

From Yugoslavia to Yugonostalgia: Political Elements in Narratives about Life in the Former SFRY

Ivan Maksimović

Introduction

Citizens of Belgrade as well as its visitors had an opportunity to enjoy a curious exhibition in the summer of 2013 and early 2014. Those familiar with the state of affairs in Serbia are well aware of the fact that museums – most of which are state owned – rarely manage to entice the native population, but somehow this particular event had them flocking in large numbers.¹ The venue, however, was no museum. Two department stores which once belonged to a socialist-era chain hosted this project, conceived and developed by several individuals who have successfully tapped into the sentiment held by a large number of people in Serbia, if not the majority. Its subject matter, anything but exotic for Serbians over 30, was life in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Wishing not to restrict the experience to a merely passive one, its authors enabled visitors to buy hot dogs at classic Yugoslav kiosks, sit in some of the cars usually seen on the streets at that time, or find themselves in a recreated supermarket from the 1960s. The authors of the exhibition even incorporated various smells reminding visitors of their lost youth – the smell of Bulgarian perfume as well as that of burnt milk.

However, this was just the apex of a decade-long wave of mainstream media manifestations of nostalgia for this particular period in time and that particular country called Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In general, the outlook towards life in the SFRY was positive. What is somewhat puzzling is a curious absence of political elements in public

nostalgic narratives. Given that they all refer to life in a bygone country under a regime which espoused political values significantly different than today's, it would be logical to assume that these narratives would at least attempt to inspect the relationship between the everyday and the political. Nevertheless, such a connection is rarely made, if ever.

The fact that my assumptions were refuted prompted me to investigate yugonostalgic sentiments further, more specifically their political elements. For this purpose, I have conducted a series of semi-structured, individually-held interviews with citizens of Belgrade who lived in the socialist era. Recording their narratives, I sought to delineate the common themes, tropes and motifs. Given that yugonostalgia as a phenomenon gained some attention in the academic community, there is an already existing body of literature which will be assessed here, with the main conclusions outlined in order to be subsequently compared to mine.

Those unfamiliar with the history of Yugoslavia might seek contextualisation. Due to constraints of space, it will not be provided here, but I will instead point out to works which have attempted and more or less successfully managed to highlight the complexities of Yugoslav society and especially its violent demise. Regrettably, it is the events of the Nineties which turned the attention of both academia and world media to Yugoslav society, triggering a hyper-production of journalistic and academic texts of uneven quality, which focus too much on the unmaking rather than the making of the country. Some of those that pass muster are John R. Lampe's *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, Susan Woodward's *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, and Misha Glenny's *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*. A comprehensive history of the country can be found in Vladimir Dedijer's *History of Yugoslavia*, and those who seek a more thorough study of ethnic issues which predate the country's birth might turn to Ivo Banac's *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*.

Definitions

The outcomes of the wars in former Yugoslavia were not only hundreds of thousands of casualties, several new nation states on their individual roads to capitalism and new elites to guide them, but among them was

also a new word. Those who opposed the postwar reality were eagerly branded by said elites as yugonostalgic. In the words of Croatian dissident writer Dubravka Ugrešić, 'A yugonostalgic is a suspicious person, "an enemy of the people," "a traitor," a person mourning the demise of Yugoslavia'... 'the term "yugonostalgia" belongs to the new terminology, the terminology of war.' Even twenty years after the break-up, according to Tanja Petrović, 'every positive expression towards the Yugoslav past, and any positive view on everyday social and cultural life in the Yugoslav state... is reason enough for applying the derogatory adjective *yugonostalgic*.'² With the passage of time, it had come to encompass those who feel lost in post-socialist times, and who are also referred to pejoratively as 'transitional losers', those 'who have no future and who thus existentially and transcendently reach for lost history'³ How, then, did it come to pass that this exhibition on everyday Yugoslav life was so unusually popular? Every social and political change has its proponents and detractors. The transition from socialism to capitalism (through the restoration of parliamentary democracy) was welcomed by many, but apparently not the entire society.

Understanding nostalgia itself is inseparable from the modern concept of time, and the understanding of a past which cannot be repeated. A rebellion of sorts against this concept, it is a desire to negate history as a linear and progressive sequence of events, and convert it into a 'private or collective mythology.'⁴ Yugoslavia belongs, after all, to another time, which makes it neither unusual nor unexpected when the proponents of the new order criticise nostalgia as historically regressive. But if their criticism is founded in political issues, does it mean that yugonostalgia is indeed apolitical?

Yugonostalgia in the public sphere

As mentioned earlier, the popular exhibition – titled 'Long Live Life' – is just one of more recent examples of nostalgia for the SFRY in the public sphere. But nostalgic narratives started to penetrate the media several years earlier, in many cases as sincere personal accounts. For instance, a band from Croatia famous in the heyday of Yugoslav rock music came to Belgrade to play in 2008, and their frontman gave an interview for a

popular daily newspaper. Besides claiming that the quality of music produced in Yugoslavia was higher than today, he chose to tackle xenophobia which he sees as more dominant in post-Yugoslav countries which he compared to 'chicken coops.' He still insists on calling Belgrade and other parts of the former country as 'his own' despite what he sees as attempts by the political elites to delete this part of history. Additionally, he briefly commented on the precarious position people find themselves in today compared to the social security of the SFRY, and stated – as a coup de grâce – that it is his right to openly criticise the situation because he could do so in 'communist Yugoslavia, so why not in a free democracy?'⁵ This was the case with famous director and actor Emir Kusturica who, while promoting a film in which he portrays a KGB analyst who passes Soviet secrets to the French, gave an interview for the media. In it, he spoke of his character as a noble communist who couldn't stand to see his youthful ideals corrupted, comparing him to his own father. Kusturica opposed the demonisation of communist times, claiming that there were both good and bad sides to that story.⁶ A Serbian military analyst praised Tito on the 30th anniversary of his death, asserting that his personality was stronger than the its cult.⁷

A minor source of amusement for Serbian (and even some international) news outlets was the case of 'Yugoland', a personal project of a deeply nostalgic resident of a northern Serbian town. It was opened in 2003 and it used to span 3¹/₂ hectares of land arranged so as to resemble Yugoslavia with its landmarks: the Adriatic sea as well as mount Triglav. An amateur's museum which exhibited private memories, Yugoland provided comfort to some who felt disoriented after the loss of their country, and over 8000 of them became its 'citizens'. Ironically enough, the 'country' failed in 2012 because of unpaid bank loans.⁸

However, mass media eventually found a way to cash in on people's nostalgic sentiments, and one of the prime examples for it is a TV programme titled 'SFRY for Beginners.' It is a independent documentary series broadcast on Serbia's TV B92 in late 2011, as well as in some neighbouring countries (TV Vijesti in Montenegro and ATV in Bosnia and Herzegovina). A collage type of show, each episode had 4 segments which focused on various elements of Yugoslav pop culture. One segment per each episode was dedicated to a celebrity of the era, whereas

the other three discussed legendary phenomena like popular comic books, hot dog kiosks, fashion of that time etc. The show's producers had a clear idea to include content that was entirely associated with lifestyle quality and avoid political and economic issues, stressing that it wasn't their goal to discuss the faults and virtues of Yugoslav political system or, in their own words: 'We wanted a story about everyday life, where one's ideology is irrelevant.'⁹ In its essence, the TV programme practically borrowed its concept to the exhibition about Yugoslav lifestyle that came two years later.

These examples serve to illustrate that yugonostalgia can be used to sell a product, which is when depoliticisation occurs. By offering pleasant memories of a peaceful and prosperous lifestyle without referencing to the communist ideology and its system (unless when absolutely necessary), they attract as many people as possible, across the political spectrum.¹⁰ On the other hand, abovementioned interviews with certain prominent people demonstrate that personal nostalgic narratives can in fact be political, which seems to imply that there are those for whom fond memories of the SFRY are directly related to its modes of governance.

Academic research on yugonostalgia

As soon as the wave of yugonostalgia became apparent, the first theoretical contributions to this phenomenon started to appear. The first researchers that problematised yugonostalgia have done so indirectly. Studies by Serbian sociologist Todor Kuljić titled *Culture of Remembering* (2006) and *Remembering Titoism: Between Dictate and Resistance* (2011) criticise so-called hegemonic discourses – versions of the past imposed by new political elites and international capital. He conceptualises an entire category of personal memories which refuse to conform to dominant versions of the past that demonise socialist Yugoslavia and Tito's regime.¹¹ According to Kuljić, the demonisation occurs because the new elites are determined to accept the values the European Union is based on, i.e. the values of liberal democracy, which are clearly opposed to those of totalitarian ideologies, both on the right as well as the left.¹² According to him, yugonostalgic feelings do speak volumes about one's sentiment towards the present, not, however, as a means of direct confrontation, but rather

a mere expression of dissatisfaction. Therefore, it is a passive sentiment that conveniently relieves the nostalgic person of his or her responsibility towards the present – as he or she do not truly live in the present.¹³ In accordance with this viewpoint, Kuljić views contemporary nostalgia for Tito as entirely cleansed of subversive elements, on account of the fact that Tito – or the socialism that he symbolises – pose no danger today.¹⁴

On the other hand, there are interpretations of yugonostalgia that choose not to deny it the possibility of an active role. Such interpretation can be found in what is momentarily the most comprehensive analysis of publicly expressed yugonostalgia – Mitja Velikonja's *Titostalgia* (2008). By examining one very important segment of the yugonostalgic discourse – nostalgia for the SFRY's lifelong president Josip Broz Tito – Velikonja makes conclusions applicable to the phenomenon in general. According to Graeme Gill, as quoted by sociologist Siniša Malešević, an entire system, the creation and establishment of which was led by a single person, will later be associated with that person. The legitimacy of the system is based exactly in this person, who is subsequently monumentalised and never called into question.¹⁵ By virtue of this mental connection, Tito represents not only the political system, but also the system of values associated with this epoch. Velikonja chose to depart from usual reductionist interpretations of yugonostalgia, presenting it instead as a complex phenomenon and, therefore, occasionally contradictory. By refusing the present condition, he claims, alternative perspectives are opened which are more welcoming to 'obsolete' ideas of social justice, common property, health care and social security, solidarity, internationalism etc.¹⁶ Therefore, Velikonja seeks out possibilities hidden within this ideological complex that might provide an alternative social order. However, he also makes a difference between mass-media nostalgia and the one that circulates in informal channels such as the internet. Whereas the former is passive, consumerist, and seen as harmless play, the latter is active, rebellious and carries with it a utopian possibility.¹⁷ In the latter sense, Tito is associated today with the following common denominators: antifascism and liberation, industrial and social modernisation, peace, respectability and renown.¹⁸

Foreign academics have also been present in exploring this problem since the beginning. Monika Palmberger did fieldwork in Mostar (Bosnia

and Herzegovina) in an attempt to uncover the nature of remembering the past in a war-torn country. She warns about the problems of perceiving poor transition as the sole cause of nostalgia, seeing that it is present in all formerly communist countries – many of which have been characterised by a smoother transition.¹⁹ The importance of nostalgia for social studies, in her view, lies in the personal constructions of history that influence people's lives as opposed to one single 'true' history.²⁰ She also notices a significant discrepancy between the number of people who remember Yugoslavia fondly and the number of people who declare themselves as yugonostalgic, while those critical of Yugoslavia also remember that period as idyllic.²¹ Claire Bancroft examined nostalgia in Belgrade using a threefold questionnaire, with questions focusing on the past, present, and future. Interviewing six Belgrade citizens, she concluded that the positive outlook towards life in socialist Yugoslavia was unanimous, regardless of the interviewee's political standpoint. The positive traits are systemic: stability and prosperity, a high level of security, freedom of expression (an unusual claim for a socialist or communist-ruled country), and even values officially promoted by the party which were based on solidarity and social responsibility. Last but not least, a sense of dignity for being able to travel abroad without restrictions.²²

According to Tanja Petrović, another dedicated scholar in this field, citizens of Yugoslavia with positive memories towards the past are without fail considered willing subjects of a totalitarian regime, which – in the eyes of those who disagree with them – disqualifies them from any future political activity.²³ This is the conclusion of a common faulty syllogism that lies behind the critique of yugonostalgia: if the SFRY was governed by the communist party, and communist parties advocate a totalitarian ideology, people who for any reason claim to have been satisfied with life in that state should be excluded from the decision-making process on account of advocating totalitarianism. According to Petrović, what is behind yugonostalgia is not so much conjuring the past, nor a Proustian reveling in reawakened senses, but a sincere and earnest belief in a country's achievements. Research done by Ivana Spasić, based on a focus group, brought similar results. Life in Yugoslavia was described as more secure and peaceful as compared to the economic uncertainties of today, but also a positive counterpoint to today's moral downfall.

However, she failed to recognise a utopian element, concluding instead that it all ends with 'dreams and longing.'²⁴

All authors concur in their conclusions that nostalgia is formed in opposition to the flaws of the present day. When it comes to yugonostalgia specifically, they are divided in answering the question of whether it represents a potentially driving force or is passive in nature. In any case, it consists of a wide variety of convictions which do not necessarily amount to blind adoration. In fact, it is usually those with positive memories about the period who are able to formulate a complex appraisal of the system, which includes both positive and negative judgment.

The interviews

Conducting this research as part of my graduate thesis, I was under both time and money constraints. The sample selected was somewhat a product of convenience, seeing that all respondents currently reside in Belgrade, but I nevertheless attempted to randomise it as much as possible. Out of twenty respondents, eleven of them were female and nine male. Five of them were born in Belgrade, whereas another five were born in smaller Serbian towns, where they lived for much of the SFRY era. Five were born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and another five in Croatia. All eventually migrated to Belgrade as war refugees during the 1990s. Most of them are college graduates, with only five of them being high school graduates. Generationally speaking, they are a diverse group, with the oldest respondent being born in 1935 (Rade P.) and the youngest in 1976 (Sonja T.). Such a sample leaves room for improvement, most evidently on account of leaving out the rural population, as well as undereducated individuals. This is not by all means an all-encompassing study of yugonostalgia in Serbia and, hopefully, subsequent attempts at research might improve its methodology. Furthermore, one can only desire an all-encompassing study of yugonostalgia throughout the region.

At the very beginning of the interviews, most of the respondents would spontaneously share their views on the political life in their former country. Politics, after all, is eagerly discussed in Serbia. Only five of the interviewees claimed that they strongly disagreed with the politics of the

state, despite not actively opposing it in any way. Three of them (Rajko P., born in 1951, Mirna P., born in 1951, Nataša M., born in 1966) were members of the pre-war capitalist or intellectual upper classes, the influence of which was severely weakened after the war. Their perception of Tito and the partisans was shaped by the attack on their families' property. Being adherents of pre-war democracy, they would usually state that they disagreed with the concept of a one-party system, which significantly diminishes the political freedoms of the individual. The remaining two (Jovan P., born in 1963, Milka V., born in 1956) formed their negative opinions of the regime independently from their surroundings, also on account of perceived enforced conformity.

These negative opinions were subsequently enriched with an additional aspect, after the wars of the 1990s. The abovementioned five, as well as several other interviewees, insisted that Serbian and Croatian cohabitation was impossible due to opposing interests. In their view, brotherhood and unity advocated by the regime was a 'false foundation.' Almost exclusively, they saw the cause of the wars and country's collapse in Croatian nationalism.

Despite such negative attitudes, however, only one of the interviewees (Rade P., born in 1935) actually claimed that the experience of life in socialist Yugoslavia was entirely negative for him. The others who disagreed with the regime were significantly less dissatisfied. His displeasure was profoundly political, attacking not only the abovementioned 'false foundation,' but also the 'destructive and deceitful propaganda,' which he has seen as disguised persecution of political opponents. The majority of people interviewed held positive views of life in the country, and some aspects of these undoubtedly pertain to the political.

The first positive recollection that would usually spontaneously come to mind was a general idea of social welfare for the Yugoslav population. Practically all of the respondents mentioned how the state provided people with free healthcare, affordable (practically free) education, as well as jobs and flats. The equality of citizens at the doctor's, for instance, was underscored by several people. There was also the idea that systemic corruption was nonexistent in this field. It should be noted that such an experience affected the perception of the people interviewed, many of them concluding that money should play no role in obtaining services

from such institutions, and that it is everyone's right to receive medical care and a decent education.

Besides social security, there was also the matter of one's physical safety. A key element of the interviewees' memories was the idea that a citizen could feel safe wherever they went, that crime was at a much lower level than today, as well as that the confidence in institutions was on a much higher level. An almost-archetypal image was used by two of my interviewees (Živka T., born in 1966, Nataša M., born in 1966) when discussing physical safety: 'You could sleep on a bench and nothing would happen to you.' Another common phrase was 'absolute safety,' and a number of respondents reminisced situations from their own youth, walking the city streets at night or returning home without fear that someone will harm them.

Another argument that can be seen as part of this group is the freedom of movement. Nearly all of the people interviewed stated with pride how they could travel without restrictions owing to the 'red passport.'²⁵ It is a fetishised symbol of this condition, a metaphorical instrument which provides its owner not only with freedom of movement, but indirectly with twofold dignity: personal and national. As many as fourteen interviewees had an opportunity to test that notion by travelling abroad, six of which insisted that their dignity was to a large extent defined by their possibility to travel freely without fear of being treated poorly by foreign authorities. For the remaining six who did not travel abroad in the time of the SFRY, the reason was either that they were too young (two female interviewees, Jugoslava K. and Sonja T., born in 1973 and 1976, respectively), or a lack of desire to do so. Namely, Yugoslavia itself was large enough for them that they could satisfy their desire to travel within its boundaries. Even Goran T. (born in 1960), who spent a month and a half with cousins in Germany stated: 'Why go to Greece or Spain, when the Adriatic is the prettiest?'

In evoking some of the pleasant memories, the interviewees touched upon something that might have been other sources of national pride. Firstly, as opposed to today's small and dependent provincial states, socialist Yugoslavia was seen as an autonomous Balkan force, economically developed and politically independent. Living in such a self-reliant country was replaced by a precarious lifestyle in a diminutive one that is

seen as too weak to take a stand and defend its interests against powerful imperialists such as the USA, but also the powers of international capital. Secondly, Yugoslavia's political independence enabled it to play a vital role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement and thus be perceived among its citizens as an emancipator of former colonies. Tito was, again, seen as instrumental in bringing about such positive developments. Even for those who disagreed with the regime, Yugoslavia was a successful intermediary (word used by Mirna P. in interview) between the East and the West, fusing qualities of both ideal types.

Interestingly enough, although many respondents considered themselves political beings, most admitted that the Yugoslav political system seemed 'confusing and boring.' For some, this was a pleasant time, believing they didn't have to worry about politics, as others were there to run the country for them. Only two out of twenty interviewed admitted to have been politically engaged: Jadranko S. (born in 1954) as a lower-level party and union member, and Vesna P. (born in 1964) as a youth activist who sought to find local rock bands places to practice.

Speaking of dominant values of that time as compared to now, most would state how solidarity was at a much higher level back then, whereas now there is a man vs. man attitude. There is lament for a lost morality, which was present in every situation: children's TV programmes, media which relied on facts, not rumors and sensationalism, and a strong faith in authority figures. Some were explicit in their belief that it was the role of party executives to create the 'socialist man' – a well-rounded, hard-working, intelligent creature.

Ultimately, when I asked each of them if they considered themselves yugonostalgic, only six dared to give a positive answer. Most of them accepted the conventional negative definition of the term, as if fearing shame if they said yes. Those that did say yes, on the other hand, understood how negatively it is perceived and went with it nevertheless. This confirms the conclusion Palmberger made about the discrepancy between the number of people who feel nostalgic and those who actually claim to be. Whereas for a number of them it was sad and unnecessary that the country fell apart, most claimed that it was unfortunately inevitable, referring again to the 'unrealistic' concept of brotherhood and unity among peoples.

Conclusion

For the most part, my conclusions conform to those of Bancroft, Spasić, and to a lesser extent Petrović. It seems that researchers such as Velikonja and Petrović attribute their own preconceptions based in their own political views by reading into yugonostalgia too many progressive and radical values. Even though a number of leftist organisations (e.g. *Levi samit Srbije*, *Marks 21*, *ASD*) see socialist Yugoslavia as a historical role model to other societies, it would be unfounded to assume that they are the majority.

When discussing this phenomenon, one is reluctant to call it nostalgia for communism. Undoubtedly, there is nostalgia for certain socialist values which were enshrined by the regime, such as social and economic security. According to the interviews, they are the ones mostly missed. Nevertheless, there are many elements seemingly incompatible with the communist ideology, that even slide into outright conservatism. The lamented lost values, for instance, were not only those of solidarity, but also – to an extent – of traditional morality. Respecting authority figures such as the teacher, the policeman, the parents, was seen as a proper way to behave in society, and such authority was rarely called into question, just as that of the national leader. Additionally, private property is neither shunned nor challenged, and what people really seem to be nostalgic about is the possibility of a middle class lifestyle, not abolishing class entirely. Progressive values typical for communism were rarely touched upon. Even though women's liberation played a significant role in the communist party's struggle (AFŽ, the Antifascist Women's Front, formed in 1942 attracted a large number of women to the fight against the occupying forces, and full women's suffrage as well as other rights were achieved in 1945), feminism was never mentioned as an important legacy. The case is similar with the ideology of 'brotherhood and unity' which is only cynically referred to as a failed policy, as well as an anti-colonial and anti-racist stance which are completely forgotten or neglected.

To sum up, it seems that political issues without a doubt represent an inescapable segment of nostalgic memories of Yugoslavia. As it seems, yugonostalgia can be manifested in different forms. The most common form is that which contains memories related to social issues like health,

workplace security and education. Secondly, slightly less common is nostalgia for a strong political system. The least common, however, is nostalgia for progressive socialist values, especially that of surpassing ethnic divisions.

Nevertheless, one of the reasons why yugonostalgia is so powerful today is the fact that perceiving any Balkan country as significant in any way contradicts common perceptions of the Balkans as a backwards, marginal region. The subservience of today's shrunken republics is a far cry from the position that Yugoslavia held among other nations before its dissolution. Serbs especially, after being demonised by much of the western media for their role in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, long for these days of respectability.

No matter how contradictory such sentiments can at times be, they signify a deep dissatisfaction with the state of things today. Especially today, when capitalism is being increasingly called into question as a system, it is important to experiment with various alternative models. A way to reach such a model is a change of perspective: aside from theories peddled by political and economic elites, one could learn valuable information listening to the people and their experiences. No matter how limited such experiences may be, they are parts of a larger collage of what Yugoslav reality was.

Notes

- 1 Unprecedented, even. The exhibition's creators boast with over 40 000 visitors. See more at: <http://www.dw.com/sr/se%2C4%27anje-nabzbri%2C5%2BEnija-vremena/a-17307958> (in Serbian)
- 2 Dubravka Ugrešić, *Kultura Laži*, Zagreb: Konzor, 2002, p. 289
- 3 Mitja Velikonja, *Titostalgija*, Beograd: XX Vek 2000, p. 166
- 4 Svetlana Bojm, *Budućnost Nostalgije*, Beograd: Geopoetika, 2005, p. 18
- 5 Marija Radojković, 'Jugoslavija mi nedostaje', Blic, 26.10.2008. <http://www.blic.rs/Zabava/Vesti/62491/Jugoslavija-mi--nedostaje> (in Serbian)
- 6 M. Čule, 'Kusturica glumi ruskog špijuna', Blic, 15.07.2009 <http://www.blic.rs/Zabava/Vesti/101743/Kusturica-glumi--ruskog-spijuna> (in Serbian)
- 7 Miroslav Lazanski, 'Tito posle 30 godina', Politika, 16.04.2010 <http://www.politika.rs/pogledi/Miroslav-Lazanski/TITO-POSLE-30-GODINA.lt.html> (in Serbian)

- 8 Dragana Raduški, 'Mini-Jugoslavija na ivici propasti', *Nezavisne novine*, 09.09.2012 <http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/ex-yu/Mini-Jugoslavija-na-ivici-propasti/157601> (in Serbian)
- 9 Marija Dedić, 'Jugoslavija – od smeha do suza', *Večernje Novosti*, 11.03.2012 <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/spektakl.147.html:369837-Jugoslavija--od-smeha-do-suza> (in Serbian)
- 10 For more similar examples to confirm this conclusion, see Jovana Vukcevic, 'Commodification of the collective memory: Yugonostalgia as a marketing strategy'
- 11 Todor Kuljić, *Kultura Secanja*, Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2006, p. 131
- 12 *ibid.*, p. 121
- 13 Todor Kuljić, *Sećanje na Titoizam: Između Diktata i Otpora*, Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2011, p. 136
- 14 *ibid.*, p. 123
- 15 Siniša Malešević, *Ideologija, legitimnost i nova država: Jugoslavija, Srbija i Hrvatska*, Beograd: Edicija REČ, 2004, p. 218
- 16 Mitja Velikonja, *op. cit.*, 150
- 17 Mitja Velikonja, 'Povratak otpisanih', *Peščanik* online magazine, 05.11.2009 <http://pecsanik.net/2009/11/povratak-otpisanih/> (in Serbian)
- 18 Velikonja, *op. cit.*, 120
- 19 Monika Palmberger, 'Nostalgia matters: nostalgia for Yugoslavia as potential vision for a better future' in *Sociologija*, Vol. L, N°4, 2008, p. 357
- 20 *ibid.*, 358
- 21 *ibid.*, 361
- 22 Claire Bancroft, 'Yugonostalgia: the pain of the present' in *SIT Study Abroad*, Paper 787, 2009, p. 20
- 23 Petrović, *op. cit.*, 187
- 24 Ivana Spasić, 'Jugoslavija kao mesto normalnog života: sećanja običnih ljudi u Srbiji' in *Sociologija*, Vol. LIV, N°4, 2012, p. 593
- 25 This passport enabled its owner to travel without a visa anywhere in the world except for Greece, Albania, China, and the USA. For more information, see Stef Jansen, 'After the red passport: towards an anthropology of the everyday geopolitics of entrapment in the EU's "immediate outside"' in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 15 Issue 4, 2009, pp. 815-832