much more grassroots level, and thus had a different take on fascism, in which communism figured in terms of being 'the reds'. 'Reds' are presented to people as outsiders, students, radicals, coming into an area and defending minorities rather than the majority of people. They're presented as interlopers; people who defend the other rather than the indigenous.

So fascism's anti-communism is, for me, essentially based around this notion of communism as forming a competing ideology for the perceived future. Once capitalism's crisis becomes acute, once parliamentary democracy fails and falls, there are two potential outcomes. One is communism, the other is fascism; and the two fought each other both on an ideological and a more physical plane, in order to bring about that future. In Britain of course it doesn't come to pass. In Italy and Germany there are far more bloody consequences of that perception.

Dianne Kirby (Christian anti-communism)

I want to put Christian anti-communism into the context of what's happening at the moment in American scholarship. There was a signifi-

cant religious dimension to the Cold War, and understanding the divisions within and complexities of this cold war Christian anti-communism is particularly relevant today, at a time when the religious right is funding scholarly endeavours to present the Cold War as an actual religious war: America's god-fearing presidents, Truman and Eisenhower, are seen as having instinctively recognised the inherent evil of the Soviet regime and committed their nation to a global leadership that went against the American tradition of isolationism. My own position is very much along the lines of other contributions here, that anti-communism was utilised for political purposes. In order to understand the nuances and complexities of Christian anti-communism, I want to give a brief historical overview of what can be called the 'religious cold war': the way in which East and West mobilised their religious forces in the cold war ideological conflict.

The first thing to stress is that there is not one variety but many Christian anti-communisms (as indeed there is of Christian communisms), and that these developed over time, becoming of particular political importance in the early Cold War owing to the way in which the United States appropriated religion for its cold war agenda. The intent was to give legitimacy to America's cold war demonisation of the Soviet Union as an atheistic, evil force bent on world conquest and the destruction of western civilisation and Christianity. Understanding the role accorded Christianity by the US is crucial to understanding how American anti-communism was deliberately presented as a positive doctrine perceived to have Christian values at its core.

Following the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, political and economic expressions of containment, Harry Truman, the first US cold war president, conducted an important letter exchange in August 1947 with Pius XII, the locus of ideological opposition to Soviet communism in Western Europe; after this he proceeded to try to construct an international anti-communist religious front that would bring together the world's key Christian leaders, adding a spiritual dimension to what in essence was a traditional power struggle. This foundered, however, not because of any lack of anti-communism within the churches, but because of that far older Cold War, between Catholic and Protestant.

Prior to the Cold War the over-riding concern for Christian churches

was the increasing strength of secularisation, of which communism was viewed as but one more outgrowth. Although the Russian revolution heightened political fears about the spread of communism, it was actually welcomed by the Christian opponents of Russian Orthodoxy, not least by Roman Catholicism. Moreover, as many Christians recoiled from the impact of industrialisation and the horrors of the First World War, there were some Christians whose faith inclined them toward socialism and in some cases even communism, and they welcomed the Soviet experiment as a secular means of achieving gospel aspirations.

In October 1917 the Bolsheviks declared the new Soviet state to be non-religious, not anti-religious. The Bolshevik decree of 1918 'on freedom of conscience and religious societies' theoretically safeguarded 'free practice of religious customs'; and religious believers were not denied admission to the party, because opposition to religion was subordinated to the class struggle. Some Christian churches flourished under the new regime, not least Evangelical Christians, who increased their adherents from about 100,000 to over a million in the first decade of Soviet rule. Religious harassment and persecution did however mark the history of the post-revolutionary years. Nonetheless, the Comintern's Seventh Congress in 1935 accepted the policy of popular front governments and collaboration with Christians 'of revolutionary temper'. Subsequently the new 1936 Soviet Constitution theoretically allowed full civil rights of citizenship for priests and freedom for the conduct of religious cults. Stalin himself repudiated previous calls for decisive and merciless struggles with religious prejudices. At peace conferences Soviet spokes-people were keen to present a positive perspective on the Soviet attitude toward religion, ignoring the huge numbers of religious being imprisoned, shot and more generally oppressed in the course of the Great Purge.

During the Second World War, the Russian Orthodox Church played a crucial role in the war effort, not least in rehabilitating the image of the Soviet Union for western consumption. The reconciliation between church and state meant that when the Cold War emerged in the aftermath of the war, the west's perception that religion was the Soviet Achilles' heel initially lacked its previous power, especially in the developing world. But the Soviet record on religion gave the US a decided

advantage, especially as its messianic narrative had been greatly enhanced by its role in the Second World War. Moreover, the way in which the US openly allied itself with the Vatican and promoted an anti-communist crusade fuelled Stalin's worst fears of religion as a fifth column that could compromise Soviet internal security, and this led to further repression of the churches in the Soviet bloc. Now this, of course, helped reinforce the western claims that the Soviet Union was a godless power out to destroy Christianity and that communism was a false religion. Christians on either side of the Iron Curtain collaborated with their respective regimes. Equally, Christian anti-communism developed either side of the Iron Curtain. Each developed according to the different political situations in which Christians found themselves.

Western propaganda emphasised religious persecution, the incompatibility of Christianity and communism and the inherent evil of communism. This in effect turned the Cold War into a politico-religious enterprise that had long-term repercussions on the Christian churches East and West. This had a particular impact on those who were committed to the ecumenical movement, and who wanted to maintain relations across the east-west divide – and to distinguish Christian anti-communism from the political variety. People in the ecumenical movement wanted to rise above America's anti-communist crusade; they saw it as potentially very damaging to the churches in the west if they were openly identified with capitalism and the nuclear arms race.

Of course, making these distinctions is easier in theory than it is in practice, particularly as the Cold War hardened, and churchmen, like citizens everywhere, were subject to national propaganda, and worried about communism as a rival faith. However, as the arms race escalated and the destructive potential of nuclear weapons impressed those concerned with maintaining 'god's creation', some leading Christians once ranked as cold warriors began to shift toward co-existence and even Christian-Marxist dialogue, a process that was aided by the way in which actual US foreign policy, especially in the Vietnam War, compromised America's post-war moral standing. Interestingly, the Orthodox churches in the communist bloc, accused by Christian cold warriors of not being Christian owing to their 'collaboration' with communist regimes, refused to participate in or endorse Christian-Marxist discussions. Their strategy

had been co-operation with their respective communist regimes in order to ensure the practice of the faith and the protection of the faithful, and if possible – as did indeed prove the case in some communist regimes, owing to the historical links between nationalism and religion – to strengthen the position of the church vis-à-vis the state. Orthodoxy saw its role as being to save communist leaders from communism, not to enter into dialogue with it. So it was the western churches that were entering into dialogue with marxists – though not all of them, obviously.

Hence there was a situation in which some western Christians, despite their anti-communist credentials, were willing to recognise the positive aspects of marxism and seek common ground, as in Liberation theology; whilst churchmen in the communist bloc, who acted in the international arena as ‘mouthpieces’ for Soviet foreign policy, especially the peace movement, totally rejected any such engagement. Mainstream church leaders who wanted at least to maintain ecclesiastical relations with their eastern counterparts tolerated their pro-Soviet propaganda, seeing it clearly as a strategy, a means to an end. Their critics argued that true Christians would not collaborate with communism, and that western Christians should only support those in the communist regimes that were openly opposing them, i.e. the underground Christians. These different approaches to Christian East-West relations caused very bitter divisions between anti-communist western Christians. The true believers of anti-communism made the mainstream ‘liberal’ churches appear soft on communism, and helped to create the space in which more conservative brands of Christianity were able to rise to political prominence, supported by America (as was the case with Christian Democracy in post-war western Europe). In America this approach gave rise to the Christian Right, with its impeccable and uncompromised Christian anti-communist credentials, which, significantly, matched the values and rhetoric of the political right.

In considering the divisions within and complexity of cold war Christian anti-communism, it is worth keeping in mind the lament of John Paul II, credited in some quarters with contributing to the demise of the Soviet bloc. Confronted with the advance of deregulated market relations as a renewed feature of market capitalism he said: ‘The exploitation produced by inhuman capitalism was a real evil, and that’s the kernel

of truth in Marxism.’ A little while later he spoke in terms not dissimilar to those of Slavoj Žižek today:

These seeds of truth [in marxism] shouldn’t be destroyed, shouldn’t be blown away by the wind ... The supporters of capitalism in its extreme forms tend to overlook the good things achieved by communism: its effort to overcome unemployment, its concern for the poor.²¹

Madeleine Davis (new left anti-communism)

The term ‘New Left’ is used to refer to a wide range of movements in different national contexts, but its most common usage is in relation to student and radical movements of the 1960s. My remarks here are more specifically about the British New Left which arose in the late 1950s, and a subtitle for my contribution might be ‘Twentieth Congress Blues’, which was the title of the following rhyme that appeared in a short-lived 1956 publication called the *Rhyming Reasoner*:

Joe and me were buddies;
We were pledged to love eternal
I subscribed to Soviet Studies
And the Anglo- Soviet Journal

I treasured all his pictures
From the date of his accession –
Until I read the strictures
Of that horrid secret session

So now – I’ve got those 20th Congress blues:
I hate the sight of Soviet News
For everyone keeps snarlin’
At my darlin’ Joey Stalin
I’ve got those 20th Congress blues ...²²

One strand of the British New Left was composed of resignees from the British communist party in 1956, most famously Edward Thompson

and John Saville. Thompson and Saville founded an unofficial publication, the *Reasoner*, in an effort to force a full discussion of the Khrushchev revelations within the CPGB, and subsequently resigned over Soviet actions in Hungary to set up a discussion journal, the *New Reasoner*, outside the party. The individuals associated with the *New Reasoner* clearly were not, and nor did most of them ever become, anti-communist in the sense of rejecting communism and the communist tradition in its entirety. Indeed, they were extremely wary of contributing to, or being seen as giving succour to, the anti-communist ideology and discourse of mainstream British politics of the time. So labelling them as anti-communists was something I was somewhat reluctant to do.

Yet, in terms of framing the question within the comparative context of this discussion, it's clear that this ex-communist critique of communism was very much concerned to uphold and reclaim the emancipatory objects of communism against the perceived betrayal of stalinism. I will therefore focus my comments on two questions. Firstly, what was the nature of the communism that this group was against? And, perhaps more interestingly, what was the nature of the communism that it claimed?

The elements of communism that were rejected were identified primarily in terms of Stalin's domination of the world communist movement, and, in the British context, of the subservience and lack of moral and intellectual courage – as it was seen – of the national party leadership. Thompson's critique recognised stalinism as having deeper and more complex causes than simply the 'cult of personality'. He characterised it as 'the ideology of an elite ... degenerated into a bureaucracy', in which was implicated a fallacious interpretation of marxism as 'economic automatism' as well as some 'mechanistic fallacies' from within Lenin's writings. Hallmarks of stalinist ideology were identified as anti-intellectualism, moral nihilism and the denial of individual human agency. However, Thompson drew a distinction between stalinism and the world communist movement, and retained a view of the Soviet Union as a socialist country, although that, he said, was not yet expressed in its political institutions.²³ And this group of incipient New Leftists also remained wary of other forms of communist anti-stalinism, most notably

Trotskyism, although what was rejected was less the ideas of Trotsky as such than Trotskyism as an alternative dogma. In particular they were thinking of the factionalism and heresy-hunting of British Trotskyist politics at the time, particularly that associated with 'The Club' around Gerry Healy.²⁴

As for the nature of the communism that this group laid claim to – what they sought to evoke as a true or authentic communist tradition against stalinist distortion was overwhelmingly humanist and democratic in its emphasis. For Thompson, communism was always a popular movement of socialist internationalism; his emphasis was on values of moral courage, personal self-sacrifice, solidarity in a struggle for the betterment of the human condition. This was very much identified in his mind with his own political formation in the popular front period. He and other key protagonists had been politically formed by the Spanish civil war and war service: it is well-known for instance that Thompson's brother Frank had fought and died with partisan forces in Bulgaria. The group around the *New Reasoner* were very much associated with this tradition, and with Dimitrov's injunction to link up communist struggle with popular revolutionary traditions. So they were attracted to what one might see as enclaves of incipient revisionism within the CPGB – contributions that challenged economic determinism, and explored in original ways, implicitly or explicitly, issues such as the relationship between social being and social consciousness, between the economic and cultural spheres.

Although the participation of this group of early new leftists in the Historians' Group of the Communist Party is well known, with the Historians' Group seen as arguably working with a more sophisticated version of social being than some of their contemporaries, at least as important an influence was the group of writers, poets and literary theorists that included Edgell Rickword, Christopher Caudwell, Ralph Fox, Alick West and Randall Swingler. Thompson cited *A Handbook of Freedom* (1939), a compendium of English radical texts edited by Rickword and Jack Lindsay, as amongst his key inspirations, and he clearly identified this group as a centre of what he called 'premature revisionism'.²⁵ Once established, the *New Reasoner* was also very much orientated to similar traditions abroad, and the humanist revision of communism in eastern Europe; its editors sought to popularise and

make links with these traditions, although not entirely successfully. Also very important was the tradition within British communism of adult and worker education, from which many of the *Reasoner* cohort came.

Thompson and this group, then, effectively posited the existence of a partially suppressed or sublimated, but vibrant and important, tradition within British communism that resisted, though not always directly, the didacticism, economism and dogmatism of party officialdom. This was most importantly expressed through the participatory and vibrant artistic and intellectual culture that was in some senses contradictory to, but in other senses tolerated by, official party structures – the kind of culture that has been well documented by scholars such as Hannah Behrend.²⁶ This alternative position was developed by Thompson as socialist humanism, which he saw as melding the humanism of Marx with the moral consciousness exemplified in English radical traditions, of which William Morris was his prime exemplar. What he hoped for was a humanist reorientation and revival of communism along these lines. This was at first seen as a lever for the transformation of the communist party itself, though later it was clear that this authentic project of socialist humanism would have to be developed outside the party.

Yet if this group were communist humanists or communist anti-stalinists, they weren't yet new leftists as such. The New Left only really emerges from the convergence of this group with other non-communist traditions within the British left: most notably the independent student radicalism associated with *Universities and Left Review*, with which the *New Reasoner* merged in 1960 to form the *New Left Review*. The term New Left, as used in its British context, in fact does not date from 1956 but from 1958, when those whom we now associate with it began using it to denote a rather tentative aspiration to foster a grassroots, activist and participatory movement for socialism through channels such as CND and the network of left clubs begun by ULR.

The attitude of this broader activist and intellectual new left towards communism was far more ambiguous and more variable. Some of the *ULR* group had been communist party members, most notably Raphael Samuel; others, like Stuart Hall and Charles Taylor, had not. At the same

time, there was some debt to popular front communism even among those who had not been communists. The *ULR* title referenced *Left Review*, and there were frequent references to the intellectual levée of the 1930s. But this group had much less direct experience and personal identification with communism; their political formation and reference points were very different – Suez, the Cuban revolution – and they paid far closer attention to the Labour Party. They were determinedly modern in sensibility, and alive to possible new sources for socialist renewal around issues like race, and the sociological and cultural changes associated with post-war affluence.

In fact, Charles Taylor challenged Thompson's claims about the humanist credentials of marxism and communism. Marxist communism, he argued, 'is at best an incomplete humanism', and he pointed out the insufficiency of a response to the communist crisis that attributed its problems to 'Stalinism' without also calling into question the entire history of communism and marxism.²⁷ So the *ULR* group understood socialist humanism not as a rebirth of communism and communist principle, but in a more nebulous and expansive sense that brought them into contact with far wider currents – some of the currents that Carl discussed, in terms of anarchistic, new social movement-type tendencies. They were not seeking a revived or transformed communism as a model or ideal for socialist politics; instead they were seeking new models altogether, and this more eclectic, ideologically heterodox and experimental approach brought them into dialogue with new ideological and political influences.

These different attitudes toward communism became in time a source of tension within the early New Left, and are one reason why there was only rather limited reflection on the lessons of 'stalinism' within this group, although one might have expected a deeper engagement given the histories of some of the protagonists. In the next phase of the New Left, the antipathy and mutual misunderstanding of the positions adopted in the notorious Anderson/Thompson exchanges also militated against a full accounting between these new left and communist traditions.²⁸ One of the things that I have been exploring in my own work is how these traditions all come together and yet many of the tensions remain un-negotiated, or not fully explored in theoretical and political terms. To

tease out these different strands fully would involve broadening out the focus beyond the scope of today's discussion.

Gavin Bowd (Left Bank anti-communism)

When I was asked to talk about 'Left Bank anti-communism' I immediately thought in geographical terms, so I'm going to take you on a brief stroll through anti-communist Paris, where we'll look at various manifestations of anti-communism and ask if they have a unifying project and a unifying enemy.

On the 'Right Bank' we could be dealing with a clearly and comfortably right-wing anti-communism that rejects the peril of egalitarianism, collectivism and *les classes dangereuses* massing at the walls of an increasingly gentrified Paris. The church of Sacré Coeur overlooks this part of the French capital, expiating the sins of the Paris Commune. Down below Montmartre are the offices of *Le Figaro*, inveterate newspaper of the conservative, not fascist, right. Further west, near the Arc de Triomphe, you might look for traces of French fascism in the Avenue Foch, nicknamed the Avenue de la Collaboration for all the apartments that have been expropriated from rich Jews. That said, among the traces of collaboration can be found ex-communists like Jacques Doriot, who combined visceral hatred for his former party with open contempt for the reactionary politics of the Vichy regime.

On crossing the Seine, do we hear a different kind of chatter, different kinds of anti-communism? In Saint-Germain-des-Prés, a Jean-Paul Sartre politicised by the Resistance is trying to reconcile marxism with an existentialist philosophy of individual freedom and responsibility. After his failure to create a 'third way' between communism and capitalism, he will, at the height of the Cold War, become a fellow traveller of the PCF, declaring notoriously in 1952 that an anti-communist is a dog – *un anti-communiste est un chien*. And yet, in November 1956, with Hungary, Sartre sees the 'spectre of Stalin' in the ruins of Budapest and embarks on a search for new forms of revolutionary dynamism, be it third world national liberation, or the 'group-in-fusion' that seems briefly to manifest itself in the events of May 1968.

You may leave Sartre in the rue Bonaparte for the rue Jacob, where

Philippe Sollers and *Tel Quel* hold sway. After proclaiming a purely aesthetic, apolitical approach to literature, the *tel queliens* carve their niche in the intellectual field by a rapprochement with the French communist party, followed by a spectacular conversion to Maoism. Followed by another spectacular rallying to anti-communist 'dissidence'.

Otherwise, we might go down the rue de Buci, where Guy Debord and the Situationists are slowly drinking themselves to death, denouncing the society of the spectacle, both east and west, arguing for a 'council communism' and writing inflammatory telegrams to the Kremlin. Nearby, the Editions Ivrea bookshop sells their work, alongside Boris Souvarine's life of Stalin and the work of George Orwell.

Moving further south into the Latin Quarter, we still meet manifestations of right-wing – what we think of as a traditional – anti-communism. Raymond Aron remains doggedly attached to an at first unfashionable pragmatic liberalism, casting a sceptical and even amused eye on the 'opium' of *marxisant* intellectuals. Further to the right, we find that the law faculty in the rue d'Assas, just by the Jardin du Luxembourg, produces a host of neo-fascists, notably Jean-Marie Le Pen, who loses an eye in a street fight with communist students. In May 1968, Alain Madelin, militant of Occident, and future liberal government minister under Chirac, also comes to blows with the Reds. Just down the rue Malebranche, the Librairie roumaine, frequented by disgruntled exiles of the Iron Guard, peddles negationist and neo-fascist literature. In the rue d'Ulm, just up from the École normale supérieure, the equally barricaded bookshop of La Vieille Taupe sells similar literature, but also demonstrates the rapprochement of ultra-left and ultra-right.

How communist, then, is this Paris? Louis Althusser theorises his isolation in the École normale supérieure, reaching the dismal conclusion at the end of the 1970s that 'the crisis of Marxism is open'. At the Sorbonne, the occupants of the Chair of the History of the French Revolution must defend an increasingly contested Jacobin-marxist interpretation, which, with its emphasis on class struggles, creates a play of mirrors linking 1789 and 1917.

At the Sorbonne, where we can still to this day find well-heeled students wearing the royalist fleur de lys and selling *Action française*, the rot has set in. François Furet, zealous member of the 'Saint-Just cell' of

the party, breaks with the communist movement in the late 1950s and, fuelled by *le ressentiment de l'amour déçu* – the resentment of unrequited love – becomes its formidable intellectual enemy. The political and ideological are emphasised over the economic, and the Terror is seen not as an aberration but a threat harboured by the values of 1789. By the time of the bicentenary, year of the fall of communism, Furet and his supporters are uniting communism, fascism and the Jacobin terror under the term of totalitarianism.

As Michael Scott Christofferson has shown, anti-totalitarianism will rally many left-bank intellectuals in the course of the 1970s.²⁹ Some, like André Glucksmann and Michel Foucault, are former members of the PCF. Others, like Bernard-Henri Lévy, effortlessly impose themselves as guardians of the 'libertarian' spirit of May 1968, denouncing 'master thinkers', and insidious and pervasive power, tracing a bloody genealogy that leads from the Enlightenment to the Gulag. Again, like the *tel quel*iens and Furet, they operate outside the main academic institutions, using the media and publishing to impose themselves.

Do these anti-communisms converge? They certainly seem to unite in criticism of the Soviet bloc and a French Communist Party which they (wrongly) consider to be on the verge of imposing stalinist dictatorship. When, in 1979, Raymond Aron leads his blind friend Jean-Paul Sartre to the Élysée Palace, to express their concerns about the fate of Vietnamese boat people, liberalism seems to have erased the 'unsurpassable horizon of Marxism'.

Of course, in May 1981, Soviet tanks are not rumbling down the Champs Élysées. The French communist party enters a steady and sharp decline. The Soviet model finally disappears ten years later. But anti-communism does not die with it. Just as there is an anti-semitism without the Jews, for example in eastern Europe, there is an anti-communism without the communists. With the *Past of an Illusion*, Francois Furet attempts to complete what he calls the 'endless burial' of communism which, he believes, began in 1956. The opening of archives offers further ammunition. From his penthouse near the Paris Stock exchange – we're back on the right bank – a former Maoist, Stéphane Courtois, discredits the PCF's role in the Resistance, and then puts together the *Black Book of Communism*.

But such a map of anti-communisms would be incomplete without a reminder of anti-anti-communism. If the *Black Book of Communism* inspired the inveterate Jean-Marie Le Pen to call for a Nuremberg trial for the crimes of communism, socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin could declare himself proud to have communist ministers in his *gauche plurielle* government: the PCF might have meant, yes, unquestioning obedience to Moscow, but it also meant the popular front, the Resistance, anti-colonial struggles and social and democratic progress at home. In 1997, during the centenary of the PCF's greatest intellectual, Louis Aragon, the intellectual Pierre Daix, who had turned on the party over its attitude to Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*, could declare that 'they are trying to do to Communism what they did to the resistance; when, in fact, all was not black'. Jacques Derrida refuses to believe in the death of a spectre, while Guy Debord sees in the fall of the Berlin Wall the triumph of the rights of spectating man.

I conclude with the observation that, on the Left Bank and elsewhere, anti-communism has not ceased to be. This year the right-leaning magazine *Le Point* gave its front page to left-wing philosopher Michel Onfray. Promoting his new biography of Albert Camus, Onfray praised the author of *L'Étranger* as a Proudhonist, anti-communist libertarian, contrasting him with the grasping, callous and figuratively blind Sartre, who, he claims, rejoiced at the death of his rival in a car accident in 1960. The understandably outraged response of *Le Monde diplomatique* shows that the Camus centenary in 2013 will display yet again the virulence of French anti-communisms, in their myriad forms.

Notes

1. Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: a conceptual approach*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
2. This rest of this article is an edited version of contributions made to a roundtable discussion offering comparative perspectives on the phenomenon of anti-communism at the 'Century of Anti-Communisms' conference held in Manchester in September 2012. No attempt at a comprehensive treatment was possible or attempted during the discussion: Islamic, social-democratic and liberal anti-communism were among

the alternative perspectives suggested, and others could certainly be proposed. The approach adopted here was to invite our six contributors to reflect on the character and significance of anti-communism as a concept on the basis of their own particular research interests. In embracing diverse left and right varieties of anti-communism, there was no attempt to collapse these into one another, as communists themselves so often did. Instead, preliminary observations were circulated inviting reflection on the protean and problematic significance of the concept. Our contributors here follow in the order in which they spoke on the day. Supporting references have been provided where appropriate but otherwise the contributions appear essentially as delivered.

3. Letter dated 1 July 1918, Kobe: Paul Avrich Archives, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
4. Errico Malatesta to Luigi Fabbri, 30 July 1919, Fabbri Papers, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.
5. H. Kelly, 'Roll Back the Years: Odyssey of a Libertarian', unpublished manuscript (n.d), box 27, p. 6, John Nicholas Beffel Collection, Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University.
6. K. Zimmer, 'Premature Anti-Communists? American Anarchism, the Russian Revolution, and Left-Wing Libertarian Anti-Communism, 1917-1939', *Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas*, 6, 1, 2009, pp45-71.
7. J. H. Summers, 'The Epigone's Embrace, Part II: C. Wright Mills and the New Left', *Left History*, 13, 2, 2008, pp94- 127.
8. A. Cornell, 'A New Anarchism Emerges, 1940-1954', *Journal for the Study of Radicalism*, 5, 1, 2011, pp105-132.
9. *Anarchist Studies*, 19, 2, 2011, to be republished by Lawrence & Wishart in 2013.
10. R. Wolin, *The Wind from the East: French Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960s*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
11. See M. Maeckelbergh, 'The Road to Democracy: The Political Legacy of "1968"', *International Review of Social History*, 56, 2011, pp301-32; D. Graeber, *The Democracy Project. A History. A Crisis. A Movement*, London: Allen Lane, 2013.

12. For a particularly helpful discussion of populism in Latin America, see Alan Knight, 'Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, especially Mexico', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30, 1998, pp223-248.
13. See Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, London: Verso, 2005.
14. On this see Paulo Drinot, *The Allure of Labor. Workers, race and the making of the Peruvian state*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.
15. See Paulo Drinot (ed.), *Che's Travels: The Making of a Revolutionary in 1950s Latin America*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
16. See, among others, Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph (eds), *Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence in Latin America's Long Cold War*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
17. Leguia went on to rule Peru autocratically until 1930, when he was deposed in a coup.
18. Paulo Drinot, 'Creole anti-communism: labor, the Peruvian Communist Party, and APRA, 1924-1934', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 92, 4, 2012, pp703-30.
19. On the Alliance for Progress, see, among others, Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
20. For an overview and latest attempt to define a fascist 'minimum', see Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
21. *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, no 14, 30 December 1987; Bernstein and Politi, *His Holiness: John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time*, New York: Doubleday, 1996, p497. For more recent scholarship that moderates the Bernstein-Politi perspective that there was a covert US-Vatican relationship directed against the communist bloc, see Marie Gayte, 'The Vatican and the Reagan Administration: A Cold War Alliance?', *Catholic Historical Review*, 97, October 2011; also Andrea di Stefano, 'Stati Uniti-Vaticano: Relazioni Politiche e Aspetti Diplomatici, 1952-1984', PhD thesis, University of Teramo, 2008. For the religious dimension of the global cold war beyond Roman Catholicism, see Dianne Kirby (ed.), *Religion and the Cold War*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013 edn;

- also Kirby, 'The Religious Cold War' in *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp540-64.
22. There were two numbers of *The Rhyming Reasoner: A journal of indiscretion* published in September and November 1956 and edited by 'W. McGonagall', a name British and especially Scottish readers will know as the perpetrator of doggerel and reputedly the worst poet in the world. Purporting to come from the Elysian Fields, it was in fact produced in Glasgow by Ronald Meek and John Houston.
 23. E P Thompson, 'Socialist humanism', *New Reasoner*, no. 1, 1957, pp109-112 passim.
 24. See John Callaghan, *British Trotskyism: theory and practice*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.
 25. Edgell Rickword and Jack Lindsay (eds), *A Handbook of Freedom: a record of English democracy through twelve centuries*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1939.
 26. Hannah Behrend 'An intellectual irrelevance? Marxist literary criticism in the 1930s' in Andy Croft, ed., *A weapon in the struggle: the cultural history of the Communist Party in Britain*, London: Pluto, 1998.
 27. Charles Taylor 'Marxism and humanism', *New Reasoner*, 2, Autumn 1957, p98.
 28. The main texts of the Anderson/Thompson debate are Anderson, 'The Left in the Fifties', *New Left Review* (NLR), 29 (January/February 1965); Thompson, 'The peculiarities of the English' in Ralph Miliband and John Saville, eds, *Socialist Register*, London: Merlin, 1965; Anderson, 'Socialism and pseudo-empiricism', NLR, 35 (January/February 1966); Thompson, 'The poverty of theory, or an orrery of errors', in *The Poverty of Theory and other essays*, London: Merlin, 1978.
 29. Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.