Sexology and the national Other in the Soviet Union

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Abstract Historians have pointed to overseas colonialism and ‘race science’ as influential in the construction of European sexual science. Soviet sexology arose on a ‘semi-periphery’ between Europe and colonised societies. The ‘Others’ against whom Russian sexual ideals were forged would be ‘internally colonised’ peasants and non-Russian ethnicities of the Soviet Union’s internal orient. Pre-Stalinist sexology blended the ‘sexual revolution’ with European sexual science focused on workers in the Slavic urban industrial heartland; nationalities beyond this perceived heartland lagged behind and their sex lives required modernisation. Stalin virtually curtailed sexological research. After 1945 the party revived it to spur fertility, especially in Slavic urban centres where births had dropped below replacement rate. Ideological control constrained sexologists, confining them to silos, limiting internationalisation and cramping research. But new, heteronormative therapeutic measures, some from Western science, and others devised at home, were developed. Less vocal than Western or Eastern Bloc sexology, Soviet sex research continued to display anxiety about internal national and ethnic Others into the 1980s and beyond.

Keywords sexual revolution; sexology; nationality; race; internal colonisation; communist modernisation

'The history of Russia is the history of a country that colonizes itself’, wrote Vasilii Kliuchevskii, one of Imperial Russia’s most influential historians, in 1904.¹ To understand Soviet sexology’s approaches to ‘race, ethnicity, and nation’ we should start with

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¹ Vasilii Kliuchevskii, Russkoe istoricheskoe iskusstvo, 1904.
Kliuchevskii’s observation about Russia and its special colonial path. In this pithy phrase he crystallised a whole school of historiography focused on the process of Russia’s self-creation through continual migration to, borderland occupation of, freebooting trade with, and eventual conquest of, its neighbouring territories. Such processes gradually absorbed peoples into an empire, ‘Rossiia’, that distinguished between ethnic Great Russian identity (‘ruskii’) and civic identification (‘rossiiskii’) – a distinction that remains critical in Russia today. Russian state-building adopted methods that treated Great Russians as ‘colonised’, most notably by the institution of serfdom, which prevailed from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and was abolished only in 1861. At times peripheral subject nations – Finns, Poles, Georgians – were treated on better terms than Russians themselves. In contrast to Europe’s great overseas empires, Russia was an expanding land empire straddling Europe and Asia that had gobbled up Siberia by the mid-seventeenth century, and conquered Central Asia in the nineteenth century. The Russian Empire on the eve of revolution was a congeries of many dozens of ethnicities, some highly integrated European ‘nations’ while others were scarcely imagined as communities. Joseph Stalin, the Bolshevik Party’s expert on the ‘nationalities question’, articulated a constructivist concept of nation in 1913 in his ‘Marxism and the national question’: the nation was a historically constituted community sharing a common language, customs, territory and economic life. For Marxists, ‘the nation’ was not primordial but historical, amenable to construction. The first Soviet census of 1926 counted and ‘created’ some 190 ethnic groups. Soviet Marxists enthusiastically embraced ‘nationality’ and set out to channel the power of nationalism through a bewildering array of ‘affirmative action’ policies that multiplied territorial divisions, levels of local government and languages of education. Bolsheviks provided illiterate societies with alphabets, grammars and eventually national literary canons and even opera houses (presenting classical European and freshly invented national repertoires). Soviet nationalities policies – which of course fluctuated during the lifetime of Soviet power – were a feature of the USSR’s internal colonisation and its sprint to socialist modernity. 

Recent studies of the evolution of modern sexology have implicated overseas empires and colonialism in the construction of scientific
understandings of sex. Almost no attempt has been made to apply this ‘colonial turn’ to histories of Soviet sexology, which are themselves in their infancy.\(^5\) Historiographies of sexual science have focused their attention on western European science and its encounters with overseas colonial subjects.\(^6\) In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ideas about ‘civilised’ sexual norms were generated by anthropologists, psychiatrists, physicians and an array of social and biological experts, in their encounters with the ‘primitive’ Other in the colonial periphery. Sexology sorted humanity into developed and underdeveloped peoples as it proclaimed its modern, scientific and secularised credentials. Sexology studying Asian, African, Middle Eastern and Oceanic peoples classified sex-related rituals, practices and cultures according to Eurocentric and orientalist frameworks. The ‘exotic’ overseas Other told western Europeans and north Americans what their sexual selves allegedly had been, and, worryingly, what they might still become, without medical, psychiatric, criminological or other expert interventions. At stake was often the differentiation of ‘white’ races from Others, determined by sciences of ‘race’ such as eugenics and human biology.

Russian and Soviet sexology imagined Russianness and the Other in different terms from the ones used by Western European sexologists. To apply the ‘colonial turn’ to Russian and Soviet sexology we have to begin by defining this country’s distinctive ‘sexology’. In this article I read Russian and Soviet ‘sexology’ expansively, to include many medical, social-science and legal forms of expertise that take us some distance from the classic pre-1933 German model of sexual science. That model ‘constituted a truly interdisciplinary field, interlinking the professionalizing disciplines of human psychology, psychoanalysis, endocrinology, ethnography, biotypology, anthropology, criminology, and physiology, as well as knowledge produced in literature, art, folk practices, and social activism’.\(^7\) The richness of German sexologies, with their many divergent proponents advocating different interdisciplinary blends and research agendas, contrasts with Russian and later Soviet analogues.\(^8\) The Russian Empire’s scientific infrastructure was underdeveloped compared to that of German and French institutions. Scientists, many trained in France and Germany, clustered in a few major university cities. Sexology as a self-proclaimed interdisciplinary field was weakly
developed in late Imperial Russia: there were influential endocrinologists and eugenics experts, some psychiatrists specialising in sexual pathologies, a small but energetic psychoanalytic movement, physicians conducting large-scale surveys of sexual behaviour, and the first shoots of a popular advice literature on sex. The Russian Orthodox Church and other recognised confessions did little to modernise their understandings of sexuality, and religious norms prevailed in a predominantly peasant society. The First World War, however, loosened religion’s hold on patriarchal familial bonds, and accelerated transformations in sexual behaviour and cultures in a way that made the ‘sexual revolution’ a fact on the ground even before the Bolsheviks seized power.

If German and French sexologists built arguments about sexual science in part on observations about overseas colonial peoples and ‘racial’ distinctions, the Russian reception of European sexology was filtered through habits laid down in the creation of a land empire where colonisation sometimes had little to do with ‘race’. Race has been a particularly ineffable category in the Russian imagination. The Russians knew that they saw ‘race’ differently from their European neighbours. There were indeed some ‘racially’ distinctive ‘small peoples of the North’ (such as the Yakuts, Nenets, Evenki), but these were remote, isolated and primitive. Russian experts were more compelled by categories of ‘ethnicity’ (seeing numerous ethnicities and language groups around them), and ‘nation’ (which, they worried, Russia could not quite ever be, unlike, say, France). Habits of ‘internal colonisation’ led Great Russians to ‘colonise themselves’, and while experts saw few major racial Others in their empire, except perhaps the Jews, it was often ‘the Russian people’ (narod) which commanded ethnographers’ attention and the dreams of reformers and social scientists. After the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, when the world’s first socialist state embarked on its project of modernisation, it inherited these dispositions about race, ethnicity and nation, and it reckoned with an enduring anxiety to measure itself against Europeanness.

How, then, was Soviet sexology shaped by Soviet approaches to race, ethnicity and nation? Answering this question would require a book-length study, and fresh archival work by a team of researchers commanding at least fifteen languages between them. This article
cannot be that study but offers instead a chronological survey of the points of interface between sexology and ‘race, ethnicity, and nation’ in Soviet thinking between 1917 and 1991. My object is to discern communist influences on the pre-existing Imperial Russian inheritance, hence the periodisation from the launch of the Bolshevik coup to the collapse of the Soviet ‘empire’. I divide the article into two sections: the first considers early socialist sexology as a contributor to the construction of the ‘New Soviet Man and Woman’ before the Second World War; the second examines post-war developments in sexology that were more closely attuned to demographic and implicitly russocentric anxieties. Many of my examples draw on Soviet debates about homosexuality, sexual maturity, and the ideal Soviet sexual subject; but I also rely upon recent scholarship on the history of sexual sciences for the region.

I argue that in the emerging global system of sexual sciences, Russian and Soviet ‘sexologists’ felt themselves to lie on what Benjamin Kahan terms the ‘semi-periphery’, engaged with ‘core’ producers of sexual knowledge in western Europe (Germany, Austria, France), and at the same time were aware that their science lacked the authority it apparently enjoyed in ‘core’ countries. Russian and Soviet science attempted to assert its expertise in an authoritarian political environment that left little space for the liberal subject governed by disciplinary knowledge; while the rule of law tradition was weak before 1917 and rejected by Bolsheviks thereafter. In Imperial Russia, religion governed sexual knowledge; in the Soviet Union, communist ideology would play an increasingly critical role in shaping permitted discourses. Soviet sexologists’ inability to dominate the field of knowledge about sexuality led them to an ‘unruly appropriation’ of European sexological ideas, as experts tried to carve out disciplinary realms. Russians and Soviets measured themselves as being located somewhere between ‘Asian’ backwardness and an idealised ‘European’ destination. The measuring stick might acquire a ‘red’ socialist colour, but the act of self-assessment against Europe or ‘the West’ was always present. It offered critics the chance to see Soviet society and sexuality as ‘backward’, but, paradoxically, experts and ideologues could also paint the USSR as ‘advanced’ in sexual terms, as a ‘young’ vigorous proletarian society, ahead of ‘old’ European ‘bourgeois’ mores. Nevertheless, reconciling socialism with ethnic, national and biological
difference proved a persistent worry for Soviet sexology, as I argue in the second section, on the post-war era. The party was reluctant to set down a ‘political line’ on the tasks and purposes of Soviet sexology; and there was little Soviet transnational influence on the more historically rooted and culturally integrated branches of socialist Eastern European sexology. As development proceeded across the USSR, sexology seemed to confirm that sexual behaviour remained persistently distinctive between ethnic and national groups.

The New Soviet Man and Woman of the 1920s and 1930s

Ideas of the ‘new person’ who would develop their full potential under socialism had circulated in Russia since the 1860s, when novels celebrated the future of women’s emancipation in a Crystal-Palace dream sequence (Nikolai Chernyshevsky’s What is to be Done?, 1863), or contrasted the feckless Russian male with his purposeful German alter-ego (Nikolai Goncharov, Oblomov, 1859). Both landmark novels – like Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin before them (1833) – measured the Russian present critically against a European ideal, thought to be available in the present (Oblomov had only to get up off his sofa) or in the future, if ‘new people’ built a palace of socialism. Russian gender was to be refashioned after a European model.18

When the Russian social democrats took the reins in October 1917, they promoted European socialism’s heritage of sexual politics: the emancipation of women, secularisation of marriage and divorce, decriminalisation of abortion and homosexuality, and drives to eradicate female prostitution with welfare and training. For some utopians, the family was to ‘wither away’ and the state would take over the burdens of childcare and housework.19 Bolsheviks themselves lived complex sexual lives, often combining radical anti-familialism with surprising sentimentality.20 The Soviet state launched a political and cultural war against religion, lasting until the late 1980s, allowing religious leaders no purchase on the sexual question until the end of communist rule. With the revolution, the stage seemed set for a radical redefinition of sex.

Yet the Russian intelligentsia liked its radical politics desexualised, and
the dominant tendency in the Bolshevik Party was ‘rationalising’ rather than ‘libertarian’. In fact, the institutionalisation of the ‘sexual revolution’ in Soviet politics led to the suppression of utopian sexual dreams. These dreams included an insistence on the revolutionary potential of pleasure, the liberating transformation of individual psychology through sexual exploration, and the call for sexual experimentation in the here-and-now, all associated in socialist memory with Alexandra Kollontai. Instead, Vladimir Lenin argued that the New Soviet Person should sublimate their sexual desires to the project of building socialism. In a much publicised conversation with Clara Zetkin, he cautioned that new forms of love relations could wait, and would only emerge spontaneously in life’s ‘superstructure’ once the ‘base’ of economic relations was made socialist.²¹ The Marxist-Leninist and later Stalinist ‘rationalising’ position on the ‘sexual revolution’ had complex transnational valences: sublimation for the goal of socialism made sense inside the USSR, where the gains of the ‘sexual revolution’ were already fixed in law – and while debates continued over how to build socialism, and the road ahead was still dangerously obscure. Beyond the USSR, and especially where communist parties vied for power with the bourgeoisie and nationalists, in Germany, France, Spain, China and elsewhere, the ‘libertarian’ aspirations of the ‘sexual revolution’ could be popular and were promoted enthusiastically.²² One transmission belt for this translational shift was the left-leaning, campaigning World League for Sexual Reform (WLSR), led by physician and socialist Magnus Hirschfeld from his Institute for Sexology in Berlin.²³ The WLSR hailed Soviet legislation and lauded Soviet delegates at its conventions, but, as Solomon reveals, it showed more interest in Soviet sexual politics than Soviet sexological research.²⁴ Another transmission belt was the Comintern.²⁵ The mechanisms and people who trafficked in radical sexual politics within the Comintern have not been studied, but this could be a highly revealing line of inquiry for tracing the transnational flow of sexual politics and sciences via socialist networks.²⁶

Current work on early Soviet ideology on sex and the formation of the New Soviet Person has little to say about expert viewpoints on intersections between sexuality and race, ethnicity or nation. In the 1920s, Soviet narratives of class were richer in furnishing sexual Others
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than narratives of racial or ethnic Others. Effectively, Soviet sexology began by ‘colonising’ or exploring the sexual behaviour of (implicitly Russian/Ukrainian) workers and peasants. Solomon’s social-hygiene oriented sexologists illustrate this point well. The surveyors of sexual behaviour established a study circle of young social hygienists investigating ‘social aspects of sexual life’ (under the State Institute of Social Hygiene, Moscow) from 1923 to 1926; and from 1927 to circa 1931 there was a separate ‘bureau of sexology’ in the same institute. These social hygienists were led by a well-known ‘utopian’ of the sexual revolution, Grigorii A. Batkis, whose defence of radical Soviet sex regulation had been published by allies in Germany in 1925. The hallmarks of their self-designated ‘sexology’ were, in Solomon’s estimation, a ‘fetish with measurement’ through surveys and quantification, and a lack of interest in ‘subjective data’ and the individualism of bourgeois sexology; they took no interest in psychoanalysis. The object of study was the worker’s and less often, the peasant’s sexual behaviour: questionnaires revealed so-called ‘sexual budgets’, counting incidence of sex attraction and intercourse.

Stripped of ‘subjective’ and ‘individualist’ factors, the ‘objective’ and ‘desexualised’ truth of early Soviet sex life was studied by leading sexologists in class terms rather than with reference to an exotic Other elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, socialist sexology’s debt to the left’s inherited interpretation of western anthropology (via Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and others) embedded the Other in this sexual science on the ‘semi-periphery’. Marxist critiques of modern sexual politics contrasted the ‘primitive sexual life’ of non-industrialised societies with the educable proletariat’s struggle against the ‘morally crippling’ environment of capitalist urban factory existence. ‘Primitive sexual life’ was alarmingly close to the present, and to the proletariat, in Soviet perceptions. As late as 1933, a leading proponent of Soviet sexology, Kharkiv social hygienist Z.A. Gurevich, proclaimed the superiority of worker sexuality over bourgeois and peasant sexual life for its restraint and sublimation for the good of the collective. This he evidenced through a range of surveys about the age of first sexual experience in Soviet society, demonstrating that workers (again implicitly Russian or Ukrainian) deferred their sexual lives until age 21.6 years (according to
a Batkis survey), while pre-revolutionary surveys of ‘bourgeois’ students had reported an age of eighteen years for their sexual debut. The key oppositions Gurevich emphasised were social and economic, not racial or ethnic. Capitalism, he argued, generated far earlier and more destructive sexual lives for its subjects, and the wealthier classes ‘have incomparably richer sources of sexual stimulation than the proletariat does’, and hence more sexual disorders and less rational sublimation for constructive social purposes.32

Frances Bernstein’s study of psychiatrists and hygienists who counselled Moscow workers shows that the classed Other in the sexological imagination was Russian, rural and backward; typically she was an aged female peasant ‘wise woman’, whose primitive diagnoses and folk-medical cures for sexual troubles threatened health, enlightenment and progress.33 The Russian peasantry needed education and uplifting to political consciousness on a par with urban workers: Russia had its internal ‘primitives’, and, in the mindset of expert observers in the major centres, the country still needed to ‘colonise itself’. Ideologists thinking about sex focused concern almost exclusively on the urban working class (the heroic protagonists and inheritors of revolution) – and that class was often Russian-speaking even in Ukraine and Central Asia, a legacy of imperial colonisation, economic migration, and development.34 The self-colonising impulse was scarcely assuaged by working-class credentials alone. Party thinkers doubted that workers’ consciousness was sufficiently advanced to assure the emergence of the New Soviet Person in sexual matters. Eric Naiman and Gregory Carleton chart the terrors of the ideologist observing the worker as misogynist factory comrade, as gang-rapist on the streets, and as incapable of the sublimation of pleasure or bored by ‘rational’ leisure.35 Within the Russian Soviet republic, the worker was to serve as the ideal citizen, while the peasant was an exemplar of ‘backwardness’; and yet both failed to measure up to demanding Bolshevik standards.

Beyond the Great Russian population, forensic experts did train a national gaze on their sexual subjects. A little-known feature of Soviet sexual legislation from the 1920s to the 1990s was the absence of a stated age of consent. Instead, sexual intercourse ‘with persons not having attained sexual maturity’ was a crime. ‘Sexual maturity’ or immaturity
was determined by doctors in each case of a complaint or allegation of a crime; in 1925, in Russia alone, 4,600 examinations of persons to determine ‘sexual maturity’ took place. The rationale for the ‘sexual maturity’ threshold of sexual consent was that the Soviet Union’s diversity of social customs, geographic and class differences, and finally ‘race’, meant that legislators felt a single age tariff was impossible to set. Doctors forced to interpret this law fell back on pre-revolutionary research on puberty-onset around the Empire; and they continued to conduct surveys of first menses (for girls) and less frequently of ‘sexual debut’ for young men. (Psychoanalytical sexology was also eschewed by forensic experts as too vague for courtroom evidence, too inward-looking, and ‘idealist’ rather than materialist.) Fascinatingly, both racial-geographic and social axes informed Soviet notions of ‘sexual maturity’.

From pre-revolutionary gynaecological and sexological textbooks of the 1880s through to Soviet manuals of the 1930s, geography and race were said to trigger the start of sexual life. Influenced by German and European sexologists, Russian experts looking beyond their own empire noted how Southern ‘races’ (Jews in Central Europe, the ‘Metis of Mexico’) experienced earlier onset, more intense sexual feeling, and higher fertility. The opposite was said of Greenlanders and Scandinavians. Within the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, the diversity of peoples became the framework for a similar ladder of racial geography. Jews living among the Russians and Poles displayed sexual precocity; Caucasians (Georgians, Armenians, Azeris) also did so, whereas the Finns, for some reason, were particularly late bloomers in Russian eyes; and Russians in the north (girls in Leningrad) matured later than Muscovites, Ukrainians and Crimeans. The Muslims of the USSR presented special difficulties, for the racial and the social were entwined in a long-observed ‘social problem’ of child-marriage. The ‘sexual maturity’ legal threshold was intended to take Muslim customs in the Caucasus and Central Asia into account while protecting girls from abuse.

At the same time, class remained critical in the definitions of ‘sexual maturity’ used by forensic doctors. Before the revolution, they paid more attention to upper- and middle-class subjects, whose environment might precociously stimulate sexual onset (servants, novels and
spicy foreign food were culprits). Peasants, who constituted eight per cent of the population until 1930, were at first romanticised, with fresh air and a lack of urban stimulants said to lead to a naturally innocent sexual debut; after the 1905 revolution with its widespread rural rebellion, however, the view of the peasant grew darker: corruption, poverty and poor diet, ignorance, and patriarchal family life were blamed for a later sexual onset in the countryside well into the 1930s. Workers under tsarism were perceived as blighted with premature onset of sexual activity in the corrupting urban setting. While this blight did not end instantly after 1917, Soviet studies of worker pubertal onset saw a sustained focus on the working class as the new scientific norm defining the onset and character of puberty. Protecting the worker-child from premature loss of sexual innocence became a critical sexological task of Soviet pedagogy in this period, and psychoanalytical approaches, loosely associated with opposition-leader Leon Trotsky, were rebuffed for the credence they gave to the sexual lives of children.

The discussion in forensic medicine of racialised geographies of sexual maturity indicates that conceptions of race mattered to early Soviet socialists, and had meaning in other areas of sexual science, such as eugenics. There was certainly considerable interest in socialist eugenics in the early and mid-1920s, with a particularly active traffic of influence between Berlin and Moscow, as the two outcast-states of the Versailles system established strong ties in racial and medical geographical research at this time. Yet the Soviet and German research agendas never sat comfortably together, with the Germans using the USSR as a fieldwork site for work that was increasingly seen by Soviet colleagues as incommensurate with socialist racial science. At its most utopian, Soviet racial scientists in 1929, when utopian ideas were in the air – and far less appropriately for the times in 1936 – postulated the mass artificial insemination of Soviet women to produce superior humans for socialist development. The party rejected such proposals, and, with an eye on Nazi Germany’s racial ideology, quickly took the view that eugenics as a prescription for human sexual norms was incommensurate with socialism. Yet anthropologists and others who had promoted Soviet eugenics before 1933 continued to pursue their scientific interests, within greater ideological constraints. Soviet anthropologists from the
Stalin-era 1930s to the mid-1950s would define human races as ‘historically emerging groups of people united by shared origins, expressed in common inherited characteristics in the structure of the body’. Race were pointedly not ‘degenerate’, and ‘racial mixing’ was a sign of social and historical advance, leading to an expected outcome of greater hybridisation, and the eventual disappearance of distinctive ‘races’. Race turned out to be rather like class: due to disappear as the approach of communism neared.

A final area in which racialised geographies informed sexology and Soviet regulation was in medical, legal and ideological understandings of homosexuality. Early Bolsheviks lacked a consistent or unified approach to the question of homosexuality, as their actions demonstrated. To secularise and modernise the law they decriminalised male homosexuality (‘sodomy’) in 1922 in the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian republics of the new USSR; however, in Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asia republics, sodomy remained a crime for reasons discussed below. (On state-security grounds, Stalin re-criminalised male homosexuality for all Soviet republics in 1933-34.) In the interval of partial decriminalisation, communist officials and sexological experts expressed diverse views about ‘homosexuality’, as both a medical and as a social phenomenon, depending on the context. Officials and sexological experts routinely interpreted homosexual behaviours in the south and east of the Soviet Union to be products of local social relations, usually in Muslim societies; while ‘homosexuality’ as an inborn or biosocial condition could be a medicalised anomaly ascribed to citizens of the more ‘modern’ European heartland. Some sexual-revolutionary ‘utopians’ and some citizens themselves argued that the Soviet decriminalisation of sodomy meant liberation for ‘homosexuals’, whom they understood as a biosocial category of people worthy of protection, like women and ethnic minorities, under socialism.

Reformers within and outside Muslim Central Asia thought that female veiling and seclusion, and male ignorance, facilitated disturbingly visible ‘survivals of primitive ways of life’ (as the criminal codes called them). The most spectacular examples of Central Asian male same-sex ‘survivals’ were the Uzbek dancing-boy (bacchi) schools, which served as hives of pimping, male prostitution and child exploitation. The 1926
criminal code of Soviet Uzbekistan adopted no fewer than eight articles against the maintenance of *bachi* and the sexual harassment of men and boys.\(^5^1\) We have no research on how these laws were drafted, received or enforced, but we know that local Bolshevik campaigning associated keeping *bachi* with gambling and womanising, and condemned such ‘backward’ pursuits in the press and in embarrassed conversation with visiting western artists.\(^5^2\)

Within the European republics of the USSR, scientists conducted a range of endocrinological, psychiatric and criminological studies of male and female homosexuality, exploring their clinical cases for evidence confirming or undermining theories for the etiology of same-sex desire they read in European sexology. There were experiments to ‘cure’ homosexuality with sex-gland transplants; psychiatric case histories of cross-dressing women; detailed descriptions of the criminal queer as female murderer or male prostitute; and at least one wide-ranging discussion in the health commissariat in 1929 attended by psychiatrists and eugenic biologists about Soviet ‘transvestites’. This committee of experts heard details of the autobiography of a ‘person of intermediate sex, a male psycho-hermaphrodite’, who had married their female partner. These experts agreed such a marriage might be permissible for ‘transvestites’ after psychiatric assessment.\(^5^3\) This early discussion of medically sanctioned same-sex marriage was the high-water mark of Soviet sympathy for the queer subject, and it was framed as a scientific concession for an otherwise ideal citizen of apparent Russian nationality; it contrasted with these same experts’ worries about Uzbek *bachi* and effeminate Russian males ‘infecting’ army platoons. Homosexuality had national, social, class and geographic aspects that presented varying degrees of ‘trouble’ for Bolsheviks and fellow-travelling scientists. European workers in the Soviet heartland who presented with queer desires were most likely to be treated with medical sympathy, while backward peoples in the internal Orient required more radical social and class transformations to eradicate egregious homosexual behaviour. The Russian and early Soviet approach to homosexuality straddled an epistemological fault line: when Russian experts looked east and south within the USSR, European medicalised explanations for homosexuality were trumped by socialist socio-economic diagnoses of an Asian ‘Other’. The disunity of Soviet understandings
about homosexuality was such that not one but two articles about it: the first, expressing the medicalised perspective, and the second, explaining the forms it took ‘among “s[o]-[alled] primitive peoples’, appeared in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* in 1930.54

Revolutionary Soviet sexological sciences withered in the 1930s under the force of Stalin’s Five-Year Plan assault on industrial development and peasant agriculture. A Moscow conference of the World League for Sexual Reform, due in 1931 on an invitation from Soviet social-hygiene sexologists, failed to materialise; it was later held in Brno, Czechoslovakia, instead. International contact in sexology disappeared. The institutional wrapper for Bolshevik sexology, social hygiene, was downgraded, and its staff scattered in five-year plan restructuring.55 As early as 1933, a psychiatrist with sexological interests could declare the virtual elimination of the need for overt talk and investigation of sexual behaviour. Soviet modernisation – with ‘the new way of life, the pioneer [youth] movement, coeducation, polytechnical education with its labour instruction, the physical culture movement – all of these powerful educational factors’ – directed ‘sexual inclinations into the channel of other interests’, leaving little left to say.56 The Soviet Union’s vaunted sexually progressive regulation was virtually annulled: male homosexuality was re-criminalised in 1933-34; contraception was secretly removed from sale in 1935; abortion was banned and divorce made less accessible and less acceptable in 1936.57 A public campaign accompanying the last two measures touted heterosexual marriage as the only place for sexual life under Soviet socialism, and ‘utopian’ sexual revolution was buried without any vocal resistance from the sexologists of the revolutionary years.

**Post-war and late-Soviet developments in sexology**

A critical problem facing the USSR after the Second World War and at the dawn of Cold War was the demographic challenge. Some twenty-six million citizens had died, with a preponderance in the most reproductively active age cohorts. The Stalinist silencing of Soviet ‘sexology’ continued, but population anxiety pressed experts to delve into the
intimate lives of citizens. The party in 1944 decreed state-paid child support for the first time, unleashing a wave of unmarried motherhood, with almost nine million ‘fatherless’ babies born in the decade after the war.\(^58\) Meanwhile doctors protested to Ministry of Health policy-makers about Stalin’s 1936 ban on abortion and the resulting illegal backstreet terminations, which harmed fertility and women’s health. In 1954, the last year of the ban, almost two million illegal abortions ended in hospitalisation; doctors were frustrated by their role enforcing the ban and treating the health impacts.\(^59\) Indeed, physicians and health officials spearheaded efforts to reduce abortion and stabilise sexual behaviour through moralising ‘sex education’ pamphlets and publications – a wave of these appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s, some of them translations of Czechoslovak or East German publications.\(^60\) The Stalinist formula, devised in the 1930s and owing much to the literary doctrine of Socialist Realism, of silencing discussion of sex and letting nature take its course, became unsustainable in a restive post-war society that was more highly educated and expected better living conditions.\(^61\)

With Stalin’s death, his successors embraced wide-ranging change. Sexological questions emerged gradually as a result of reforms intended to offer the Soviet population more incentives to build communism in the cold-war atmosphere of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Legal, state-funded abortion was restored in 1955; labour policy encouraged women to cede lucrative industrial jobs to men and retreat to the welfare and service sectors.\(^62\) Khrushchev launched a housing construction boom of single-family apartment blocks, giving millions of citizens more privacy after years confined to typical Stalin-era communal flats. Between 1957 and 1984 over fifty million apartments were built using pre-fabricated concrete slab technology.\(^63\) After decades of ideological attacks on individualism, the party conceded that Soviet citizens deserved a degree of ‘privacy’ behind the closed doors of their homes, with unforeseen implications for sexual behaviour.\(^64\)

Several sites of broadly sexological research emerged in the 1950s and developed into the 1980s. These endeavours had at least four features in common; the first was a commitment to applied science. Blue skies exploration of sexuality remained impermissible to Soviet research gatekeepers, but specific sex-relevant problems that might be resolved
through medical therapy or social policy interventions were given licence and a degree of investment. Behind this permission lay the state’s demographic and welfare priorities to improve efficiency and productivity. By the 1970s, as Russian birth rates slowed, nationality began to figure in these priorities for sexology. The applied nature of these sexologically relevant investigations contributed to the second common feature, their confinement to disciplinary silos. Soviet experts working on sexual behaviour and sexual norms in the post-war did not become interdisciplinarians in the manner of Weimar German sexologists or US post-war investigators like Alfred Kinsey. The limits of late-Soviet tolerance for delving into sexual questions were set by disciplinary gatekeepers: academicians, editors, doctoral committees and research bureaucrats, all under party supervision.65 Until the 1980s, and the popularising publications of philosopher-sexologist Igor’ Kon, the party would not let a ‘Soviet Alfred Kinsey’ as public intellectual exist in the Soviet information sphere to explain sexual questions to the broad public.66 Moscow’s reluctance to enable a figurehead for Soviet sexology to emerge contrasted with sexological practice in the socialist people’s democracies of central and eastern Europe, with their older and stronger traditions of interdisciplinarity and public outreach, and their distinctive sexual cultures. The vector of influence ran to the Soviet Union, and rather less from it. Although Pavlovian physiology got a late-Stalin era boost in Soviet science at a moment when Sovietisation was strongest in the new ‘peoples’ democracies’ of central and eastern Europe, the Kremlin did not impose on the socialist camp a rigid transnational uniformity in sexology.67

A third common feature of late-Soviet sexological discourse was nevertheless its limited, but still significant, internationalisation, common to all late-Soviet science. Gatekeepers believed that if solutions were to be found to sex-related problems, they might be sourced from Western or Eastern-bloc science. Bibliographies and card catalogues demonstrate that Soviet sex researchers read foreign scientific works about sexual dysfunction, sexual behaviour and psychosexual development, even if libraries restricted distribution. Nevertheless, Soviet sexologists’ interaction with foreign researchers and agendas was circumscribed by prudish party and academic gatekeepers who saw ideological danger in confer-
ence attendance or shared research activity. It is striking how little knowledge exchange ran from the Soviet Union to the people’s democracies or Western nations in the sexological field.

Finally, a fourth area concerns the key theme of this article, the role of racial, ethnic or national Others in Soviet sexology. In this period, ‘nationality’ became an increasingly institutionalised and ‘primordial’ category in Soviet perceptions, despite the ideological (and colonial) dream of a merging ‘Soviet people’ based on a shared Russian language and socialist values. Individual Union republics became modern, urban, educated societies with the titular nationality gaining in confidence; outmigration of other nationalities tended to homogenise republican capitals. Some researchers in sexual matters responded to these contradictory aspirations and trends by concentrating attention on ‘national’ problems. One such issue was an emerging demographic trend: European Soviet birth rates dropped below replacement level in the early 1970s while Central Asian levels rose. Late-Soviet sexology justified itself by studying ways to elevate Russian and Ukrainian ‘marriage productivity’ (fertility). Sexological studies proliferated in a new medical sub-field of ‘sexopathology’; in forensic-medical debates about sexual maturity; in the emergence of psychotherapies focused on sexual life; and in the appearance of a new branch of sociology, that of families, with a focus on reproductive activity.

‘Sexopathology’ (seysopatologiia) emerged as a new medical field in the early 1960s, as Soviet psychiatrists, gynaecologists and urologists sought to address pathologies of sexual function. Authorities confined the new science to the ‘pathologies’ of sexuality, rather than exploring ‘normal’ sexual behaviour. Historians have noted the anxiety about male impotence driving the development of this new field, most powerfully in psychiatry; psychiatric leadership in the field in the 1960s recapitulated many concerns about ‘nervousness’ and sex charted by Bernstein for the 1920s, and there were slim threads of continuity from the 1930s. From 1965, health ministry funding supported a Department of Sexopathology in the Moscow Scientific Research Institute of Psychiatry, and seminars and conferences on sexological issues were held in Moscow, Leningrad, Riga, Kyiv, and Gor’kii (now Nizhnii Novgorod). Areas of interest investigated by Soviet sexopathology included birth defects or hormonal
disorders inhibiting sexual function; psychotherapy for sexual disorders; the detection of sodomy in men for police investigations; hermaphroditism and medical interventions to manage it; and, later in the 1970s-80s, sex changes for transsexuals. Psychotherapy, itself enjoying a modest post-Stalin expansion, and a proliferation of approaches and methods including ‘autosuggestion’ and ‘autogenic training’, contributed to the therapeutic arsenal of sexopathology when dealing with sexual dysfunction and homosexuals who sought cures. A handful of comparatively sympathetic psychiatrist sexopathologists used talking cures to ‘treat’ male homosexuality in the 1960s-70s, despite the fact that ‘sodomy’ remained a crime in the USSR.

Cures for female homosexuality were touted too. Sexopathologists sought to bring the queer patient to a ‘sexual-psychological vacuum’ by hypnosis and ‘rational’ suggestion techniques and (for some) by using desire-deadening drugs, and then to develop feelings in the patient for the opposite sex via ‘autogenic training’ and even group therapy. Only in the late 1980s could some therapists envision social adjustment without attempting to undermine the patient’s sexuality. A noteworthy Leningrad psychologist-sexologist, Dmitry Isaev, studied male homosexuality and treated gay men suffering from psychological problems sympathetically. Psychotherapists also promoted ‘sexual hygiene’ for workers in extreme situations; one site of research and experimentation with lectures and one-to-one counselling was the Soviet fishing fleet, where mostly-male staff were on six-month tours of duty with limited contact with the opposite sex. While research remains to be done on regional sexopathologists and their practice, it is clear that resources were limited to large cities, and that, whether deliberately or as a convenient result of funding limits, European Soviet citizens were the principal beneficiaries of the new sexology. Sexopathology was evidently intended to improve marital relations, reduce divorce rates and raise childbirth rates in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, where its institutional bases were concentrated.

Sociological work on marriage and sexual life also revived after Stalin’s death. Similar academic restrictions applied to its output as to sexopathology. A significant body of questionnaire-led research studied sexual activity among urban Russians, focused on citizens’ decisions to initiate
a sex life, get married, raise a family and seek divorce. Conducting the research was difficult within a hostile and suspicious academic environment, according to practitioners.\textsuperscript{78} Related work on demography seems to have been easier to organise and report on. (Meanwhile, a separate silo of sociologists employed in housing design institutes conceptualised family configurations and housing need.\textsuperscript{79}) Demographers and sociologists of marriage alike noted trends in Russia and Ukraine that disturbed the dominant national groups in the Soviet elite. Sex was happening earlier, marriage was coming later in life after a shorter courtship, and divorce was rising rapidly even before legal relaxation in 1966. The fertility of Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian women was dropping below replacement level, while Central Asian (Muslim nationalities such as Kazakh and Uzbek) birth rates were rising dramatically. Soviet demographers in the 1960s anticipated a situation by the end of the twentieth century in which the labour needs of European Russia would have to be met by migrants from Central Asia; today they are indeed met this way.\textsuperscript{80} There was obvious concern in sociologists’ research programmes and methods about the decline of traditional constraints on intimacy and about the stabilisation of the European family inside the Soviet ‘family of nations’. Sociologists worried explicitly about the improvement of the ‘quality’ of births among Central Asians, by which was meant improving education and training opportunities to catch up with rising demand; and also encouraging intermarriage with Russians and Ukrainians, believed to have a ‘modernising’ impact.\textsuperscript{81} Despite the ideological aspiration for more mixed marriages between diverse national groups – and more mixed offspring that would adopt ‘all-Union’ outlooks – Soviet experts witnessed hardening endogamy in southern and eastern nationalities. The Soviet sociology of marriage was not always overtly ‘sexological’ in focus, but its anxieties about reproductive behaviour illustrated the tension between socialist ‘internationalism’ and the realities of persistent ethnic hierarchies and the consolidation of nationalities.\textsuperscript{82}

Late-Soviet forensic doctors continued to research the onset of sexual maturity since it remained a legal concept to the end of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{83} New guidelines adopted in 1966 gave doctors greater authority in sex-crime investigations where minors were examined for their sexual
maturity, which remained the threshold for legal sexual activity. Some forensic doctors conducted large-scale anthropometric studies of ethnically distinct populations, comparing, for example, Karelian or Armenian girls’ maturation against that of Leningrad schoolgirls. Improvement in diet and living conditions were judged to have brought about convergence in the onset of ‘sexual maturity’: the Soviet Union’s diverse peoples were, by this sexological measure, becoming more like the implicit European-Russian baseline.

Conclusions

What does thinking about Soviet sexology through the lens of communist approaches to ‘race, ethnicity, and nationality’ reveal about the Soviet sexual sciences and their place in Soviet politics? Sexology’s development in early Bolshevik Russia reflected both the modernising optimism of the ‘sexual revolution’ and its limits based on the pre-revolutionary inheritance and Russia’s ‘semi-peripheral’ relationship with the European ‘core’ where sexology was developed. From an emergent science directed primarily at the affluent in tsarist Russia, early Soviet sexology firmly turned its attention to the working class. The New Soviet Man and Woman would be forged from this demographic: Russia would ‘colonise itself’. Batkis’s social hygienists tallied up sexual acts and impulses, and apparently ‘found’ a proletariat gradually learning to channel its sexual appetites for the good of the collective. Workers were the baseline when measuring ‘sexual maturity’ and managing sexual ‘anomalies’ like homosexuality or transgender individuals. At the same time workers could display ‘wild sexuality’ and needed discipline – and the party, as well as sexologically informed experts, consistently recommended sublimation, labour and education. Beyond the factories of European Russia and Ukraine, the picture was more challenging. ‘Primitive sexual life’ was never far beneath the surface in the Russian and Ukrainian countryside – peasants needed Soviet sexual ‘enlightenment’, but transformation would be a long process. The dilemma for Batkis and his bureau of sexology was that by the dawn of the 1930s, counting and describing the ‘sexual budgets’ of
workers had become superfluous. Stalin’s Great Break would radically transform the ‘economic base’, and superstructural phenomena like sexual life would follow spontaneously into natural grooves laid down by the party.

Elsewhere across the Soviet Union, the gaze of early sex researchers examined non-Russians and non-Ukrainians and found undesirable ‘survivals of primitive custom’ in sexual life. Such judgements expressed in policy and research were products of Marxist readings of European anthropology, applied in local context. It mattered little that the original anthropological insights, applied in sexology, were gathered from Europe’s overseas colonies. Bolshevik encounters with the peripheral Other in their land empire were frequently mediated by the tension between christian Europeans and muslim Asians, a relationship inherited from Imperial Russia and one which communists struggled to decolonise through secularisation, affirmative action policies and promotion of indigenous cadres. Communist aspirations for Central Asia and other peripheries involved ‘modernising’ agendas in educating indigenous nationalities, industrialisation of outlying regions, and raising the status of women. Later marriage, freely chosen by women rather than arranged by families, was a critical prescription for modernisation; also promoted for their ‘modernising’ effect, in the post-war period, were interethnic marriages between Central Asian men and Russian or Ukrainian women. And yet endogamy prevailed among non-Russian nationalities as they gained in confidence and viewed Russia’s ‘elder brother’ role with mistrust; in the early 1970s educated Muslim Tatars expressed greater disapproval of interethnic marriage with Russians than less educated fellow Tatars. Central Asian women experienced comparatively little Soviet-style emancipation in their marital lives, as Anna Temkina’s study comparing women’s sexual lives in Russia, Armenia, and Central Asia reveals.

Being situated on the ‘semi-periphery’ of sexological knowledge development compelled Soviet researchers to look both ways: westward to the European and American ‘core’ countries, and eastward to the Soviet internal orient. Sexologists had to filter Western knowledge and align it with communist ideological narratives. Perhaps this translational habit was most evident for sexologists studying homosexuality in
the early Soviet years, which seemed to be a medical issue in European Soviet cities but a socio-cultural and thus political problem on the Soviet peripheries. Later in the Soviet era similar translation work was evident in sex-relevant research into sexual dysfunction, psychotherapy for male and female homosexuality, and the sociology of marriage and family reproduction. Even work from fraternal socialist countries had to be ‘translated’ for Soviet use, and much of Central and East European sexology, with its psychological depth and appreciation of pleasure, was impossible to transfer to the Soviet context. In their position on the ‘semi-periphery’, Soviet sexologists and researchers handled problematic knowledge that had to be sifted for what it could offer to the project of communist modernisation with its notes of internal colonisation.

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Notes


8 For a mapping of the German field see Susan Gross Solomon, ‘Soviet Social Hygienists and Sexology after the Revolution: Dynamics of “Capture” at Home and Abroad’, *Ab Imperio*, 4, 2014, pp109-12.

9 See, e.g., Laura Engelstein, *The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search*

10 Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness, says almost nothing about churchmen’s contributions to debates on sex; the ‘holy man’ Rasputin was iconic for his sermonising and promiscuity, and not alone as a late-Imperial celebrity preacher; see Boris Kolonitskii, “Tragicheskaia Erotika”: Obrazy imperatorskoi sem’i v gody Pervoi Mirovoi voiny, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moscow 2010.


24 ‘For much of the 1920s, foreign sexologists took from Soviet work what they needed for their own purposes.’ Solomon, ‘Soviet Social Hygienists and Sexology after the Revolution’, p126.


27 There is already a colonial relationship in the Russian/Ukrainian dyad, of course; it is hard to analyse the relationship because the actual discussion of differences between them in the sexological records available is so limited. A thorough history of Soviet Ukrainian sexology is needed.

28 Solomon, ‘Soviet Social Hygienists and Sexology’, pp112-14; 125.


34 Jeff Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923*, Indiana
Sexology and the national Other in the Soviet Union


35 Naiman, *Sex in Public*; Carleton, *Sexual Revolution in Bolshevik Russia*.


39 Ibid, pp48-49.


45 Hirsch, ‘Race without the Practice of Racial Politics’.


49 Among the ‘utopians’ was Batkis, who expressed this perspective in...


Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia*, pp159-62.


The first was by a psychiatrist, the second by a classicist; Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia*, p171.


Field, *Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia*;


66 Kon’s landmark popularising book was *Vvedenie k seksologiiu*, Meditsina, Moscow 1988.


69 On these demographic trends and Soviet expert anxieties see Dan Healey, ‘The Sexual Revolution in the USSR: Dynamic Change

70 Kon, *Seksual'naia kul'tura v Rossii*, pp171-95; for continuities see Rustam Alexander, ‘Homosexuality in the USSR (1956-82)’, PhD, University of Melbourne, 2018, pp81-84; for the 1920s, when psychiatry was just one of many medical disciplines interested in sexology, see Bernstein, *The Dictatorship of Sex*, pp66, 73-99.


74 Alexander, ‘Homosexuality in the USSR (1956-82)’, pp154; 160.


77 This work is discussed in Healey, ‘The Sexual Revolution in the USSR’.


81 Kon, *Seksual'naia kul'tura v Rossii*, pp174-77; A.G. Kharchev, and M.S. Matskovskii, *Sovremennaia sem’ia i ee problemy: sotsial’no-demo-
82 Edgar, ‘Marriage, modernity, and the “friendship of nations”’, pp585-86, 596.  
84 The new guidelines let doctors determine ‘sexual maturity’ physiologically, excising ideologised social criteria imposed on them in the 1930s; see Healey, ‘Defining Sexual Maturity’, p124.  
87 Edgar, ‘Marriage, modernity, and the “friendship of nations”’, p591.  